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Abstract 
On the eve of World War One the Huon felt itself to be on the 
threshold of a bright and prosperous future. The recent rapid increase in 
the export of its apples and timber had led the region's "boosters" to 
believe that the long, dark night of the 1890s depression was at an end. 
Such new found vitalism was soon translated into plans for the 
construction of a rail link to Hobart, an overseas wharf at Port Huon, the 
dredging of the Huon River to Franklin and the development of a diverse 
range of industries for the area. 
Such hopes were soon dashed by the European conflict of 1914-1918. 
Despite, perhaps because of, the Huon's remoteness, the region soon 
suffered the full effects of war; its overdependence on the export of 
apples and timber rendering it peculiarly vulnerable to any change in the 
international marketplace. As a consequence the Huon soon found itself 
a community under siege, held bondage in the grip of profound anxiety. 
Such tension was reflected in the region's bitter debates over 
conscription and recruitment; in the growing conflict between the 
worker and his employer; in the Huon's growing sense of isolation from 
main-stream political decision making and in the death of any pre-war 
optimism. 
The first chapter of this thesis outlines the Huon's pre-war aspirations, 
describes the area's first reactions to the outbreak of World War One 
and notes the immediate effects of such conflict upon so fragile an 
economy. 
Chapter two details the Tasmanian Government's first tentative steps 
towards a soldier settlement scheme and describes the Huon's less than 
favourable reaction to such plans. 
Chapter three outlines the increasingly disastrous effect of the war 
upon the Huon; points to the growing divide between the area's self-
declared loyalists and their predominantly unionist antagonists; notes 
the effect of such division in the 1916 referendum on conscription and 
details parliamentary debate over the passage of the Soldier Settlement 
Act of 1916. 
Chapter four gives an account of the growing despondency that 
overwhelmed the Huon as the war continued, such despondency clearly 
evidenced by the near total collapse of the fruit industry in 1918 and the 
(VI I I ) 
hardening of the area's attitude to the war as evidenced by the size of the 
"no' vote in the conscription referendum of 1917. All hope was though 
not entirely lost and war's end brought renewed expectations of a 
prosperous future, though first experiences of resettlement gave pause 
to such hopes. 
Chapter five outlines the Huon's fate in those unsettled years of the 
early 1920s. It was a period of great tension as orchardists sought to 
reestablish markets; as unemployment rose dramatically; as Ireland's 
problems saw reflection in the growth of Catholic antagonism towards 
the British Empire and as unionists sought better pay and working 
conditions. Such was the depth of despond that many left the Huon to 
seek employment elsewhere. 
Chapter six details the mechanics of resettlement in the Huon, a 
process that doubtless typified wider Tasmanian experience, then 
explores the impact of resettlement upon state politics, suggesting the 
Labour Party's rise to power in 1923 to be largely the consequence of 
Nationalist party indecision, perhaps intransigence, towards the 
continued and ever deepening financial crisis posed by resettlement. 
Chapter seven recounts the experiences of those soldiers who resettled 
in the Huon and evidences the Closer Settlement Board's varied 
attempts at overcoming those settlers' difficulties. 
Chapter eight details both the background and findings of the 
Tasmanian Government's 1926 Royal Commission into soldier 
settlement, a minor study of the politics of the pragmatic. 
Chapter nine discusses the final stage in the repatriation of the Huon's 
soldier settlers, Justice Herbert Pike's Federal enquiry into resettlement 
and considers factors which likely led to successful resettlement. 
( I X ) 
Introduction. 
The following work presents a picture of near unrelieved depression. 
It is a tale of contrasts wherein the pre-war hopes of a small rural 
community and its soldier settlers meet the harsh reality of a post-war 
Tasmania. The bitterness of those post-war years was perhaps nowhere 
else more clearly exemplified than in the experiences of those soldiers 
who chose to resettle on orchards in the Huon at the end of the war: their 
experiences undoubtedly marking an extension rather than a cessation of 
war-time traumas. As such its telling presents a microcosmic view of the 
more general Tasmanian experience of that time. 
When I began this thesis I had no intention of writing about soldier 
settlers in Tasmania following the Great War. I had instead intended to 
write of the Huon - under the loose title "From War to Depression." But 
as I began my research I found myself increasingly drawn towards some 
study of those men who had taken up properties in the area at the end of 
the war. Such a decision, while initially offering the happy convergence 
of two interests, soon posed serious structural problems for my thesis. 
On the one hand a study of the Huon between 1914-1929 offered useful 
contextual material for my soldier settlers: on the other hand the 
parameters of the study were too limiting to allow of a more detailed 
analysis of soldier settlers on a state-wide political and economic basis. 
The latter analysis was of course necessary if I was to place my settlers in 
some realistic perspective. My happy convergence of interests soon 
dissolved in the face of such wider considerations. 
The dilemma now was how coherently and fluently to tell the tale of 
the Huon and its soldier settlers against the larger backdrop of the 
State's resettlement scheme and its political and economic 
consequences. I must concede that I have found it a dilemma, incapable 
of full resolution. That I had necessarily to continually shift my focus 
from issue of local Huon interest to matters of more state-wide 
relevance caused only great concern; nearly all of my attempts at 
incorporating both subject matters in the same chapters produced only 
confusion. Better, I considered, to treat specific issues as near seperate 
entities - the telling of their stories in parallel hopefully producing a 
useful contrast of localised hopes and concerns against the larger context 
within which these hopes and concerns had to be judged. When it came 
to the necessary study of the workings of the Tasmanian soldier 
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settlement scheme I was left with little choice but to leave the Huon. 
Such digression was necessary if the experience of the Huon's settlers 
was to be fully understood. Such was also the case with Tasmania's 
Royal Commission and Justice Pike's Federal inquiry into soldier 
settlement. While the above explanation may not justify complete 
exoneration for my decisions it at least, I hope, offers some justification 
worthy of consideration. 
The study of soldier settlement has received recent impetus from the 
publication of Lake's Limits of Hope; the mixed reviews the work 
attracted a warning to any one toiling in the field. While there is general 
agreement upon the historical background surrounding the 
establishment of soldier settlement at the Federal level there is wide-
spread disagreement over its implementation within the various states 
and even as to limited groups - or even individuals. This disagreement 
extends to matters such as: the correct methodology to adopt in 
approaching soldier settlement files, the adequacy or otherwise of 
various sampling procedures, the correct appraisal of Australia's varied 
soldier settlement schemes, the significance of the "yeoman myth" and 
the scientific developments in farming in the 1920s and to the correct 
analysis of contemporary comment upon the soldier settlers themselves. 
Even discussion of the success or "failure" of individual settlers is 
sufficient to provoke argument. My research has shown such issues to 
pose deep, near intractable difficulties, for any would be student of 
soldier settlement. The temptation to generalize upon the experiences 
of individual settlers must needs be always tempered by the knowledge 
that one is, after all, studying a group as diverse as any one would find 
within the average community. 
Perhaps the only way adequately to understand these settlers is to 
study them in their localized contexts: the task I have set myself. In this 
sense my work comes closest to that of L. M. Key's chapter on Closer 
Settlement in Neil Gunson's The Good Country: Cranbourne 
Shirel, another story of soldier settlement in a local context. The 
present work makes no attempt to emulate Lake's state-wide approach. 
As with Key's study mine attempts to provide only a specific slice of the 
larger experience of soldier settlement - that being the unique 
experiences of the men who took up properties in the Huon. 
1 Gunson,N. (Ed). The Good Country: Cranbourne Shire, Melbourne: F. W. Cheshire, 1968. 
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The uniqueness of those soldiers who returned to the Huon essentially 
stems from their common background and choice of properties. All but a 
few returned to the very place from which they had enlisted. As such 
their knowledge of local conditions was extensive. That they all chose to 
purchase ready made properties, often from parents or other close 
family members, also set them apart from the general run of Tasmanian 
settlers. They all took up orcharding and had all to confront extremely 
difficult times in the management of their properties. Their consequent 
high departure rate (73%), already higher than the state average of 
61% 2 , was significantly higher than the rate of departures in other states. 
This clearly set them apart from the experiences of most. 
But the specificity of the study, as with Key's, does not preclude 
matters of larger moment. Indeed, it allows for some testing of those 
larger questions that surround the study of soldier settlement: in this 
case the work of J. M. Powell. 3 It allows for a localised study of 
factors which may have determined a settler's success or departure: his 
background and experience, age, marital status, war-related injuries, 
access to capital, choice of property and the importance of family 
networks of assistance. While this work provides some data in response 
to Powell's call for more statistical information 4 , I must admit to certain 
reservations as to the value of such information. Reliable statistics are 
often difficult to come by. Any adequate determination of a settler's 
capital provides a simple case in point here. But a further reservation 
must lie in the fact that statistics too easily disguise the specific and 
determining experiences of the settlers. The one notable exception to 
the above would lie in the need for a much more detailed study of the 
role of illness among the settlers as I believe, along with Powell, that this 
would expose an important factor that caused the departure of many 
settlers. 
My study also allows for some test of what Powell has emphasized as 
the "eight major characteristics of what was generally dubbed the 
"failure" of soldier settlers in Australia." 5 drawn from various 
2  Figures derived from Pike's report: Losses Due To Soldier Settlement. C. P. P., Vol 2, 1929. Paper No. 46. 
3  I have drawn upon various works by Powell, listed in my bibliography. 
4  J. M. Powell, "The Debt of Honour: Soldier Settlement in the Dominions, 1915-1940", Journal of 
Australian Studies No 8, June 1981, pp 64-87. 
5 ibid., pp 65-71. 
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government reports of that time. Such failure was officially blamed 
upon: falling prices for farm produce, the high costs of plant and 
equipment, the burden of capital debt, the often innapropriate purchase 
of properties, the settlers' lack of a viable living area, the faulty manner 
in which settlers were selected, the near intractable difficulties 
surrounding Commonwealth-State relations and the very nature of the 
schemes under which the settlers languished. To a greater or lesser 
degree all of the above played their part in the departure of my settlers. 
But all such connections were ultimately related to the area to which my 
settlers returned, to the peculiar emphasis that the area placed upon 
orcharding and to the difficulties the area faced during the immediate 
post-war years. In turn those difficulties reflected the larger problems 
faced by Tasmania at this time. 
The Huon, to which the soldiers returned at the end of the war, lies 
some thirty miles south of Hobart, Tasmania's capital. Consistent 
european settlement did not occur in this area until the late 1830s - a 
comparatively late date considering the region's proximity to Hobart. 
The mountainous barrier of the Wellington ranges, the density of the 
Huon's forests and its seeming lack of readily available arable land 
ensured such a delayed process of development. 
The region's early economic mainstay of timber, an activity which 
readily attracted the transient yet hardy settler, only served to reinforce 
the area's relative isolation. As if these economic and geographic 
factors were not of themselves sufficient factors of isolation from the 
rest of the state then the area's wide-spread convict base ensured its 
social separateness in the late 1840s, the very time when the anti-
transportation movement was growing from strength to strength 
elsewhere. Of course the late development of the area necessitated such 
a presence - a cheap, if sometimes less than ideal, source of labour. But 
this convict presence cast its shadow over the region, adding further to 
its sense of isolation. Fellow Tasmanians soon came to regard the 
inhabitants of the Huon as a race apart - as indeed did many of its early 
settlers. 
The Victorian gold-rush gave an enormous economic boost to the 
Huon; its timber widely used in Victoria's mines and Melbourne's 
burgeoning suburbs and docks. It was a short lived boom. At its end the 
Huon settled down to quiet penury. The Depression of the 1890s 
ensured such economic desperation would continue. 
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But hope at last arrived for the Huon in the form of "black spot". As 
this disease made survival increasingly difficult for northern orchardists 
the focus of the state's apple industry inexorably shifted southward. By 
the 1890s the Huon offered, albeit briefly, the final refuge from such a 
crippling disease. 6 Consequently orcharding emerged as the 
predominant economic pursuit of many in the Huon. The apple industry 
breathed new life into the area, the early 1900s witness to a new found 
vitalism, a vitalism directly matched to the rapidly growing size of the 
region's apple expoits. Such was the nature of this new found vitalism 
that the Huon, at the onset of war in 1914, believed itself to be on the 
threshold of an era of unlimited prosperity. Local "boosters pushed for 
such developments as a rail link to Hobart, the construction of an 
overseas wharf at Port Huon and the dredging of the Huon River to 
Franklin. There soon emerged the not unusual belief that the area's 
growing prosperity underpinned that of Hobart's. The Hobart fruit 
canneries and pulping plants were largely reliant upon the Huon's 
successful orcharding, the port of Hobart only truely alive during the 
apple season. Indeed, many in the Huon soon came to view Hobart as a 
parasite, feeding off the area's good fortunes and hard labours. But the 
conflict in Europe signalled an end to such hopes, an end that forms the 
basis of the following thesis. It was a passing made more bitter by the 
experiences of those who returned after having offered themselves in the 
name of Empire, an Empire that offered precious little to those who had 
served in its name. 
6  Goodhand, W. E., "Pome fruit Orcharding in Tasmania: Its evolution and Present Geographical Basis", 
unpublished M. A. dissertation, University of Tasmania, 1960. 
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Regional Aspirations: Cherished in Peace, Threatened by 
War. 
In 1914 some eleven thousand people lived in the Huon. Though it lay 
only thirty miles south of the capital city of Hobart the area felt itself to 
be isolated from and neglected by the rest of Tasmania. Although a 
reasonable road link had been established to Hobart in 1855 the main 
link to Hobart in 1914 was, as it had been for many years, by water. As in 
other rural areas of the time such government services as health and 
education were rudimentary. Those seriously ill or in need of a 
reasonably good standard of education were forced to find their way to 
Hobart. 
From the middle of the nineteenth century the Huon's economy had 
primarily depended upon its orchards and plentiful timber resources. 
Consequently the region's economic base was extremely fragile. This 
fragility was exacerbated by the fact that most of the area's produce was 
exported to either mainland or oVA:c.:ge as markets so international events 
impacted heavily upon the Huon. 
Towards the end of the nineteenth century attempts had been made to 
diversify the Huon's limited economic base. Attempts had been made to 
mine gold at Cygnet and a coal mine had been established at Catamaran. 
Neither had proved a success. There was the widespread belief that the 
rivers and hills to the west of the area held as yet vast untapped 
resources. 
Before the war many in the Huon believed that given the right 
economic developments the region might come to rival the capital city of 
Hobart itself. There were some who believed Hobart's economic 
position was primarily due to the support it received from the Huon. J. 
D. Balfe, an early booster and Franklin member of the House of 
Assembly, claimed that but for the Huon "grass would be growing in the 
streets of Hobart". 1 
This widely held feeling that Hobart was dependent for its success 
upon the Huon led some to believe that the area was being retarded by 
certain, unspecified but malicious interests, based in Hobart. At times 
this feeling was to verge on paranoia. For the Huon to expand its 
economic base the government would have to provide what the Huon 
1 Daily Pon, October 16 1912. 
2 
helie%ed to he the four pillars of development: a railway link to Hobart. 
the development of a deepwater port at Geeveston. the dredging of the 
Huon River to Franklin and the reclamation of its swampy foreshore. 
Despite the war the Huon was to agitate long and hard for all four 
developments. 
The construction of a railway had been first proposed in 1885 when a 
petition containing over one thousand names was presented to 
Parliament by J. Watchorn, Franklin member of the Legislative Council. 
The government ordered a select committee to investigate the proposal. 
The committee met in 1886, gathered evidence and initiated a somewhat 
cursory survey of a possible route but decided that no recommendations 
could he made until further investigations had taken placc i. A There the 
matter was allowed to rest. Continued agitation led to the establishment 
of another committee in 19 lelt too recommended greater study before 
the government should commit the large amount of money needed to 
fund such development. The main difficulty was that neither committee 
was convinced a rail link would return a profit that compensated the cost 
of development. 
Of course the proponents of the rail link were more than convinced the 
line would pay its way. They argued that the railway would open up a new 
timber resource, on its own sufficient to justify the expense. The 
potential exploitation of large scale mineral deposits would prove an 
added bonus. Orchardists saw the link as a means by which they could 
reduce the harmful handling and added charges their fruit received on 
its way to Hobart by sea. Evidence was also presented that the rail link 
would carry some 13 000 to 14 000 thousand tourists a year to the area. 
How, argued the railway's proponents, could the government lose, given 
the enormous benefits to be realised all round. 
In 1912 yet another deputation met with the Premier, A. E. Solomon, 
the Minister for Lands and Works. E. Mulcahy, and the Chief Secretary 
G. H. Butler. The recent development of the State's Hydro Electric 
scheme offered a new and potentially exciting alternative. All previous 
submissions had in mind the use of a steam train but now there was the 
possibility of a cheaper and more efficient electric system. Unlike the 
steam train, the electric train would be able to stop and start over short 
distances so every orchard would have its own railway siding. The 
transport of fruit would be immeasurably more efficient. 
3 
The deputation again stressed the Huon's right to such 
development. The Hon. G. P. Fitzgerald claimed that "it was to the 
Huon district alone that Tasmania owed its present position, and its 
being, outside political matters, in a prosperous condition. There was no 
capital city which had a population near it as large as there was in the 
Huon which was without a railway communication thereto." 2 Solomon 
informed the deputation his government was keeping an open mind in 
the matter but warned the state's present financial problems imposed 
severe restrictions on all development. He reminded the deputation that 
all previous investigations of a rail link had been unable to guarantee its 
economic viability. 
The Huon's demand for a deepwater port at Geeveston had continually 
perplexed successive governments. In their view the demand for both a 
rail and sea link seemed contradictory. There was no such contradiction 
in the minds of the Huon's boosters. The orchardists believed such 
developments offered freedom from the clutches of the Hobart shippers 
and the promise of higher returns on their fruit. A rail link saved on 
handling: the port offered direct access to overseas markets. Moreover 
the primary impetus for the port had not come from the orchardists but 
from the timber industry. It was widely believed that this industry had 
never achieved its full potential due to a lack of adequate ports. In 1914 
timber shipments at Dover and Southport were still loaded by lighters 
which ferried cargo to boats anchored in the bay. 
Despite repeated meetings with Government delegations a wharf at 
Geeveston seemed no closer in 1914 than at any other time. As with the 
railway the expected cost proved the main difficulty. Perhaps of equal 
significance was the widely held belief that the government's decision 
had been influenced by powerful Hobart interest groups. Hobart 
shipping firms and the Marine Board came in for a great deal of criticism 
in this context. 
Since the beginning of settlement Franklin had always been 
regarded as the area's "capital." With steep hills at its back and a 
swampy foreshore it had proved a poor site for that role. These physical 
impediments placed severe limitations on expansion. What growth there 
had been was strung out along the banks of the Huon River 
but its frequent flooding and silting, and the shifting sandbanks this 
2 ibid. 
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produced. made access to the town by boat hazardous and difficult. 
Dredging the river to Franklin meant a safer passage for boats and a 
reclaimed foreshore offered valuable land for expansion. In early 1914 
the government reluctantly gave approval for the work to begin. It was 
soon obvious that the dredge used to carry out the work was inadequate 
to the task. For this reason work on the project ceased. Before a new 
dredge could be deployed to the site, war had begun. 
Franklin Township: First "Capital" of the Huon. 
Tourism was the last of the Huon's hopes for development. From the 
late nineteenth century the area's good beaches, pleasant climate and 
scenic attractions had proved popular to both Tasmanian and mainland 
visitors The small fishing village of Dover and the forests of the Arve 
Valley held particular promise. There was no doubt in the minds of most 
that if a regular rail link and a suitable port were developed this 
fledgling industry would provide a substantial economic boost to the 
region. In early 1914 the Huon believed itself to be on the threshold of 
what would prove to be a confident and prosperous future. It at last 
seemed possible that the area's economic overdependence on the ever 
vulnerable export of apples and timber might be overcome, replaced 
with a more diversified economic base. Indeed, local boosters argued 
that a little government assistance would see the Huon's emergence as 
5 
an economic power house for the state. But the advent of war in Europe 
would sorely test such hopes and crystalise those very fears which had 
long motivated the boosters' dreams. 
Such fears were readily reflected in the Huon Times's early reportage 
of the war. No concentration here on patriotic fervour, so favoured by 
most Tasmanian papers. Instead there was a clinical reportage of the 
economic consequences of the war. The Huon Times reported the 
Australian Stock Exchange to be one of the first casualties of the war, 
noting that "mining stocks alone have receded in value over one million 
pounds."3 A week later the paper nervously reported that large trade 
the Huon had so long enjoyed with Germany to be at an end. There 
would be few in the Huon unaware of the threat this posed to the area's 
viability. So totally reliant on the export of timber and apples for its 
income the Huon was probably more vulnerable than any other 
community in Tasmania. 
The danger that the war posed became apparent in discussions within 
local councils. On August 6 the Cygnet Council passed a resolution 
supporting the Imperial Government and pledging loyalty to Empire. In 
so doing the Council expressed the belief that "by growing all the 
foodstuffs they can (they) will he assisting the Empire as much as by 
placing men in the field." 4 Two days later the Huon Council moved a 
similar vote of loyalty. The Huon Times noted that some councillors 
expressed a concern that the war had its origins in trade rather than high 
moral issues. Tempered enthusiasm or not, the Huon soon found itself 
directly involved in the war. 
On the evening of August 5 the calm of the area was disturbed by 
the appearance of a naval force under the command of Lieutenant 
Russel Young. The presence of such a military force immediately 
inspired a succession of rumours. Some believed the Germans to have 
attempted a landing at the mouth of the Huon River; others felt the 
naval force had been sent to defend the small town of Catamaran. It 
soon transpired that the sailors had been ordered to the Huon to effect 
the arrest of a hapless German steamer, the Oberhaussen, then loading 
4A 
timber at Port Huon. The naval party reached the Oberhaussen at 7.30 
3 Hutu/ Times. August 1 1914. 
4 ibid.. August 8 1914. 
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and promptly commandeered the ship. The following day she sailed for 
Hobart where the crew were interned at Claremont Camp until their 
removal to the quarantine station at Bruny Island. 
Within 48 hours of the Oberhaussen's capture the first men to 
enlist from the Huon boarded the steamer Endeavour and made the 
short journey to the newly established army camp at the Sandy Bay golf 
course. A noisy crowd of three to four hundred gathered at Cygnet to 
farewell these men, the first of many to leave the Huon. 
Like the rest of Tasmania the Huon rushed to organise funds in 
aid of the war effort. A concert was held at the Franklin Town Hall to 
raise money for the Hobart Patriotic Fund. At Castle Forbes Bay a 
series of euchre nights were held. There was general dismay when on the 
first night it was discovered that the shaving kit offered as first prize had 
been made in Germany. The Franklin branch of the Druids passed a 
resolution conferring full membership on any of its members who 
travelled overseas with the Australian Imperial Force. 
By the middle of Augug--.:, the Huon Times reported what all had 
feared since the outbreak of war some two weeks earlier: the rumour 
that the Esperance mills would have to close due to the sudden 
downturn in trade. By the beginning of September there was further 
cause for alarm when newspaper reports commented on the possible 
collapse of the orcharding industry. On September 5 the Huon Times 
remarked on the difficult times that lay ahead for the area. The article 
pointed out that unlike other parts of Tasmania, such as the mining 
communities of the west coast, orchardists could not simply leave their 
holdings. Mines could close down and wait for the end of the war to 
reopen but orchards required constant care and attention. If left for 
even a relatively short period of time they would quickly deteriorate. 
Worse still, as most orchardists depended on the export earnings from 
one year to finance the following year's crop, to lose the export market 
for that year alone might mean the complete loss of the orchards. 
In early October 1914 the timber mills at Stanmore, Catamaran and 
Raminea burned down. By the end of October the Hopetown and Cockle 
Creek mills had been forced to close. A great proportion of the Cockle 
Creek railway track had been destroyed by fire. Due to the downturn in 
trade the Raminea mill was soon forced to shed some 50% of its workers. 
Such downturn was impressive. The number of men employed in the 
4B 
timber industry dropped from 1 846 in 1 .912 to 1 384 in 1915. Sawn 
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timber production fell from 63 242 859 feet to 47 889 991 over the 
corresponding period. 5 There were urgent calls for the government to 
do something to ease the burden of growing unemployment in the area. 
The Iluon Times described the situation as one of special need and 
suggested the government's apparent reluctance to help was yet another 
example of that neglect with which the Huon had for so long been 
treated. 
The closures proved a double blow. Many of the men who worked in 
the mills were also attempting to establish their own farms and orchards. 
The income derived from such jobs allowed them to develop their 
properties. If the government was either unable or unwilling to offer 
some kind of relief then they would be forced to leave their properties. 
As the Huon Times noted "the case of many of these men is particularly 
hard, inasmuch as while working at the mills they have been 
endeavouring to build up homes for themselves on small blocks they 
have selected, just as many of the stalwart pioneers of the district did 
before them." 6 By early November two hundred men were out of work at 
Dover. As they had been earning some 1,600 7a month the Huon 
Times warned that the loss of this income would soon see "a depression 
in all areas of local trade." 8 There were those, however, who believed 
the growing unemployment in Esperance to be the result of union 
interference rather than war time trade restrictions. In their view the 
war had merely been a precipitating factor. W. L. Clennett, owner of the 
Stanmore mill, claimed the present crisis had resulted from the 
"increasing burdens being placed upon sawmillers by the industrial 
organisations." 9 In the years immediately preceding the war attempts 
had been made to unionise timber workers around Geeveston and 
Dover. The Timber Workers union had been especially active in the 
area though it found the going difficult. Two early organisers had been 
W. A. Woods and David Dicker, both of whom were to become Labor 
Members of State parliament. In 1908 Woods managed to establish a 
small branch of the Timber Workers Union in Esperance. On his return 
5 T. J. P. P. Volume I.XXVII 1917 p289. 
6 fluor, Times, October 31 1914. 
7 ibid., November 4 1914. 
8 ibid. 
9 W. A. Woods to J. Sutch May 8 1908 NS 139/8/3. 
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to Hobart he wrote to J. Stitch of the Trades Hall in Melbourne, 
informing him that he had "just returned from a trip towards the South 
Pole where the sawmills are busy slicing blue gum logs and mill hands in 
a casual and indiscriminate way."" ) Woods made special note of the 
shyness he had found among those workers and found them to be wary of 
unions, believing such to be synonymous with the idea of "agitation". At 
Hastings, Woods was pleased he had been able to persuade twenty men 
to form a local branch. He also managed to enlist one "Tiger" Beresford 
to act as branch secretary. In his letter Woods passed the revealing 
comment that: 
Berseford showed some pluck in taking on the job - for the bosses 
are hostile and offending the bosses in those parts is akin to the 
offending of God - in the eyes of the local men. That's the 
tradition and though the mills hands have nothing to lose but their 
servitude and a few (very few) remaining fingers and toes, the 
tradition is all powerful." 
Many of these mill towns had long been communities unto themselves 
and at the head of each stood the mill owner or manager - often a deeply 
religious Scot. The near patriarchal quality of many of these men 
entered local folklore. An early manager of the Strathblane mill had 
been particularly notorious. On one occasion he ordered his employees 
to pay for the construction of a local school, forcing them to enrol their 
children on pain of dismissal. Following a disagreement with the teacher 
he then threatened to sack any worker who allowed his child to attend 
the school. This same manager also banned dogs from the mill site and 
declared Sundays to be sacred. To own a dog or to hang out washing on 
the Sabbath brought instant dismissal. " A 
The omniscient owner and the dangerous work were but two of the 
notable features of mill life. There was another, more insidious factor, 
which left the worker locked into a semi-feudal state. This was the truck 
system of wages. The worker was Often paid in kind. What cash wages he 
did receive had usually, due to poor roads and the long hours of work, to 
be spent at the mill store. Mills generally provided workers with 
accommodation, though usually of a wretched kind. Houses were often 
poorly built and overcrowded, with little or no sanitation. Consequently 
1 ° ibid. 
11 Iluon Times, March 17 1915. 
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the worker's health often suffered and with professional help some 
distance away the mill owner regularly doubled as doctor or dentist. 
Diseases such as typhoid or scarlet fever were common. 
By early 1915 most of the mills in the Huon had closed. Mainland 
markets contracted significantly after shipping was reallocated to war 
time needs. Traditional European markets, especially that of Germany, 
closed to imported timber from Tasmania. A series of bushfires 
destroyed a number of mills and the downturn in trade slowed their 
rebuilding. By 1915 too most of the easily accessible stands of forest had 
been cut out and timber getters were now increasingly forced to travel 
longer distances to gain good timber. In this bleaker, war time economy, 
the expense of constructing tram lines and the cost of transportation 
precluded new development." 
In late March 1915 the Huon's economy suffered a second blow when 
the Federal Government announced it was to commandeer the fruit 
boats. The decision, reflecting the successful German submarine attacks 
on allied shipping, met an outrage directed not so much at the decision 
itself but at the way it had been made. Although it was the height of the 
apple season there had been no consultation with local orchardists. 
Indeed, two of the ships affected by the decision, the Clan Macarthur 
and the Euripides, had both been loading fruit in Hobart at the very time 
they had been commandeered. The loss of these two boats alone meant 
one quarter of the fruit destined for the English market would fail to 
reach its destination. Fruitgrowers would he forced to dispose of their 
fruit on an already oversupplied mainland market. 
Despite this setback, the news of German atrocities in Belgium 
produced revulsion similar to that felt nation wide. At Franklin money 
was raised for the relief of Belgium by way of weekly subscription. 
Esperance fundraisers collected £300 within a few weeks. The Huon 
Times referred to this quick response with pride. However, it noted that 
while people were happily prepared to raise money they were not so 
readily forthcoming when it came to enlistments and suggested that here 
the Huon "perhaps...needed stirring up". 12 
That "stirring up" came in July when Premier John Earle and the 
Leader of the Opposition, N. K. Ewing, visited the Huon to speak at ,a 
number of recruiting rallies. The Huon T imes was fulsome in its praise 
12 M. Lake, A Divided Society (Melbourne.1975) p.29. 
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of the bipartisan approach the two leaders had adopted. At Geeveston 
Earle and Ewing addressed four hundred people packed into the Town 
Hall. In his speech Earle warned that if Germany won the war then the 
present wage of eight shillings a week would drop to a mere four 
shillings. He urged all unmarried women not to become engaged to any 
man who showed himself unwilling to take his place at the front. Earle 
delivered the same message at Franklin, with the same disappointing 
result. The Geeveston rally only managed to attract twelve volunteers: 
seven of whom were rejected as being unfit for active service. The 
Franklin rally attracted fourteen volunteers: eight were rejected. 
Warden Ryan assured Earle such a poor showing was not the 
consequence of any disloyalty in the Huon, but rather reflected the haste 
with which men had been asked to make up their minds. Ryan promised 
there would be a noticeable improvement over the coming months. 
Others were less sanguine. The Tasmanian Mail was particularly 
severe in its indictment of the reluctant heroes of the Huon and warned 
menacingly that they were qualifyi, z, or the white feather." 13 This poor 
response no doubt alerted Earle to the potential difficulty of raising a 
volunteer army. Such experiences would eventually lead to his advocacy . 
of conscription. 
The most striking aspect of these Huon recruiting figures is the high 
rate of rejection. Thirty-eight of the 91 men who volunteered from the 
I3A 
area in July 1915 were rejected. It was a sad commentary on the general 
health of the Huon at that time and especially reflected the poor state of 
dental care and the danger of mill work. Wood's letter confirmed a 
missing finger or toe to be the common signature of mill work. By mid-
August a hundred "reluctant heroes" had enlisted from the Huon: forty of 
these were from Southport. The numbers though still proved 
disappointing and brought the loyalty of many into question. An angry 
Councillor Clennett told a meeting of the Esperance Council he had 
heard one young man state publicly he would rather be a live coward 
than a dead hero. 14 
On the fourth of August the Huon took time off to celebrate the end of 
the first year of the war. Throughout the region businesses closed for an 
hour between eleven and twelve o'clock. Church services were well 
13 Iluun Times, August 18 1915. 
14 ibid., August 7 1915. 
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attended as congregations were reminded of their ties to Empire, of the 
debt Australia owed to England and of the history-making efforts of the 
Australian forces at Gallipoli. The Anglican Minister, the Reverend 
Menzies, proudly told his congregation that "Australia was the youngest 
nation, but the heroism displayed by her soldiers at Gallipoli (had) made 
her rise to the height of the oldest nation." 15 There were soon moves to 
make April 25 the Australia Day holiday: in 1915 it had been held on July 
30. 
The first year of the war had not been auspicious for the fluon. The 
timber and orcharding industries were both under threat. 
Unemployment was rising. The economic cost of the war meant long 
yearned developments must needs be put on hold. The seeming slowness 
of enlistments had placed a question mark over the area's loyalty. There 
was though some sense of optimism. Following a successful Queen 
Carnival held to raise funds for the war effort the Huon Times was 
pleased to note that it afforded "further evidence that the disunity that 
has existed in the district in past years, is slowly but surely 
disappearing. " 16 Such comment seemed small compensation. 
15 ibid., September 15 1915. 
16 ibid . 
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Chapter Two. 
Towards a Soldier Settlement Scheme. 
In 1913 the Tasmanian Government of Liberal Premier A.E.Solomon 
passed a Closer Settlement Act designed to encourage settlers to take up 
land in the State's undeveloped or underdeveloped areas. Such 
legislation was not unique to Tasmania. Most Australian states had 
already passed similar legislation. These acts were indicative of the 
widespread concern then existing throughout Australia at the nation's 
falling birth rate and the increasing urbanisation of its population. It was 
feared that these two factors were sapping the lifeblood of the nation 
and that something had to be done to reverse this trend. Such fears were 
encapsulated in what came to be known as the "agrarian myth" the idea 
"that Australia's vast land resources could be utilised by small farmers 
who would produce a surplus for export to the United Kingdom and 
would also provide a market for British manufactured goods." 1 
The aim of Tasmania's Closer Settlement Act was to open up the 
state's virgin lands to rural settlement, to foster as yet untapped sources 
of agricultural wealth, cement links with Empire and develop a strong 
and healthy rural class. Such legislation clearly intended the 
development of a new or revitalised Australian character based on the 
"romantic or arcadian idea that farming represented an idealistic way of 
life because it was "close to nature" and was therefore in some way 
morally superior to urban life." 2 The settlement of Australia's as yet 
underutilised lands promised an added advantage. The anticipated 
increase in population would help offset the threat from those densely 
populated lands to the north. The agrarian myth reflected Australia's 
greater preoccupation with a white Australia. 
In the Huon the Closer Settlement Act was seen to be an appropriate 
response to the region's demands upon successive governments. It 
offered hope of a more secure future to the state's outlying districts. No 
longer would their needs be sacrificed to the demands of the larger cities 
such as Hobart. The Act neatly complemented Huon mythology. Many 
I K. Fry, "Soldier Settlement and the Agrarian Myth after the First World War," Labour History 48 (1985). 
p.29 
2 ibid., p.41. 
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in the lition still saw themselves to he firmly in the tradition of those 
early settlers who had carved out homes for themselves from a hostile 
and unforgiving wilderness. The names of those early settlers: men such 
as Geeves, Walton and Parsons, were spoken of in hallowed terms. The 
myth promised success to anyone who worked hard, was frugal and 
diligent. 
A Huotz Times editorial of 1915 claimed the area to be exactly of a 
type the Government had in mind when it passed the Closer Settlement 
Act: 
In no part of the Commonwealth can a more striking example of 
successful closer settlement be found than in the Huon. It is 
essentially a district of small holdings, many of which are of a 
surprisingly limited area. Moreover, it is a prosperous community, 
the best index to the individual prosperity of the settlers here 
being the fact that nowhere else can a district of the same extent 
be found wherein so many of the producers own the properties 
upon which they reside. All this can mean only one thing and that 
is that the district, by reason of its remarkable productiveness, is 
especially adapted for closer settlement. 3 
However the writer felt that in certain aspects the legislation proved 
faulty and suggested an immediate review by Parliament. The main 
concern centred on the Government's decision to create small farms 
from those large estates it intended purchasing in the north and the 
midlands. The Huotz Times argued that this policy would fail to 
provide the State with any long term benefits. Rather than dismember 
these large estates the paper urged the development of small holdings in 
appropriate areas - areas such as the Huon. The closer settlement of 
such areas would add substantially to the state's economic base and 
develop a thriving and vibrant rural population. 
The Earle government would have ben only too happy to use the Closer 
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Settlement Act to break up these large estates. It had long been Labor 
policy to curb the legislative power of these large landowners and 
release the tight grip they held over the State's productive lands. Such 
power and wealth had long been resented in Labor circles. Despite the 
political ramifications of the Closer Settlement Act there were some, 
influenced by the events in Europe, who saw the Act in a more altruistic 
3 Iluon Times, July 21 1915. 
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light. S. J. Kellaway suggested some of the closer settlement land in the 
Huon might be used to resettle refugees from Belgium. 4 A few days 
later the H11011 Times noted the Victorian Government's decision to 
give preference to returning soldiers when allocating land under its 
closer settlement scheme. 5 Implicit was the suggestion that Tasmania 
adopt a similar approach. 
The Federal Government had also begun to show interest in the issue 
of returning soldiers. On June 10 1915 Alexander Poynton, in the House 
of Representatives, asked Prime Minister Fisher what consideration had 
been given to the repatriation of returned soldiers. Poynton suggested 
Fisher "approach the various Premiers...with a view to an arrangement 
under which returned soldiers should have preference in connexion with 
land allotments dealt with by land boards." 6 Following Poynton's 
suggestion Fisher wrote to Earle on 17 June requesting information on 
the availability of land suitable for the settlement of returned soldiers. 7 
In late July Earle informed Fisher that there would be little difficulty in 
finding such land providing the men were experienced in farming. "I 
have no doubt," wrote Earle, "that the government can find suitable land 
in this state, either crown lands or a specially selected large estate and I 
am prepared to make the effort when the time arises." 8 It is clear from 
Earle's reply that he did not envision a scheme of any magnitude. 
In early August the Federal Government announced its intention to 
establish a Federal Parliamentary War Committee which would "liase 
between relevant departments, hospitals, Labor exchanges and 
employers in order to secure work for all men returning capable of it." 9 
By August 12 the committee had completed its report and presented it to 
Parliament. It outlined the first plans for the repatriation of returning 
4 ibid. 
5 ibid.. July 24 1915. 
6 Premiers Department (PD) 1/302/212/1/16, 17 June 1915. 
7 ibid. 
8 ibid.. 30 July 1915. 
9 M. Lake. The Limits of Ilope.(Melbourne. 1987). p.27. 
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soldiers. I° The committee was quick to warn that: 
The duty of the nation in respect to the employment and future 
welfare of Australian soldiers now fighting our battles is a matter 
which demands immediate and earnest consideration, with a view 
to bringing into being a properly organised body, representatiVe of 
all classes of the community, which may be prepared in good time 
for the immense task we will be confronted with soon of finding 
civil employment for returned soldiers. 11 
The committee suggested there was a need to co-ordinate those 
organisations which had previously been formed to raise money to assist 
returning soldiers and their families: otherwise confusion, inefficiency 
and a needless overlapping of services would occur. 12 
The committee also impressed upon the government the need to 
reassure those men who enlisted from either the Federal or State public 
service or from private enterprise that upon their return their jobs would 
still be open. It stressed that a number of these men would return in an 
incapacitated state, unable to continue their previous occupations. For 
these men the government would have to look to alternative avenues of 
employment. The committee considered the provision of artificial limbs 
and a re-education programme as being two ways by which the Federal 
government might help. The committee urged the Government to 
establish State War Councils, the membership of which should comprise 
two Federal members appointed by a central committee, members of the 
State Parliament appointed by each State Government and 
representatives of municipal, commercial and industrial interests. Their 
responsibilities should be to: (1) find out certain facts about soldiers, (2) 
obtain particulars respecting employers and Labor, (3) classify the men 
under their respective advocations, (4) ascertain Crown and other lands 
available for farming and settlement purposes, (5) prepare particulars of 
public and municipal works available for employment, (6) establish a 
soldiers employment bureau and (7) arrange for securing employment 
for returned men whose injuries prevented them from following their 
10 Returned Soldiers: Recommendations of the Federal Parliamentary Working Committee., C. P. P., Vol V, 




previous occupations. As Lake suggests 13 , at this point the idea of 
settling returned men upon the land was merely one of a number of 
options. 13A 
The Tasmanian War Council was established in September 1915. The 
Council included the Premier, J. Earle; the President of the Legislative 
Council, T. Gant; the Speaker of the House of Assembly, W. A. Woods; 
the leader of the Opposition, W. H. Lee; the Mayors of Hobart and 
Launceston, respectively W. M. Williams and P. Hart; the acting Chief 
Health Officer A. H. Clarke; the health Officers for Hobart and 
Launceston namely G. Sprott and G. H. Hogg; the President of the 
Chamber Of Commerce A. H. Ashbolt. the President of the Trades and 
Labor Council W. Lawrence and the Commissioner of Crown Lands E. 
A. Counsel. Senators Long and McWilliam were the Federal 
Government representatives and Colonel W. J. Clarke and Lieutenant 
R. P. Smith represented the military. When President of the Trades and 
Labor Council, W. Lawrence, wrote his letter of acceptance he did so on 
paper that bore the old Labor call "Workers of the world unite." 
Although the State War Council followed the guidelines as established 
in the Federal Committee's agenda it is clear from the very beginning its 
primary concern lay with the provision of farms for the returned men. As 
one of its first initiatives the Council instructed the Lands and Surveys 
Department to prepare a report upon those lands suitable for soldier 
settlement throughout the state. 
The impetus for such a move resulted from the growing pressure 
placed upon both the Government and the State War Council to alleviate 
the alleged mistreatment of returned men. In early October a 
deputation of Liberal League members, perhaps with electoral 
advantage in mind, approached the Premier, concerned that little was 
being done. The deputation, composed of W. J. Fullerton, Dr. W. E. 
Bottrill and J. C. McPhee being given the men, of the limited 
employment opportunities available to them and of the seeming 
indifference on the part of the civilian and military authorities. 
Fullerton told the Premier that "it was well to realise that from this time 
onward a number of soldiers would be returning constantly, and they 
should not be allowed to walk about the streets looking for work." 14 
13 Lake, The Limits of Hope., p.28. 
14 Mercury, October 12 1915. 
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McPhee,in what would become an oft-repeated message, reminded the 
Premier that "At the time of the South African war the men were made a 
great fuss of when leaving Hobart, and were under the limelight for a few 
days after they returned, but after that no one bothered about them at 
all 15 
Earle thanked the deputation for its concern and gave the assurance 
that both the Federal and State governments were addressing the 
problem. Earle claimed that at present the major concern of the State 
War Council lay in making adequate provision for the return of those 
men who had been seriously injured. "Many of the men would come back 
to Tasmania with enhanced reputations but without limbs, and it was 
only right that everything possible should be done for them." 16 Earle 
informed the deputation that artificial limbs would be supplied as 
necessary, that rest homes would be established, that soldiers would be 
helped by the provision of free rail passes, and that some form of re-
education facility would be established to help those soldiers who were 
incapable of returning to their old occupations. 
During October a Mercury editorial outlined the problems it 
expected soldiers would face on their return. 	To alleviate these 
problems the Mercury suggested the soldiers be encouraged to take up 
land for settlement. It argued that as many of the soldiers had been: 
bushmen or farmworkers...it would be most fitting that each of 
these men should have the opportunity of securing for himself a 
piece of land sufficient to earn a good living and make a future 
competency. In addition, there are a great many men who have 
hitherto been clerks, or shop assistants, or followed some 
avocation which kept them in cities, and confined them during the 
best part of the days within doors. These men will have learned to 
appreciate life in the open, even though accompanied by dangers 
and hardships, and will, perhaps not willingly return to their 
ledgers or counters. 17 
The Mercury believed that land most suited to resettlement lay in the 
midlands from a little north of Anti11 Ponds through to the Macquarie 
River. The paper argued that the best site would have to provide the 
15 ibid. 
16 ibid . 
17 ibid., October 19. 
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returned man with an easy living in the first year, allow for large numbers 
to live in close proximity to each other and be readily accessible to a 
large centre of population. This last requirement recognised that many 
of the men, now more worldly wise, might not wish to be cut off from 
those minor pleasures to which they had become accustomed. It also 
acknowledged that many would return restless and unable to adjust to 
peace time conditions. In a sense the farms offered the soldiers a 
rudimentary form of therapy - a chance to reintegrate themselves into 
the wider community. 
But the Mercury also believed resettling soldiers on the land offered 
the State a golden opportunity for progress and, as an added bonus, 
argued that such a scheme would prove attractive to potential 
immigrants. Land settlement offered a solution to two problems: the 
plight of the returned men and the more efficient utilisation of the 
State's as yet undeveloped agricultural lands. As the Mercury suggested 
"here is an exceptional chance to settle on the land fine men who are 
already proved good citizens, and who would readily take the chance if it 
were offered them." 18 The Mercury's plans for resettlement received a 
warm reception. " A.A.G.", mother of an eighteen year old soldier, wrote 
in enthusiastic support suggesting "the Government might give Crown 
Land for the purpose,(or) landholders might contribute blocks of an acre 
or more. The men of the different districts might give work - say a day a 
week - either singly or in working bees, to clear, fence, plough and plant 
the blocks." 19 
In early November the State War Council wrote to every Local Council 
19A 
in the State requesting help in the repatriation of soldiers. The letter 
suggested each council form a National Service Committee to liase with 
the central War Council in Hobart. There was to be no restriction on the 
size of these committees but their executive had to include the Warden, 
the Police Magistrate or other government official, a practical farmer or 
pastoralist, a good businessman, a recognised Labor man and two ladies. 
The central responsibility of these committees was to provide advice on 
both employment prospects for wounded returnees and the amount of 
land available, either as vacant Crown Lands or large estates, suitable 
for soldier settlement within the municipality. In judging the suitability 
18 ibid . 
19 ibid., October 21 1915. 
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of land the Committee was to keep in mind the quantity, quality, value, 
distance from transport to markets and the type of settler it would most 
readily support. 
The establishment of these National Service Committees served to 
reinforce the belief that the main focus of repatriation in Tasmania 
would be the settlement of soldiers on small farms. Whether the 
Mercury had been acting in a wholly independent capacity must be open 
to doubt. Perhaps it was acting in a semi-official capacity, preparing the 
community for such an idea so as to frustrate any potential opposition. It 
is certain the War Council's plans would meet with a great deal of 
scepticism. 
In early November the Cygnet and Huonville Councils discussed 
the State War Council's request for assistance. At Cygnet there was 
initial discontent at the request to appoint a Labor man to the Executive 
of the local National Service Committee. The Warden managed to quell 
such discontent by reminding Council that politics had no role to play in 
such an important matter and warned that if repatriation was to be 
successful it must be above party political considerations. Political 
differences settled the Council quickly moved to reject the idea of using 
vacant Crown Lands for resettlement. Councillor Markham expressed 
great concern at such a proposal and claimed it would be more suitable 
to settle men on land that had already been cleared. However, as there 
were no large estates in the area it was felt that the purchase of small 
farms or orchards would present an ideal solution. Compact and already 
productive such properties would not prove too taxing on either the 
physical or professional acumen of the soldier. Councillor Atkins agreed 
with Markham and declared the idea of settling returned men on small 
farms near Cygnet to be a good one, especially if the men went in for 
small fruits. Whereas the Cygnet Council had extended its brief in 
suggesting the State War Council consider small farms for resettlement, 
the Huon Council merely replied that "there were no large estates in the 
municipality at all. All the holdings were small and the Crown Lands 
were too far from easy transit." 20 A motion to this effect was agreed 
unanimously. Such reply carried no imputation of disinterest but rather 
reflected the greater conservatism of the Council. The Huon 
municipality had a wider economic base than that at Cygnet - was less 
lition Times, November 13 1915. 
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dependent upon orcharding. Some in the Cygnet Council no doubt 
regarded the government's repatriation plans as a means by which the 
economic base of the area might be extended and consolidated. There 
was no such imperative at Huonville or Franklin. 
While the War Council moved to establish its state wide register of 
land suitable for resettlement there were continuing complaints about 
20A 
its supposed inactivity. In November J. T. H. Whitsitt, Independent 
member for Darwin, moved an adjournment of debate in the House of 
Assembly so the matter might be discussed. Whitsitt warned that many 
of the returned men were being treated very shabbily indeed. Some had 
told him that "when they came back to Tasmania it looked as though they 
were not wanted, or were regarded as castaWays." 21 Whitsitt claimed 
returned men had experienced difficulty in obtaining transport passes 
and had been refused new clothing from Government stores; he cited the 
case of one man who, having apparently lost his pay book during a 
bayonet charge at Gallipoli, had returned to Launceston an invalid and 
was now stoney broke. Whitsitt told the House that "such was the 
treatment of our returned heroes, who had set an example to the fighting 
men of the world. To think of such treatment made his blood boil." 22 
Other members of the House claimed they too had returned constituents 
who were experiencing similar problems. W. J. Fullerton said that when 
he had approached Earle about a similar issue earlier in the year he had 
nearly had his head bitten off. The Boer spectre haunted discussion. 
When the Premier rose to defend the Government David Dicker, a 
Labor member for Franklin, interjected "the South African war again." 23 
Although it is difficult to gauge to what extent the debate over 
resettlement reflected the experiences of returnees from the earlier War 
there is little doubt those memories influenced the views of many. 
In reply Earle admitted some difficulties had been experienced in the 
course of repatriation but claimed that war-time disruption of the 
nation's economy had made life difficult for many. Earle reminded 
Parliament that strictly speaking the government held no responsibility 
for repatriation - that responsibility lay with the State War Council. 
Such a refined point satisfied few. As Earle was both President of the 
21 Mercury, November 17 1915. 
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State War Council and Premier the distinction was for many a nonsense. 
Adopting the role of State War Council President, Earle reminded 
Parliament that as the Council had only recently commenced operations 
it would be unrealistic to expect immediate solutions. Certain 
approaches had already been made to Local Councils and future 
interstate meetings of State War Councils would no doubt formulate and 
develop legislation to assist the returned men. 
Towards the end of 1915 the issue of returned soldiers had quickly 
become politicised. Attempts to place these men above party politics 
had necessarily to fail. Some politicians no doubt saw the championing 
of the returned soldier's cause as a means to parliamentary office. 
Indeed, it would have been impossible for any politician to have ignored 
such a volatile issue. The returned men themselves were quick to realise 
and exploit their unique position. As Lake noted "the returned soldiers 
represented a new and powerful figure in Australian society. He assumed 
the roles of instructor, mentor and policeman all in one: he was the 
superior repository of patriotic values." 24 In March 1916 this role would 
be formalised in the establishment of the Returned Soldiers Association. 
Although the Government appeared to have satisfactorily answered its 
detractors, Earle felt sufficiently concerned to warn the Federal 
Minister for Defence: 
If the statement (sic) are only partly true, the wrong must at once 
be righted, or not only will Australia be disgraced but recruiting 
will be seriously affected. How can I, or anyone else, ask young 
men to enlist for the front, if in the event of them returning 
wounded, they may be cast aside like a broken stool. I trust the 
military authorities are not depending upon any patriotic society 
to care for the soldiers. These societies who have collected funds 
should, and I believe are assisting families of soldiers, and perhaps 
finding some comforts, but the real and full care of the soldiers is 
the duty of the State. No one else should be depended upon, or 
expected to perform that duty. 25 
Earle recognised that continued public discussion of such allegations 
jeopardised recruiting and effectively transferred responsibility for 
repatriation from the federal to the state government - a situation 
24 Lakc, A Divided Society., p.69. 
25 PD1/302/212/4/15, 17 November 1915. 
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fraught with political danger. 
Earle's letter received an immediate response. 	The public 
questioning of repatriation had clearly created consternation in 
Melbourne. J. J. Long, Tasmanian Senator representing the Minister for 
Defence, was dispatched to Hobart to hold an inquiry into Whitsitt's 
claims. During its course several witnesses refuted Whitsitt's 
allegations, leading Long to remark that he could "come to no other 
conclusion than that the charges made by him (Whitsitt) of ill treatment 
of wounded soldiers by the Defence authorities are absolutely without 
foundation. In nearly every instance they were found to be frivolous in 
the extreme." 26 
Though Whitsitt had been discredited there is little doubt that on 
occasion returned men had been wronged - but whether this was due to 
maladministration or to the soldier's basic ignorance of his rights is not 
clear. For whatever reason, as Earle acknowledged in his letter to the 
Minister of Defence, the treatment of returned men was an especially 
sensitive matter. The Whitsitt allegations highlighted the need for the 
authorities to develop an adequate repatriation scheme: less perhaps as 
a "reward" for military service than as an incentive to recruitment. This 
suggests many Tasmanians were far from convinced of the need to 
involve Australian troops in what was essentially a European conflict. 
Such reluctance had been clearly evident during Earle's recent 
recruiting drive in the Huon. 	In late 1915 the State War Council 
requested the Lands and Surveys Department to report upon those lands, 
both Crown and private, which might be used for the settlement of 
returned soldiers. The Department presented its report on 3 December. 
This report, written by E. A. Counsel and W. H. Lee, rejected the use of 
Crown Land on unspecified legal grounds. The report noted that as 
complex legislation would be needed to overcome these legal difficulties 
it would prove an easier course for Parliament to pass legislation 
allowing for the compulsory purchase of private property. Referring to 
the larger issue of soldier settlement, the report suggested that the most 
effective method of dealing with the returned men would be to make 
provision for their temporary location on farms as they arrive "so that 
only those may be selected for settlement, who, by reason of their 
previous experience and condition on arrival, will be likely to work out 
26 ibid., 19 November 1915. 
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their salvation on the land."27 It was suggested that a special farm be 
established or that the State Farm be used. Here the men would spend a 
period of time working on a probationary basis so that their skills and 
expertise might be judged before they were given properties of their own. 
As well as having a probationary function, these farms would also be 
used to train the men in agricultural methods relevant to their chosen 
area - whether it be general agriculture, horticulture, orcharding or 
dairying. The report stressed that the cost of such an exercise should not 
prove too great and suggested that the accommodation need not be 
elaborate, expensive or extensive "and when the scheme would be fairly 
in operation the proportion of those in occupation should be drafted out 
about as rapidly as those arriving from the front." 28 The report assumed 
that repatriation would be an ordered and systematic process extending 
over a reasonable period of time. Any rapid return of men would expose 
the fragility of the plan. 
In early January 1916 Lee and Counsel submitted a further, more 
complete report, to the State War Council. This first summarised the 
purpose of the Closer Settlement Acts, presenting them as an attempt to 
allow that group of settlers, excluded from access to land by the Crown 
Lands Act but eminently suitable as settlers, to take up small farms on 
State owned land. The report stressed that though the energies and 
skills of the applicant would count for a great deal: 
a man should possess at any rate from three hundred to four 
hundred pounds, or the equivalent in stock and implements, to 
make a fair start on the land, varying according to the size and 
conditions of the holding, and that he should be a married man, 
physically and mentally fitted for the occupation. Where a settler 
has not had sufficient means to fairly support his energies, it is a 
long and hard struggle, in which only those best suited to the 
conditions can succeed, while the remainder are doomed to 
certain failure. 29 
The report warned that as a large number of soldiers would in fact 
possess little or no capital then a considerable capital outlay would be 
27 ibid., December 3 1915. 
28 ibid. 
29 PD1/302/212/6/16, January 28 1916. 
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required to establish and support them on the land. In what would prove 
to he a prophetic warning Lee and Counsel noted that "the most - expert 
skill and judgement and the exercise of the greatest care in the selection 
of applicants must commend itself to the Council, if a failure in the 
project and the consequent loss of a-large amount of capital are to be 
averted."" 
The report suggested a system of classification to be used in the 
selection of settlers. There were three categories: (1) . those men 
experienced and in good physical condition who it was believed Would. 
succeed, (2) those men debarred from group one due to war related 
injuries who would need an improved piece of land to he successful and 
(3) those men who through lack of experience or physical injury Were 
unsuited to farming and could only be helped by the offer of temporary 
employment under day rates of pay. 
A Settler's Homestead near Dover at the turn of the Century. 
Once again the report recommended the use of the State Farm but 
significantly included a proposal to settle a number of returned men on 
Crown Land near Dover in the Huon. At the time of the report's 
publication this was apparently the only Crown Land available. The 
30 ibid. 
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land, some 3 000 acres in extent, had been resumed from timber leases 
and lay about 50 miles by road or 30 miles by sea from Hobart. The 
quality of the soil was declared to range from good to excellent and the 
land was well served by tramways. A steamer ran twice weekly to a good 
port at Dover. The report also included an offer from the Huon Timber 
Company to sell 639 acres to the Government. It was felt this land could 
be cleared at a cost of 30s an acre and that it would prove suitable for 
grazing, fattening stock, mixed-farming and orcharding. The offer also 
included a fifteen roomed residence and 28 other one-to seven-roomed 
"tenements". It was felt these would provide adequate temporary shelter 
for the settlers and offered a possible site for a training school. What 
seemed especially attractive about the Huon Timber Company's offer 
was the possibility that cleared timber might be sent to Hobart as 
firewood providing the settlers with an immediate source of income. The 
report was fulsome in its praise for the site: 
This area, with its favourable surroundings, appears to offer a 
special opportunity for the temporary employment of those who 
might wish to try their hands at land settlement, as the men can be 
occupied, and, under efficient management, will during the 
probationary period become initiated into the best methods of 
road making, scrubbing, burning off, fencing and all kinds of work 
incidental to a settler's life. Moreover, in the proces of clearing 
the land, firewood can be cut, sawn, split and shipped to Hobart at 
remunerative rates. 31 
By early 1916 an embryonic plan for settlement lay before the 
State War Council. Such a plan seemed to offer the best solution to what 
was rapidly becoming a difficult issue. Although Counsel and Lee's 
reports acknowledged that there were inherent dangers in any plan for 
resettlement they also offered hope of successful repatriation and a 
potential-advancement of Tasmania's interests. Any danger signs might 




The Huon Continues the War. 
In early January 1916 the editor of the H u o tz Times referred to 
the depressing effect that the war was having upon the Tasmanian 
community, especially in the Huon. "In our district the change was 
particularly marked. The new year was born without ostentation, there 
being no organised celebrations of any kind. The community was found 
in a high mood of seriousness." 1 True, the local patriotic funds were still 
working successfully and the Shipwrights Point Regatta had been held as 
usual,, but there was now a deepening concern about the future of the 
apple industry and a growing feeling that the Huon had somehow become 
politically disenfranchised, leaving small hope of any development for 
the area. 
The state election of March 1916 did little to allay this increasingly 
cynical attitude. Both Labor and Liberal politicians campaigned 
Strongly but, asked whether they supported developments such as the 
railway or the dredging of the Huon, replied that the state's financial 
difficulties precluded any immediate hope of such major projects. IA 
Within the Huon it was seen to be yet another excuse justifying inactivity. 
Yet the Huon Times saw some cause for optimism and argued that 
while the war had given pause to development it had also drawn the 
community closer together. The editor claimed that "the war has broken 
down many barriers that divided our social and political life. Men were 
drawn together for mutual protection against a foe that threatened their 
very existence, and in coming together they found so many things in 
common that they have lost the inclination to be divided by artificial 
means." 2 Such optimism was somewhat wide of the mark for if anything 
the war years displayed a hardening of class divisions. 2A 
The election result saw the Earle Labor government lose office to the 
Liberals, led by W. H. Lee. Lee had first entered parliament in 1909. By 
1915 he was party whip and leader of the opposition. As Premier he 
worked to establish new industries. He encouraged plans for hydro - 
electric power: Cadbury's factory and the Zinc works stand to his credit. 
The fact that "he was opposed during the war to giving sanction to 
Huon Times, January 1 1916. 
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unremunerative works" 3 would create difficulty for the Huon's boosters. 
The Labor Party managed to attract 55% of the Huon vote but the 
pattern of that voting made clear the division then existing within the 
region. The vote went most strongly against Labor in the north. At 
Huonville the party polled a mere 23% ; at Franklin a more creditable 
42%. In the south Labor polled strongly and the further south the 
stronger this support became. Both Hastings and Recherche gave over 
90% of their vote to Labor. At Hastings the Liberal Party attracted a 
mere four percent of the vote. The personal following enjoyed by David 
Dicker and the strength of the unions clearly had determined the size of 
this vote in the south. 
The election result did little to further the Huon's cause. There was a 
widespread belief that due to a lack of political strength and unity, the 
Huon failed to receive its share of Government expenditure. The Cygnet 
Council claimed the north of the state received more than its due and 
that this was the result of us weighted political representation: the 
north's eighteen parliamentarians, so it was believed, were able to 
dominate the fourteen southern members 3A What was particularly 
upsetting was the generous support that had been given in the past to the 
Deloraine Railway line. Having long campaigned for a railway of its own 
the Huon perceived this line to symbolise the economic repression under 
which the area had long been forced to exist. The cause for such 
economic repression was held to lie in the State's unfair electoral 
system. By now many perceived all communities north of the Huon to be 
a threat; none moreso than Hobart, the state's capital. In the eyes of 
many the city was shameless. "The capital was largely kept going by the 
fruit and timber industries, yet Hobart commercial men had not given 
the Huon help in any shape or form to develop the district." 4 
This growing sense of political impotence led to calls for the 
boundaries of the then sprawling electorate of Franklin to be reformed. 
In 1916 that electorate stretched from Port Davey in the south to 
Campbelltown in the north with the Franklin parliamentarians coming 
from New Norfolk, Campbell Town, Sorell and Hobart. What, it was 
asked, did the people of the Huon have in common with the pastoral 
3 L. Robson, History of Tasmania: Colony and State from 1856-1980s. (Melbourne 1991) p.389. 
4 Huon Times, July 7 1916. 
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community of Campbell Town? It was felt that if the electorate could be 
reduced in size then there was the greater chance that the Huon would 
receive adequate representation of its special interests. 
- The party system was also seen to be a problem, although some 
saw a hope in the fact the parties were evenly represented in Parliament 
and there were suggestions that one of the Franklin members should 
threaten to bring the Government down if nothing was done towards 
helping fund local developments. If this proved an impossibility then it 
was best perhaps to abandon the idea of parties altogether and replace 
them with truly local representatives. As the if uon Times pointed out: 
in all parts of the Huon lately there have been indications of a 
radical change in regard to political views, and the cause is not far 
to seek. Liberal and Labor Governments have come and gone in 
Tasmania: each has promised to work wonders for the 
development of the Huon: but no party has a singular monument 
to point to as even part fulfilment of its promise. It is not strange 
then that there should be a wide spread agitation for the 
abandonment of the party politics and a desire to send to 
parliament only men who will devote their energies to the proper 
development of the valuable resources of the district. 5 
The position had nearly become one of despair, the community felt 
threatened. 
The position today is that although the Huon was one of the first 
districts in the state to attract rural settlement, has contributed 
more to the building up of Hobart than any other district in 
southern Tasmania, and is the most closely settled district in 
Australia, apart from roads and bridges which have been largely 
paid for by the residents themselves, it is devoid of any public 
works whatever except the bungled attempt at reclamation work at 
Franklin. 6 
Frustration reached breaking point in July when the Esperance 
Council passed a resolution of no confidence in one of the Huon's most 
popular and longest serving parliamentarians, J. W. Evans. The move 
was the direct result of Evans' decision to change his stance on the 
proposed site of a port at Geeveston. This vote of no confidence was no 
5 ibid., July 14 1916. 
6 ibid., July 11 1916. 
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capricious whim for Evans had by now come to symbolise all that was 
wrong with the party system. Evans had initially supported the 
deepwater site at Shipwrights Point hut had recently changed his mind 
and now, in what was seen as an act of treachery, supported the shallow 
site at Port Huon. The difference between the two sites was viewed as 
crucial to the Huon's progress. The littott times questioned Evans' 
decision. "It looks very like as though he has realised at last that he 
cannot serve two masters - his firm and the electors of the Huon - and has 
chosen to serve the former.There is no doubt that if a deepwater wharf is 
built at Shipwrights Point where overseas boats could load their fruit it 
would be a serious blow to Hobart shipping firms." 7 Evans was, and had 
been for some time, the manager of the Hobart branch of the shipping 
company Huddart Parker Ltd. 8 Fellow Franklin member Frederick 
Burbury sprang to Evan's defence accusing the Esperance Council of 
placing its own interests before that of the state and warned that if an 
overseas port were built at Port Huon the Huon might become merely a 
suburb of Melbourne or Sydney. " Elector" from Franklin was far from 
, 
impressed and asked why "Mr Burbury evidently thinks it is a dreadful 
crime for the fruitgrowers of the Huon to desire to market their fruit at a 
more profitable rate by cutting out the unnecessary double handling and 
extra shipping charge at Hobart."9 
Premier Lee's visit to the Huon in late July brought little comfort. He 
offered a choice of either a railway or a port but claimed there could be 
no possibility of the government supporting both. The decision was far 
from popular. S. J. Kellaway, in a letter to the Huott Times, spoke for 
many when he complained of what he felt to be the unfairness of the 
situation. After all, he suggested, hadn't local residents paid taxes on a 
railway for years and received little in return? There was an urgent need 
for a port because at present it took longer to ship fruit to Hobart than it 
did to Sydney. But now, claimed Kellaway, "when the people of the Huon 
ask for what is their due they are told that they cannot have it. After all 
the district (produces) a large proportion of the fruit which keeps the 
7 ibid. 
8 F. C. Green, A C'entury of Responsible Government 1856-1956. (I lobart 1956) p213. 
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Hobart jam and other factories employing thousands of hands." 1 () Such 
arguments failed to persuade Lee from the government's view that the 
cost of the war precluded all major development. His stance only served 
to convince most that Lee was a mere apologist for the business interests 
of Hobart.'" 
Lee's decision strengthened the Huon's antagonism towards all things 
political. The government's plans for soldier settlement at Dover 
reinforced this belief. 
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 
As outlined in the previous chapter the government, acting on the advice 
of officers of the Lands and Surveys Department, had prepared plans for 
the settlement of soldiers on Crown Land immediately behind Dover. 
The Lands and Surveys report had spoken glowingly of this land, 
believing it to be eminently suited to soldier settlement. But such 
optimism was not shared by the local community. Their disquiet at such 
a proposal would soon turn to open hostility. 
In January 1916 the Huon Times, already aware of the government's 
intention to settle soldiers in the Huon, had suggested that if the 
government were prepared to provide access, then the Denison Valley 
would prove to be a perfect site. The paper, while acknowledging the 
government's preference for large estates or the limited use of Crown 
Lands, complained that when the Lands and Surveys Department had 
sought advice from local councils on potential settlement sites, the brief 
had been too restrictive. The department's demand that the land be 
ready for cropping and close to good transport had denied any possibility 
of opening up new lands to settlement. Although admitting it may have 
misunderstood the government's intention the paper still strongly urged 
consideration of the Denison Valley and gave the assurance that the land 
in question was as fertile as any to be found in the Huon. As the paper 
argued "there is not a large estate in the whole district and the reason is 
primarily that every acre of the land in it is admirably suitable for 
intense cultivation." 11 The government soon rejected such advice and 
on the 8 February, made public the interest it had in the land near Dover. 
The announcement produced an immediate outcry. 
10 ibid., July 28 1916. 
11 ibid., January 28 1916. 
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The Esperance Council, now the issue was public, vehemently attacked 
the government's proposal E.:ouncillor Clennett claimed the question of 
soldier settlement to he the most important issue that the state now had 
to face and argued that the government's proposal clearly demonstrated 
that it was failing to take the issue seriously. For Clennett, the Lands 
and Surveys' report broke faith with the soldiers who had been promised 
land at the end of the war. 
Clennett claimed that when the Esperance Council had received a 
letter from the State War Council in January 1916 seeking its opinion on 
the Dover site the Council had unanimously agreed the land would prove 
too great a handicap for any soldier who was settled there. 	The 
Council had been scathing in its criticism. It claimed the houses referred 
to lay some four miles from the farm land and that the supposed thirteen 
miles of railway was in reality a mere eight miles, four of which had 
already been torn up. As if this were not had enough the railway ended 
before the Dover jetty so that the settlers would have to lump their 
produce a fair distance to the boats. The cost of grassing the land was 
not the 30s as had been believed but was closer to 5, and the land itself 
was not suitable for growing vegetables of any kind. The chance of 
making a profit, or any money, from sending firewood to Hobart was 
laughable. 
The Council was deeply concerned at the proposal to settle such a 
large number of inexperienced men in the same place, believing this 
would not help them to adapt to the land in any way. It would be better, 
so the Council suggested, to place the men out on small blocks in close 
proximity to experienced men who could help them settle on the land. It 
was suggested that such blocks were available near Lune River to the 
south of Dover. The Huon Times gave strong support to the Esperance 
Council arguing that "under the best of conditions it is by no means 
certain that even the majority of men taking up land will prove 
successful, but when totally inexperienced men are given worse than 
third class land it is simply courting danger." 12 
Most members of the Esperance Council were convinced the War 
Council had been far too hasty in its planning. They claimed it had 
considered repatriation to be only the resettlement of men on the land, 
and warned that many of the returned men might not wish to go on the 
12 ibid., February 15 1916. 
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land. In fact, the Council argued, there might not be enough men to take 
up the number of jobs on offer at the end of the war when the present 
situation returned to normal. Small holdings might suit the wounded hut 
the Council was convinced that able men would have no trouble finding 
employment. Whether this view reflected the self interest of the 
Council, composed largely as it was of mill owners, is not clear. No 
doubt many of them held the private fear that the government's plans to 
settle returned men might threaten their labour supply. Though these 
concerns may have played some role in the Council's stance, probably a 
greater motivation was the concern that the council had for the welfare 
of the soldiers. 
In March the Esperance Council was criticised by both the State 
War Council and the Mercury over its opposition to the government's 
plans. The Mercury accused the Council of apathy and implied that its 
present attitude displayed a sense of disloyalty. In turn the Ffuon 
Times accused the Mercury of being no more than an "apologist" for 
the State War Council and other, unspecified, government interests. - 
The Esperance Council, never doubting its patriotic motives, 
rejected the Mercury's comments. Clennett claimed that though some 
self appointed "patriots" in Hobart might accuse the Council of apathy he 
was convinced that this was not the case. Someone, he argued, had to put 
a stop to the Government's absurd plans and protect the interests of the 
returned men. Clennett was sure that "they would do the returned 
soldiers a greater kindness by putting them in the Turkish trenches than 
place them where it was proposed and let them linger for years." 13 
Councillor Burgess was even more scathing when he suggested that "they 
might just as well put the men under the land as put them on any virgin 
soil - at any rate in the Esperance Municipality." 14  When an unnamed 
member of the War Council reportedly claimed that it had already had 
an offer from an unidentified buyer of a pound an acre for the land near 
Dover, the Esperance Council was quick to suggest that the Government 
accept the offer before the person realised the mistake they were 
making. 
On 17 March the if uon Times again asked why the War Council 




settlement. In the paper's view the land was so patently inappropriate as 
to suggest some ulterior purpose on the government's part. It was, the 
paper reminded its readers "the desire that is uppermost in, we believe, 
every loyalist's mind...that every returned soldier who wishes to go on the 
land should be given exceptionally good opportunities for making an 
easy and profitable living." 15 It is clear that the Huon Times viewed 
the government's decision to provide properties for returned men as a 
reward for military service rather than as a serious business transaction, 
and therefore believed that such land should promise an easy reward for 
those services. The paper felt it would be completely wrong of the 
government to use these men to open up as yet unsettled areas of the 
state. To ask soldiers to accept this new responsibility was too much. It 
was enough that the soldier should have won the war against the 
Germans without being asked on his return to fight this new "War". 
The Esperance Council during its debate with the War Ccuncil 
had the bipartisan support of two local members of Parliament: Labor's 
David Dicker and J. W. Evans of the Liberal Party. As both men were 
familiar with the area, their support gives the Esperance Council's stand 
credibility. 
In late March Clennett warned that if the Government persisted in its 
plan to settle men on the land behind Dover then it was sure to lose many 
thousands of pounds. A letter from P. Schnell of Dover, evoking 
memories best forgotten, suggested that the Government's plan was,"like 
a return to old prison days." 16 Schnell shared the concerns of both the 
Esperance Council and the Huon Times but foreshadowed future 
Government policy when he asked why the War Council didn't,"look 
around and find them (soldiers) properties on which there is already a 
house with some cleared land, so that they can get a good start instead of 
having to wait years for any return." 17 
In July the Huon Times reported that the government had 
decided to "definitely (abandon) the wild cat scheme of settling soldiers 
on the inhospitable heights of Dover." 18 The paper wondered whether 
anyone would be censured over the money that had been wasted, 
15 ibid., March 17 1916. 
16 ibid., March 21 1916. 
17 ibid. 
18 ibid., July 14 1916. 
34 
especially as it could have been far better spent on bringing new 
developments to the area. 
The issue's deeper significance lay in the potential damage that had 
been done within Esperance to the government's future campaign for 
conscription. People in Dover, now aware of the type of land the 
Government was considering "giving" to the returned men, no doubt held 
grave reservations as to the seriousness of the government's intentions. 
Conversely the fight put up by the Esperance Council had an effect upon 
the Government's future plans for soldier settlement. What clearly 
emerged from the issue was the widely held belief within the community 
that the promise of land for settlement should be both a reward for, and 
I8A 
an inducement to, enlistment. 3uch inducement though was still proving 
to be insufficient when it came to enlistments in the Huon. 
Throughout February the government continued its recruiting 
campaign with limited results. This was primarily due to the health of 
the recruits rather than to the complete unwillingness of men to come 
forward. Of 34 men who offered their services at Cygnet seven were 
rejected and at Geeveston seven out of fourteen were declared to be 
unfit. Only eight out of 30 were accepted at Franklin while at Dover, no 
doubt reflecting the torpor of the timber industry, 60 men came forward 
hut only eleven were accepted. Such a high rate of rejection was a cause 
of concern to many. P.Schnell was convinced that this lack of fitness was 
due to,"the bad effects of drink" 19 though it would be more appropriate 
to suggest general working conditions and local dietary habits as the 
significant factors. 
Any concern about the health of the men before enlistment was easily 
matched by concerns about their return. In March, at a farewell to 
soldiers at Cygnet, Warden Davies stressed the need for a government 
assurance that the men going to the front must upon their return be 
assured of receiving a fair deal. Davies had seen the condition and 
consequent treatment of men who had returned from the Boer War and 
claimed that the government must not allow such a situation to occur 
again. "There had been cases" claimed Davies: 
in the Boer War... where men were lionised for a day or two and 
then forgotten and he considered it one of the greatest problems 
19 ibid., February 29 1916. 
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that must he solved by those unable to give their services in the 
field, to see that it no case did a man who perhaps lost his health in 
fighting our battles suffer pecuniary disadvantage as a 
consequence of his return. 20 
From mid-1915 Tasmania had experienced a statewide decline in 
enlistments, a decline nowhere more marked than in the Huon. A 
vigorous recruiting drive in early 1916 had failed to improve the 
situation. By mid-1916, as Lake has noted "indifference to the progress 
of the war reached a (new) height.... The first excitements and thrill of 
being at war had faded and the consequent lack of enthusiasm was 
reflected in the fall in the amounts of patriotic funds raised and the 
number of men enlisting.” 21  By April the State War Council was calling 
upon the Federal Government to adopt "some form of compulsory 
service either within or without the Commonwealth." 22 The Somme 
offensive of July 1916 added a new sense of urgency to these calls. 
On 31 July Prime Minister Hughes returned to Australia after an 
extended visit to England where he had been feted and lionised by 
leading figures in the worlds of politics, economics and the military. 
While in England Hughes had come to the conclusion that the war could 
be won only through a dramatic increase in the allied forces. To achieve 
this aim Hughes now viewed conscription as a necessity, convinced that 
the voluntary system of recruitment had been a failure. On 14 September 
he announced that a referendum on conscription would be held on 28 
October. 
While the Federal Government set about organising its conscription 
campaign the State Government of Premier Lee was introducing a Bill 
for the resettlement of returned men. This Bill, introduced into the 
House of Assembly in September 1916, was essentially a reworking of the 
Closer Settlement Act of 1913 so that it now reflected the agreement 
entered into by the Federal and State authorities over soldier settlement 
in early 1916. 23 In broad terms the Bill envisaged that soldiers would be 
settled either on vacant Crown Lands or on larger private properties that 
would be compulsorily purchased. Only those soldiers who had received 
20 ibid., March 3 1916. 
21 Lake, A Divided Society., p.64. 
22 PD1/302/212/14/16. 13 May 1916. 
23 Inter-State Conference of Ministers: Adelaide, May 1916., T.J.P.P., Vol 1.XXV 1916-1917, Paper No 27. 
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an honourable discharge were to be considered for settlement. The 
settlers were to he given 99 year leases and were to be charged five 
percent interest on the capital investment in the land. As an aid to 
settlement, the first year of the lease was to be interest free. If settlers 
kept to the terms of their agreement then they would, after ten years, be 
able to purchase their properties in fee simple. To provide further 
assistance the Bill allowed for a remission of rates and taxes on the 
property for the first four years. As well, settlers were allowed an 
advance of £300 on farm buildings and from early January 1917 an extra 
£150 for stock, feed and implements. Interest was to be on a sliding 
scale starting at three and a half percent in the first year and reaching 
five percent in the fourth and consequent years. The Bill established a 
Closer Settlement Board, under the responsibility of the Minister for 
Lands and Works, to oversee the resettlement of the men. This Board 
was given wide discretionary powers. All monies raised through the 
scheme were to be paid into a Returned Soldiers Settlement Fund rather 
than general state revenue so that the Board would have the greatest 
possible freedom in its dealings with the settlers. 
Any returned man who wished to purchase a property had to 
submit an application to the Board. This application informed the Board 
of the property the applicant desired, the name of the applicant's unit 
and period of service, the date and reason for discharge and any 
particulars of physical disability or disease resulting from service. The 
applicant also had to list his relevant work experience, the amount of 
capital he possessed and the assistance he thought he would need to 
establish himself. 
Included in the Bill was a provision for British returned men to 
take up holdings within the State on the same terms and conditions as 
local servicemen. The decision to allow these British ex-servicemen to 
settle in Tasmania resulted from an agreement between the 
Commonwealth and the British Governments and reflected the happy 
marriage of two separate though linked interests. 24 Many in England 
believed that the end of the war would see large numbers of their ex-
servicemen, now restless and keen on adventure, wishing to emigrate. 
Fearing that these men might settle in countries having few ties with 
Empire these people hastened to encourage settlement in 
24 ibid . 
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Commonwealth countries so that the cultural and economic links with 
Empire might be maintained, if not strengthened. For Australia's part, 
the decision to allow British servicemen to settle in Australia gave access 
to vitally needed foreign capital. The decision reinforced that 
traditional economic link by which Australia provided primary produce 
for the English manufacturers and in return imported manufactured 
products. 
The Mercury gave strong support to the legislation, the editor 
believing that in every way it "guards the soldier from hardships and 
holds out a helping hand wherever it is needed." 25 Newspaper accounts 
at this time would suggest that many returned men who were in need of 
such a helping hand. In late September the Mercury published a report 
on one returned man who, having lost his job at the Huon Timber 
Company, had been forced to live along with his wife and children in a 
bark hut at Cairns Bay, existing on fish the soldier caught. The family 
had so far received little help from the government. The Patriotic Fund 
and their local Parliamentary representative, David Dicker, had 
managed to provide some assistance 26 but the man had been effectively 
left to fend for himself. 
The Labor Party did not share the Mercury's optimism. It 
believed there had been scant consideration of alternatives to 
resettlement and that too little provision had been made for returning 
soldiers who did not wish to take up land. It argued that the Bill placed 
too big a financial strain on the soldiers and provided less than generous 
tax provisions. Earle warned parliament that "the soldiers would thank 
them for nothing if they were going to buy land on the open market and 
load the land with all the charges."27 He believed the plan to settle 
returned men on the land to be a mere pretext and claimed the real 
intention behind the Bill was the cynical plan to open up new farming 
areas throughout the State. Earle warned that "if the Government 
wanted to encourage returned soldiers to settle on the land they must 
look upon such settlement otherwise than as a commercial 
speculation." 28 Earle's colleague, W. A. Woods, shared this concern 
25 Mercury, September 21 1916. 
26 ibid., September 26 1916. 
27 Daily Post, September 28 1916. 
28 Mercury, September 28 1916. 
3g 
and suggested that the Bill, in its present form, "would be condemning 
returned soldiers to a life of misery by sending them into the backblocks 
or by placing them on land under such conditions as would break their 
hearts in a few years."29 Such comments echoed those of the 
Esperance Council when it had opposed the government's plans to settle 
men at Dover. Despite such concerns the Bill passed the House of 
Assembly on party lines and in mid-September reached the Legislative 
Council. 
While the Legislative Council deliberated upon the government's 
plans for repatriation, Tasmania turned its attention to Hughes' call for 
conscription. It was a call which would be rejected by the majority of the 
Huon's electors. Warden Ryan, at the unveiling of the Ranelagh Roll of 
Honour on 22 September 1922, gave clear voice to such majority belief. 
Ryan told his audience that Australia was now facing a crisis which 
required all eligible men to consider whether their efforts were 
sufficient to win the war. As he pulled aside the veil to disclose the 
names of those who had already enlisted, Ryan pointed to the space left 
for the names of yet other men prepared to do their duty. But Ryan was 
fervently hopeful "that the time would never arrive when they would have 
to put on that tablet the name of any conscript." 30 After all, Ryan 
argued, enlistment must be a matter for individual conscience, not 
legislative dictate. Ryan's speech received bi-partisan support from 
local parliamentarians J. W. Evans and W. E. Shoobridge who also 
expressed their opposition to conscription. On 26 September the Huon 
Times noted that Australia's casualties had now reached 64 000. 
While Ryan rejected conscription others believed there to be little 
alternative. " Argus" of Glen Huon, stung to action by his neighbours' 
failure to welcome home A. H. Bester, a local returned soldier, wrote to 
the Huon Times in support of conscription. " May conscription come 
and let these apathetic spirits know that there is something of vital 
importance going on in the world, which to them seems of no moment." 31 
In the opinion of "Argus" the only thing the people of Glen Huon were 
concerned about was three meals a day and the eternal problems of the 
orchards. At Franklin private Oakford in his farewell speech berated 
29 ibid . 
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fellow unionists for the selectivity of their beliefs. He told his listeners 
that as a Labor man he supported the eight hour day hut as the soldiers 
at the front were at present unable to gain such a condition he had 
enlisted to help them do so. 32 
On 3 October 1916 the Litton Times reported Hughes' decision to 
make use of the Defence Act to call up all single men and widowers 
without children between the ages of 21 and 35. As Lake noted the move 
was "a tactical blunder. It strengthened the radical opposition in the 
labor movement and convinced doubters that, in his impatience to 
impose conscription, Hughes was indeed a rabid militarist." 33 Many in 
the Huon felt Hughes' decision would have little effect on recruiting. 
One report from Cygnet claimed "so many men between these ages and 
outside it for that matter, have left the district that one would hardly 
think the number to he enrolled can be very large when the unfit have 
been culled out."34 
The number of men consequently rejected by medical boards seems to 
bear out this observation. The rejection rate in October continued high. 
Only fifteen of the 75 men who reported at Huonville were declared fit. 
At Franklin, the medical board accepted only sixteen of the 63 who 
reported and at Cygnet fully half the men were rejected. 
The State War Council, the central coordinator for the "Yes" vote, 
wrote to local councils in early October seeking their assistance. The 
Cygnet Council, following brief discussion, decided that the matter lay 
outside its responsibilities and decided that the issue was best left as a 
matter for individual conscience. The Huonville Council refused to vote 
on the issue. This left the Esperance Council as the only council in the 
Huon to support the War Council's request. A prime mover behind this 
decision was Clennett who argued the Council must give support to 
counteract the widespread anti-conscriptionist sentiment in the area. 
He claimed such support stemmed from the strong local influence of the 
I. W. W. and went so far as to suggest that many people were actively pro-
German. He viewed the union's stand on conscription as hypocritical for 
although they "professed to be shocked because men were conscripted to 
perhaps sacrifice their lives for the liberty of the country,...these same 
32 ibid. 
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people a short time ago saw no shame in reducing a man and his family to 
starvation if he refused to join a union." 35 Clennett was totally dismayed 
at the strength of the anti-conscription movement in Esperance. It was 
well organised, ably led and strongly based within the union movement. 
Clennett felt a strong need for the establishment of a pro-conscription 
committee for when he "saw men standing on a public platform and 
slandering the lads who had fought through Gallipoli and France, and 
not a voice raised in protest, he did not know what the district was 
coming to."36 
In the. Huon the leading campaigner against conscription was David 
36A 
Dicker. In early October he organised an anti-conscription rally at the 
local picture theatre in Geeveston. There he told an approving audience 
that Australia had already contributed more than its fair share towards 
the winning of the war. He argued that whether a man enlisted or not 
should be a question for individual conscience and suggested that 
workers should not he forced to fight in what was clearly a war inspired 
by the capitalist quest for new markets. 
Australian Timber Workers Union Conference. Hobart 1913: David Dicker bottom right. 
At Franklin, Dicker met anger. The meeting was so rowdy that the 
chairman felt it brought shame to the Huon. Such admonition may have 
had some effect for at Dicker's next meeting he was listened to with 
35 ibid. 
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patience and respect. This speech, in essence a reiteration of that given 
earlier at Geeveston, differed in one significant detail. This time Dicker 
claimed that even if the government managed to introduce conscription 
it would he small comfort for those at the front, as the government did 
not have enough transports to convey the conscripts to Europe. The 
significance of this was not lost on his audience. Orchardists, already 
experiencing difficulty in finding shipping space for their fruit, might 
now have to compete with the extra demands on shipping that could 
result from a pro-conscription vote. 
The Federal Government having invoked the Defence Act had also 
necessarily established exemption courts allowed for under Section IV of 
that Act. The Court's activities in the Huon would give orchardists 
further cause for concern. As Robson has noted "the importance of the 
exemption courts lay in the fact that they brought before everyone a 
close-to-home example of what would happen if conscription were 
enforced."37 
The first account of the operations of the exemption court appeared in 
the Huon Times of October 20. At the first of these courts, held at 
Cygnet, Magistrate Wise was reported to be highly critical of the 
regulations that applied to their operations. He claimed they were too 
restrictive and that this had forced him to refuse exemptions when he 
believed they were fully justified. The fact that people applying for 
exemptions were not allowed the services of a lawyer was a further worry 
to Wise as he was convinced that many of the men appearing before him 
were unable to represent themselves adequately. 
Such comments would have done little to assuage the fears of the rural 
worker and his employer, and the exemption figures would seem to 
justify these fears. Only two of the 51 men who applied to the court for 
an exemption on the ground that their labours were indispensable to 
37A 
either the orcharding or farming industries received an exemption. In 
contrast some of the exemption court's decisions would have inspired a 
deep sense of bitterness within the laboring class and no doubt 
exacerbated old antagonisms. A case in point was that of J. B. Dance 
who applied for an exemption on the ground that he was a general 
storekeeper in possession of stock valued at between fl 500 and El 
600. He received an exemption. Another such case was that of Mathew 
37 Robson, The First A. I. F., (Melbourne 1970) p.I09. 
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Fitzpatrick, the son of a local Cygnet Councillor. Fitzpatrick claimed an 
exemption on the ground that he managed a property that reputedly 
produced some 4 000 cases of apples, valued at nearly £7 000, a year. In 
his application Fitzpatrick received support from the manager of the 
local branch of the Commercial Bank and the Cygnet Warden, Arthur 
Davies. He was given an exemption of three months - well above the 
average of one month. These cases would have done little to inspire that 
unanimity of class that the Huon Times had so fondly referred to at the 
beginning of 1916. 
Not only did these exemption courts fuel class bitterness they also 
strengthened anti-German feeling within the Huon. At times Clennett 
had hovered on the brink of such sentiment but his comments had always 
been driven more from a sense of exasperation than from a genuine 
vehemence towards persons of German background. This was not the 
case with Jeremiah McArthy. When his son was refused an exemption 
McArthy turned on Wise and demanded that he journey "down to Castle 
Forbes Bay and rope in the Germans. There are thousands of them there 
and young men too." 38 To protect themselves a number of Huon 
families of German descent did anglicise their surnames but the majority 
held few fears for their safety. 
As if to underline those fears engendered in labourers by the 
exemption courts the Huon Times in late October reported the closure 
of yet more mills in Esperance. "The Stanmore mills are all but closed 
and work will be lesser still soon with more men to be put off. There is 
the rumour that the Hopetown mill will reopen in a small way, but with 
the war and bad weather the management are naturally not in a hurry to 
recommence operations." 39 If men who worked on farms and orchards 
had been refused exemptions then what hope had the unemployed mill 
workers? 
While the Huon Times was reporting the closure of these mills it 
announced its support for conscription. The paper claimed it had 
adopted this view because it believed the real danger now to be faced by 
Australia came from the growing power of the unions and the threat they 
posed to individual freedom. In this belief the Huon Times was at one 
with Clennett. "Was it not", so the paper argued, "by compulsory means 
38 Huon Times, October 20 1916. 
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that Trade unionism gained its strength. Men were even threatened with 
starvation of themselves and their families and in numerous cases 
suffered physical torture for daring to refuse to join certain unions."" 
The visit of John Earle to Geeveston in late October to speak in favour 
of conscription no doubt reassured the Huon Times of its belief. 
It is not entirely clear why Earle adopted this position. Lake suggests 
it was the result of a visit to Prime Minister Hughes in Melbourne from 
which he returned a passionate advocate of conscription. " Like Hughes 
Earle became an ardent critic of "extremists" in the Labor movement. In 
Earle's view the war was in direct defence of Australia. If the Labor 
Party believed in home defence then it should logically agree to send 
men where defence of that home was most effective - in this case, 
France."41 Now an advocate for conscription Earle addressed meetings 
throughout the state. At Franklin he received a courteous reception as 
he told the meeting that he considered conscription to be above politics 
and that, although some might find it strange for him to be standing on a 
pro-conscriptionist platform, he did not think so. He argued that if 
Britain lost the war Australia would be open to invasion and "hordes of 
people would be sent out here."42 to populate our open lands. If this 
happened then union principles would count for little. Earle, while 
admitting there had already been an unfortunate form of economic 
conscription, argued that there were still far too many who felt little 
responsibility for the war. In Earle's view the situation seemed to lack a 
sense of fair play. The only way to stop the war, he told the meeting, was 
to win it so that all the men might come home. But to do this, he warned, 
it would be necessary to send more soldiers to the front. 
Earle delivered the same message at Geeveston on 24 October. On 
this occasion his appearance met with a most hostile reception. While 
Earle delivered his speech inside the local hall, an anti-conscriptionist 
meeting, addressed by representatives of the Federated Waterside 
Union and the Builders Laborers Union, took place outside. At the end 
of Earle's speech those who had gathered outside the hall "invaded" it for 
question time, during which each attempt by Earle to speak was howled 
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down with cries of " you're a twister" 43 Three returned men who had 
accompanied Earle on stage were hooted down each time they attempted 
to speak. Some in the audience suggested they had only enlisted for their 
own benefit. To widespread cheers these three servicemen were 
eventually forced to leave the stage. 
One of the issues that had most upset Earle's opponents was that he, as 
a member of the State War Council, had rejected the pension 
application of a returned man called Sanson. Sanson, a veteran of the 
Boer War, had been an early enlistee. On arriving in Egypt he had fallen 
ill and then been repatriated. At the meeting Sanson claimed Earle's 
signature to be on the letter informing him his pension application had 
been rejected. Earle claimed no knowledge of the matter. When 
challenged by someone in the audience, Earle wagered £10 on the truth 
of his statement. After some weeks it transpired that Sanson had not in 
fact applied for a pension at all but had instead asked for assistance to 
establish a business. As such a request was outside the powers of the 
War Council it had been rejected. 
The Sanson affair also led to an attack on Osborne Geeves, 
Esperance Councillor and avid conscriptionist. One member of the 
audience shouted at Geeves "you pretend to be a very patriotic man. I'll 
let the people see what you are like"44 ; he claimed that Geeves had 
accused Sanson of feigning illness and that he was perfectly capable of 
pick and shovel work. The accusation caused further uproar. 
The Sanson affair is somewhat clouded. While Earle's reply 
satisfied his accusers Geeves was unable to offer an acceptable 
explanation. Valid or not, the accusations against Earle and Geeves 
clearly damaged the cause of conscription in Esperance. The support of a 
now increasingly isolated Esperance Council no doubt only antagonised 
what was already a volatile issue. Esperance was clearly hardening its 
resolve against both conscription and the employer. 
Four days before the Referendum the Mercury published an article 
which discussed the problems conscription posed to rural industries. 
The Mercury recognised that as a whole the agricultural districts of 
Tasmania had given their full quota of men for active service and were 
now "feeling the pressure resulting from the decrease in the labour 
43 ibid., October 24 1916. 
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available for farm and orchard stations." 45 The paper noted that 
conscription left people in rural industries anxious as "fruitgrowers 
wondered whether they would be able to get sufficient labourers for 
spraying and other necessary operations." 46 The paper condemned 
those anti-conscriptionists who had misinformed the rural sector by their 
claim that conscription would be used without discrimination. The 
Mercury reassured its readers that this would not be the case. They 
were reminded that when Prime Minister Hughes addressed meetings in 
the Hobart City Hall "he took pains to allay the fears on this account, and 
explained that instructions had been given to the Magistrates 
constituting the Exemption Courts that in all cases where men liable for 
service were able to show that they were wanted for rural industries, 
their applications for exemption should be granted." 47 According to the 
Mercury men already in camp had only to explain their situation to their 
officers to be released. They could then return to their farm work until 
it was completed. The Mercury was hopeful that it was not too late to 
calm the fears of those in the rural sector. 
In fact the Huon Exemption Courts had presented a picture markedly 
at odds with that of Hughes and the Mercury. As the majority of 
Tasmania's population lived in rural districts of which the Huon was 
typical, conscriptionists clearly had reason to be concerned. 
On the eve of the Referendum the ffuon Times plead for voters to 
support conscription and reject the efforts of a noisy and unpatriotic few. 
When the first returns were published a few days later this "noisy and 
unpatriotic few" had emerged as a small majority. Only the Huon 
Municipality supported conscription. Cygnet( 54%) and Esperance (69 
%) both rejected the idea of compulsory military service. The 
electorate of Franklin recorded the highest Tasmanian vote against 
conscription. 48 
The reasons for this large No vote in the Huon are reasonably clear. In 
the south at Esperance, the Huon's "industrial" heart, the vote no doubt 
reflected the strong union presence in the area, the decided antipathy of 
many towards the Esperance Council, the growing fear of unemployment 
45 Mercury, October 24 1916. 
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and the State Government's aborted attempt to settle returned men at 
Dover. The Sanson affair had also clearly antagonised many. It is 
important not to overlook the role the Daily Post played in the vote. 
This paper, established by Hobart businessman Tom Nettlefold and 
edited by Edmund Dwyer Gray, a leading figure in the early Labor 
movement, had been the only major daily in Australia to oppose Hughes' 
call for conscription. In Esperance the paper sold an average 250 copies 
an issue. 
The size of the no vote in Esperance probably reflected a 
strengthening class division in the region. Many unionists had by now 
come to believe that the war was fundamentally a war of capitalism with 
the workers cast in the role of victim. There was a feeling amongst some 
that the war had given the mill owners an opportunity to move against 
the unions and in their view the closure of the mills was motivated by 
industrial considerations rather than war time economic pressures. The 
Examiner, analysing the strong rural no vote, decided that class 
antagonisms had been a prime motivation. Referring to the large no 
vote in Campbell Town the paper suggested: 
there is a wider gulf between the employer and worker in these 
rural districts than in other parts, wider than is healthy for the 
community, and there is no attempt to bridge the gap or lessen it. 
Dorcas meetings and playing the Lord and Lady Bountiful will not 
do it, but only the cultivation of that human sympathy which makes 
all classes kin." 
In the north of the Huon, around the orchard ing and farming towns of 
Huonville, Franklin and Cygnet, the situation differed somewhat. Here 
large numbers of orchardists, concerned at the prospect of labour 
shortages and shaken by the actions of the exemption courts, voted 
against conscription. Robson has noted the comment of Governor 
General Munro Ferguson "that the Referendum had been defeated by 
Irish-Catholics, the women's vote and a large sector of the agricultural 
vote, the latter opposing the Government's proposal as a protest against 
the land being denuded of labour." 5 ° Lake suggested that "these 
farming districts had experienced severe labour shortages and hence the 
49 Examiner, October 31 1916. 
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figures suggest that farmers, fearful of the worse shortages which would 
result from conscription, voted no." 5 I The evidence in the Fluon 
upholds these comments. 
Though the Catholic vote is usually believed to have played a 
significant role in the anti-conscription vote the evidence suggests that 
this was not the case in the Huon. Father P. J. O'Flynn, a leading 
member of the Huon's Catholic community, was a regular speaker at 
farewells to enlisted men. Published accounts suggest his views differed 
little, if at all, from other speakers. Although at times there was an 
undercurrent of sectarian division, the various denominations were at 
pains to avoid conflict. Early plans to construct a hospital as a war 
memorial at Ranelagh bear out this point. When it was discovered that 
the proposed site was on land owned by the Catholic Church it was 
decided to resite the hospital to neutral ground at Franklin. Although 
the H uon Times attacked the anti-conscriptionist stance of Archbishop 
Mannix and attempted to link the Irish uprising to German influence, 
such claims engendered no public outcry within the area. Some believed 
the Catholic vote to have been of no significance. 
In response to a claim by the Mercury that Catholics at Port Cygnet had 
shown themselves to be strong anti-conscriptionists, John McMullen - a 
leading member of the Anglican community - accused the paper of 
blatant unfairness. McMullen suggested it was absurd: 
for anyone to say that the Catholic vote, or the Irish vote, 
prevented anything becoming law in the country where they are 
outnumbered by more than seven to one? In your paper last week 
you mentioned the strong anti-vote in Esperance and ascribed it to 
the Irish there. You should know that the Irish there are not one-
quarter of the population in that municipality, yet the vote there 
against conscription was about three against one in favour. How 
do you account for this?... In the Port Cygnet Municipality I think 
there are as many non-Catholics as Catholics and if they vote on 
religious lines wouldn't the vote there be about equal? If you can 
persuade four out of every seven non-Catholics in the 
Commonwealth to vote as you desire wouldn't you be able to carry 
anything you liked? As conscription was turned down about half 
51 Lake, A Divided Society., p.81. 
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the non-Catholics of the Commonwealth must have voted against 
it or failed to vote which in my opinion amounts to the same. 52 
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 
By the beginning of November the Government's Bill for soldier 
settlement reached the Legislative Council. The Mercury believed 
repatriation to be one of the most important issues that the state had to 
face and stressed the necessity of making adequate preparations to 
"avoid the pauperisation of large numbers of men who certainly deserve 
something better." 53 As the Mercury saw it, the central problem with 
any scheme to settle men on the land was the need to provide a correct 
balance between "a system of advances so elastic that, while deserving 
cases will get ready and sympathetic help, the dependence of returned 
men upon the resources will not be encouraged."54 
The Legislative Council, though concerned about the welfare of the 
returned men clearly showed it held greater fears about the threat the 
resettlement Bill posed to the state's larger landholders. The Council 
appeared determined to protect those interests. It was particularly 
worried about the possible effect of two specific clauses: Clause 5 which 
allowed for compulsory purchase of land and Clause 7 which established 
the formula under which a portion of the Federal Government's 
resettlement grant of £150 000 would be spent on the acquisition of 
private properties or the development of Crown Lands. The Bill 
proposed the expenditure of the greater amount of this money on the 
purchase of private properties. 
The Council opposed the idea of compulsory purchase on a number of 
grounds. It argued there were many properties around the state that 
could easily be purchased in a normal commercial manner and that there 
was no need to give the Board the power to purchase properties 
compulsorily. The Council further argued that the use of such power 
would merely replace one settler by another, and produce no conceivable 
advantage to the state. The Council was also deeply concerned at the 
sweeping powers the Bill gave to the Board and demanded that these be 
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either reduced or that provision be made for tighter ministerial control. 
Such concerns were understandable. A well-funded Board, allowed 
widespread powers and the right to compulsorily purchase properties, 
would have seemed a threat to many landholders. 
The Council moved to protect the large landholders. As has been 
noted, the Government's Bill for Soldier Settlement was closely based on 
the Closer Settlement Act of 1913. Under that Act properties valued at 
over £12 000 had been excluded from compulsory purchase. The 
Council now moved that the new Bill limit this amount to £6 000. The 
proposed amendment produced a storm of protest in the House of 
Assembly, especially among the Labor Party. 
Many in the Assembly accused the Legislative Council of being 
unpatriotic. For the Labor Party, the Council's move only reinforced the 
long held belief that the upper house represented only the interests of 
the state's larger landholders. F. Burbury attacked the Council's claim 
that the power of compulsory purchase was unnecessary and argued that 
without such a power "the choice of properties in the State suitable for 
settlement of soldiers was.. .very limited." 55 He suggested that though 
there might very well be, as some Councillors had suggested, many 
suitable properties throughout the State valued at less than £6 000, it 
would be difficult to purchase them through ordinary commercial 
channels. The House of Assembly was convinced the Act had to allow for 
compulsory purchase so that soldiers might gain access to the best 
possible properties and the best possible chance of making good. It 
considered any potential threat the Bill posed to private ownership to be 
more than outweighed by the moral necessity of repaying the returned 
men for those sacrifices they had made. 
To resolve the deadlock a managers conference was held. The 
resulting compromise allowed for the compulsory purchase of properties 
but only those valued at less than £6 000. The Labor Party felt the 
soldiers had been betrayed. When Lee moved the Council's amendment 
in the House of Assembly Earle demanded its outright rejection. He 
argued that the compromise would place too great a restriction upon the 
operations of the Board and that to exclude properties valued at £6 000 
or more from compulsory purchase would severely limit the soldier's 
access to good land. Earle suggested that although it might be 
55 ibid. 
appropriate in the normal course of closer settlement to place monetary 
restrictions on the purchase of certain properties there was nothing to be 
said for it in this case when the purchases were designed, "to provide 
homes for (those) men who were fighting to preserve the homes and 
liberties of all of us" 56 
The Minister for Lands, J. B. Hayes, suggested Earle's intransigence 
would do little to help the soldiers. The House of Assembly had to make 
such a concession to ensure the passage of the Bill. Earle told Hayes 
that he viewed such an argument as the "utterance of a weak man, a man 
who when he sees that conditions forced upon him are wrong, proposes 
to compromise and accept wrong." 57 Parliament now adjourned until 
the following day. 
When the debate resumed Earle continued to attack the Government 
over its willingness to accept the Legislative Council's amendment. He 
suggested that the actions of the Government and the Legislative 
Council "justified the taunts often made that the proper thing would not 
be done for the soldiers when they returned."58 Lee, while admitting 
some sympathy with Earle's position, reminded parliament that the 
compromise must be accepted, otherwise it was likely the whole Bill 
would be lost. If this happened, the soldiers would be left with nothing. 
James Belton said it appeared to him: 
to be a question of whether they could have any legislation of a 
patriotic character if property was concerned. The people of the 
State would learn a lot from this lesson. They would know what to 
expect from those who represented property. He was sorry a 
branch of the Tasmanian legislature was so unpatriotic. 59 
Burbury, in what appeared to be something of an about face, now moved 
to reassure the House that any concessions made to the Legislative 
Council would have little effect in practice. He was convinced there were 
many properties throughout the State readily available for resettlement 
so there would be little, if any need, for the Government to make 
compulsory purchases. 
56 ibid., October 8 1916. 
57 ibid., October 24 1916. 
58 ibid., December 8 1916. 
59 ibid. 
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Such reassurances were far from convincing. David Dicker warned that 
the compromise would only encourage property owners to unload "the 
dead horse on the soldier."" Along Party lines the House of Assembly 
agreed to the Legislative Council's amendment to Clause 5. 
The other point of difference that existed between the two Houses 
related to Clause 7 and the government's intention to spend the greater 
proportion of the Federal Government's grant on the purchase of private 
property. The majority of Legislative Councillors were convinced that 
the grant should be spent mainly on the settlement and sustenance of 
returned men on Crown land. In their view this had always been the 
Federal Government's intention; to use resettlement grants to open up 
productive lands throughout the Commonwealth. There was, however, 
division within the Legislative Council on this point. H. A. Nichols 
argued that recent experience had shown settlement on Crown Lands to 
be a near impossibility and suggested using the grant for such a purpose 
would be inviting disaster. Others, especially F. Bond and A. W. Loone, 
disagreed. They warned that if the major proportion of the money was 
spent on the purchase of private land there would be little left to help the 
settler establish himself. After all, they suggested, there had as yet been 
no assurance from the Federal Government that further monies would 
be made available for resettlement purposes. 
Despite such arguments, Nichols remained adamant that the majority 
of the grant should be used to purchase private properties. He was 
convinced that when the money ran out many of the settlers would merely 
leave their Crown Land selections. Nichols felt many had 
underestimated the physical and emotional effects the war had had on 
the soldiers. "The years of service at the front" Nichols claimed "would 
unfit many of the soldiers who had been brought up on the land for 
country life." 61 Nichols believed small blocks of private land would 
prove to be the most suitable for settlement. Any idea of settling 
returned men on Crown Land was courting disaster. 
The discussion of Clause 7 led to renewed attacks on the operations of 
the Board. C. H. Hall claimed he could not understand what reasoning 
lay behind the Board's insistence on purchasing private properties while 
J. Hope questioned the Board's ability to manage those 
60 ibid . 
61 ibid., November 2 1916. 
properties already purchased. Hope claimed that a great deal of the 
land the Board had "purchased up to the present time was not suitable 
for returned soldiers or even for the average farmer to deal with" 62 and 
claimed many properties had been purchased at prices which were much 
too high. "It was clear to him," said Hope, "that the Closer Settlement 
Board considered only one class, and that was not the returned 
soldier." 63 It was a point upon which the rabid Tory Hope and the Labor 
radical Dicker could happily agree. 
Following lengthy debate the Legislative Council decided to amend 
Clause 7, proposing to divide the Federal Government's grant equally 
between the purchase of private properties and the development of 
Crown Lands. The decision met with strong resistance. C. E. Davies 
considered the Council had lost sight of the real issue; the settlement of 
the returned men on the land. He was convinced some Councillors, at 
the expense of soldier's interests, had shown themselves to have been far 
too ready to use resettlement as a pretext for developing the state's 
vacant lands. At the ensuing managers conference the Legislative 
Council compromised. It agreed to one - sixth of the grant being used for 
settlement on Crown Lands - the remainder to be spent on the purchase 
of private property. 
The actions of the Legislative Council had not gone unnoticed. In late 
November "Ajax in Parliament" a columnist for the Daily Post, 
suggested "returned soldiers...note these little proceedings"64 as they 
indicated the "patriotism" of some in the legislature. It was clear to both 
"Ajax" and others that the Legislative Council's aim from the outset had 
been the protection of property rather than concern for the soldier's 
welfare. 
62 ibid . 
63 ibid. 
64 Daily Post. November 23 1916. 
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Chapter Four. 
Ambiguous Years: 1917-1918. 
By early January 1917 many of the Huon's leading political and 
business figures had become convinced that the state's war strained 
economy precluded all hope of new development. More significant was 
their belief that the growing power of local unions, so influential in the 
1916 conscription referendum, had to be destroyed. As one Huon 
Councillor noted there "was also another battle to be fought sooner or 
later, and that was the extermination of the I. W. W." 1 To underline 
these concerns, a renewed recruiting drive in January 1917 met with only 
limited success. Such response was far from unique. As Lake 
commented "compared to the city there was little interest in recruiting in 
the country areas and little effort to promote any." 2 
An air of despondency now infused those responsible for recruitment. 
At Franklin it was suggested, more in desperation than hope, that 
returned men might be employed to manage orchard so their owners 
might be released for active service. The Esperance committee 
considered any attempt to encourage enlistments to be a waste of time. 
One member complained "there are a lot of people who are going about 
as though they did not know the war was on." 3 The Huonville Win The 
War Committee, bereft of new ideas, called upon Prime Minister Hughes 
to reintroduce his conscription plebiscite. The Huon Times was more 
convinced than ever that the conscription debate had engendered a 
dangerous division within the community. Earle's departure from the 
Labor Party in January 1917 exemplified such division: an especially 
popular politician in Franklin, his stand on conscription had left him no 
alternative. His letter of resignation echoed the feelings of many when 
he claimed that certain unionists posed "a greater menace to the 
freedom, liberty and national life of Australia than the Hun"4 In March 
Earle resigned his seat in the House of Assembly to take up the vacated 
Senate seat of Labor's R. K. Ready. 
1 Huon Times, January 16 1917. 
2 Lake, A Divided Society., p86. 
3 Huon Times, February 9 1917. 
4 Lake, op cit p87. 
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Earle had no sooner departed for Melbourne when David Dicker, 
another popular Labor MI-IA from Franklin, found himself in difficulty. 
Two visiting actresses claimed Dicker, while drinking at the Freemasons 
Hotel in Hobart, had stated that he "would as soon be under German 
rule as under British, and if Australia were in trouble Britain would not 
fire a shot to help her." 5 Dicker was charged with having made 
statements prejudicial to recruiting, was found guilty and fined £15. 
Many considered the fine insufficient. The House of Assembly Public 
Works Committee, of which Dicker was a member, refused to meet until 
his removal. Following Premier Lee's discovery that the Act by which 
the Public Works committee was constituted did not allow Dicker's 
dismissal, Lee promptly introduced amending legislation which 
specifically validated such removal. Lee's following attempts to have 
Dicker's parliamentary seat declared vacant were soon frustrated by 
Attorney-General W. B. Propsting, who advised Lee 6 that parliamentary 
regulations did not provide for such a course of action; Dicker's 
behaviour insufficiently serious to warrant his removal from office. 
In late March the pro-conscriptionist Southport Progressive League 
held a public meeting at Hythe and called on Dicker to resign. The 
League's action received strong support from the Huon Times. The 
meeting proved a rowdy affair. Dicker's supporters, mainly local 
unionists, claimed the issue to be a matter for the Labor Party. Others 
threatened that if the meeting failed to vote to remove Dicker then the 
soldiers would - but whether by physical force or political preference 
was left unclear. Dicker argued that as numerous family members were 
at the front his loyalty was beyond dispute. He denied having ever made 
the statements attributed to him and suggested his work for the unions 
and the Labor Party answered any of the charges that had been brought 
against him. It was up to the electors of Esperance, not the Southport 
Progressive League, to make the final decision. The meeting having 
failed to pass a motion for Dicker's resignation contented itself with the 
preparation of a petition to that effect. At the close of the meeting 
scuffles broke out and the police had to maintain order. While agitation 
over Dicker's position continued, the bye-election for Earle's vacant seat 
crystalised the growing tension between those 
5 Huon Times, February 20 1917. 
6 PD1/306/59/2/17,6 March 1917. 
55 
community leaders who argued for development and those who believed 
the primary responsibility of government to lie in winning the war. Such 
polarisation was evident during a pre-selection meeting at Franklin. 
Warden Ryan, in seeking a candidate who "understands our position, 
who is in sympathy with our wants and aims and ambitions, and who will 
put them before the House of Assembly, and I feel that we will get what 
we have been looking for a long time, and that is justice." 7 stood 
squarely for development. Ryan met with opposition from V. Hall, the 
local Church of England Minister, who argued the importance of placing 
" men in both houses of Parliament who were determined upon winning 
the war." 8 Hall was especially scathing of the Labor Party, claiming it to 
be indifferent as to whether the Germans won the war or not. 
Throughout the election Liberal candidates received strong support 
from the Huon Times. Great stress was laid upon their solid farming 
backgrounds, their support for development in the Huon, their belief 
that Australia must maintain close links with Empire and their rejection 
of what was considered to be the irresponsible push by the unions for 
increased wages and improved working conditions. In contrast Labor's J. 
Craig received scant coverage. The Huon Times claimed Craig "in his 
platform utterances....failed to show either by education or natural 
ability that he would be a suitable representative for the district."9 The 
Liberal Party's Pierce was singled out for special praise following his 
criticism of the government's proposal to settle men on Crown Lands: 
"Nothing was too good for the returned men. The best we could do was 
only a poor return for the man who had offered his life for his country, 
and it was ridiculous to talk of asking him to carve out a home in the 
bush." 10 Pierce instead suggested the government purchase and 
subdivide selected properties so that an experienced man might be 
settled beside a returned soldier. This would provide the returned man 
with assistance during those first difficult years. 
Although the election polarised the community's leaders it seems to 
have inspired little enthusiasm amongst the general population, only 
7 Huon Times, March 20 1917. 




fifty percent of whom cast a vote. The Huon Times believed the war to 
have "undoubtedly been responsible for the apathy that is so general 
regarding the issue." 11 The paper was pleased though that "all the 
candidates (were) prepared to support legislation making adequate 
provisions for the soldiers who return from the front" 12 but regretted 
that none of them had proposed "any definite scheme by which this 
desirable end would be achieved." 13 
Although the Liberal League won the seat the Labor Party received 
considerable support in the Huon gaining 47% of the overall vote. 14 
The voting pattern again served to emphasise the industrial and political 
division of the area. Around Huonville Labor only managed to attract 
28% of the vote: at Esperance the figure was 66%. In timber towns such 
as Raminea, Recherche, Southport, Surgess Bay and Hastings Labor 
received 83% of the vote. The pattern of voting parallelled that of the 
conscription referendum of 1916 and suggested the Dicker affair had in 
no way diminished support for Labor. If anything the strength of the 
unions may have increased. In April Dicker was elected to the 
Esperance Council as representative for the ward of Southport. He now 
became a member of that very body which had so long opposed him. 
** ** * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * ** * * * ** * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *** * * * ** * 
Despite the economic constraint of a war time economy and the 
determination of some to solely focus the Huon's attention on victory 
there were still those who steadfastly pushed for development. The 
railway might have to wait but the reclamation works at Franklin and the 
development of a port at Port Huon were still viewed to be essential. By 
1917 the Minister for Lands and Works, J. B. Hayes, was considering two 
possible sites for a port. One, the so called "shallow site", was at 
Shipwrights Point while the other, known as the "deepwater site", was in 
Hospital Bay. The shallow site restricted shipping to Hobart while the 
deepwater site allowed for both interstate and overseas trade. The 
11 ibid., April 13 1917. 
12 ibid . 
13 ibid. 
14 Figures taken from Huon Times 1917. 
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growers' preference for the Hospital Bay site now attained some 
urgency. Unlike the timber industry the apple industry had so far been 
largely unaffected by the war. Now, however, the financial strain that 
had been placed upon the British economy by the stalemate in Europe 
and the successful German submarine war against allied shipping posed 
a real threat to the orchardists. Any advantage that they might receive 
could prove the difference between success or failure. The proposed 
deepwater site offered a real chance to break the monopoly that growers 
had long believed to be firmly held by middlemen in Hobart. 
By 1917 the government, following a series of hydrographical surveys 
and with economies uppermost in mind, decided on Shipwrights Point as 
the site for the new jetty. The growers and mill owners opposed the 
decision and pressed the cause of Hospital Bay. The Esperance Council 
gave ready support. It believed that direct shipping to the mainland or 
Europe "would make all the difference between profit and loss in regard 
to the timber industry while the advantage to the fruit industry by the 
saving of handling (on fruit) was ohs to anyone." 15 
In April Hayes visited the Huon to discuss the issue with 
representatives of the local councils '. "  He urged them to adopt the 
government's plan arguing that any consideration of Hospital Bay would 
lead to an expensive and lengthy delay due to the necessity of further 
surveys. Hayes argued that any possible restriction on direct access to 
markets was more than outweighed by the increasing competition local 
orchardists faced from Victorian growers. He warned growers they 
should spend more time solving this problem than discussing sites for a 
port. The growers were unswayed by such arguments, maintaining that 
the Huon needed direct access to overseas and interstate markets: the Id 
to be saved on each of the 1 000 000 cases shipped annually would easily 
pay for the port. What was a saving to the grower though was a potential 
loss to the shipper, especially Henry Jones. It was clear to the 
orchardists that their problem was not so much the intransigence of 
government but the powerful influence that Hobart shippers and their 
Marine Board wielded over Government policy. By May growers were 
discussing the formation of their own Marine Board at Geeveston. After 
all, they argued, as the Huon annually shipped a greater tonnage than 
15 Huon Times, March 25 1917. 
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the Port of Launceston it had a good claim to a Marine Board of its own. 
Some locals disagreed believing that such a proposal would only serve 
the growers interests and that to impose an added tax burden on the 
labourers must prove inequitable. 
The Huon Times supported the proposal claiming that for too long 
the Huon had allowed its business "to be managed by Hobart merchants 
and shippers." 16 In July an article laden with venom castigated those 
opposed to the Hospital Bay site, branding them as "ultra-conservatives". 
The Huon Times imputed sinister motives to their actions, claiming 
that they were "allying themselves with a small section of merchants and 
shippers in Hobart who will undoubtedly be the losers by the 
establishment of direct trade between the Huon and the mainland." 17 
For the Huon the siting of the port had become a test of the 
government's independence from those who had a vested interest in the 
centralisation of shipping in Hobart. 
While growers continued their agitation for an overseas and interstate 
jetty, events in Europe finally overtook them. In late 1917 the English 
Government announced it was to restrict import to those materials 
deemed essential to the war effort. For the orchardist the decision was 
devastating and there were immediate calls for the Federal Government 
to accept responsibility for the industry. As the Federal Government 
had already accepted such responsibility when the meat, wool, wheat and 
hop industries had been threatened by the war, growers felt their claim 
to be merely a call for equity. Despite several approaches to both the 
17A 
Federal and State governments little assistance was forthcoming. One 
suggestion that the Imperial Government purchase 500 000 cases of 
dried fruit at a low 7 1 / 2 d a case was rejected on the ground that a lack 
of water on the battlefields would create insuperable difficulties in the 
preparation of the fruit in cooking. In September Senator Earle asked 
the Federal Government to purchase 8 500 000 cases of dried fruit at 
"bedrock" prices so as to provide growers with some return on their crop. 
Nothing came of the idea. The industrial unrest then occurring on 
mainland wharves did little to reassure the orchardists and much to 
inspire anti-union feeling in the Huon. 
In October a meeting of growers at Cygnet expressed the fear that they 
16 ibid., May 29 1917. 
17 ibid., July 20 1917. 
59 
faced ruin. 1 he local Catholic priest. Father P. J. OTIvnn. warned that 
unless the Federal Government moved soon to control the markets "it 
not he the 13elt2ian poor we will contribute to next season hut the 
hutp2rv and poor neighhours in our midst." IS He claimed many of the 
families of unemployed men were already starving and he was fearful 
that many more would soon join them. O'Flynn blamed this increasing 
hardship on the steep rise in the price of sugar. flour and meat: the result 
of the prolonged industrial dispute on mainland wharves. There were 
some at the meeting who believed local shopkeepers to have been less 
than patriotic when setting their prices. Others. who believed the very 
future of the Huon at stake. began to question the motives hehind the 
war. The crisis appeared to offer little hope to those soldiers who would 
return to the Huon. 
In late October the Federal Government, following further approaches from Earle, 
agreed to purchase 150 000 cases of dried fruit at 5d a pound. The offer promised the 
growers a paltry 10d a bushel. It was an offer greeted with derision. 18.A 
The uncertainty over the 1918 crop had an immediate effect on 
property prices. In November the Iluon Times reported the value of 
many orchards in the Cygnet area to have dropped to a third of their pre-
war value. The Huonyille Council. reacting to what it claimed had heen 
a 20% fall in .growers 'incomes over the past two years. reduced the 
rateable value of orchards in the municipality. The Fsperance council 
soon followed suite. By December the future of the 1918 crop was 
uncertain though the growers now expected the worst. 
While the growers concerns intensified. the Federal Government 
announced its intention to hold a further referendum on conscription. 
Throughout 1917 a series of recruiting drives in the Huon had met with a 
singular lack of success. In July the flu on Times reported one such 
drive at Huonville to have been a failure because of the decided 
preference that young men held for "studying the mysteries of pool in the 
billiard room opposite." 19 The central recruiting committee in Hobart 
was by now convinced far too many Tasmanians were taking the war too 
lightly and as Lake noted "launched an onslaught on halls. dances. race 
IS ibid.. Octobcr 16 1917. 
19 ibid...lulv 24 1917. 
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meetings and football matches." 2° The movement soon spread to the 
Huon when, at a meeting of the Huonville Recruiting Committee, it was 
moved that the annual Shipwrights Point Regatta he postponed. One 
member claimed there were now more social activities in the Huon than 
ever before. Another argued such activities had led the people to adopt 
a light hearted attitude to the war and suggested "people ought seriously 
consider the desirability of curtailing cricket, football and other sports, 
which were doing a lot to lull the people into a false sense of security.u 21 
The motion was lost ten votes to three, the majority believing that the 
adoption of such a motion would only serve to further antagonise those 
who already showed little if any interest in recruiting. After all, it was 
argued, the community had its own life to lead. A recruiting drive in 
November only managed to attract eight volunteers: four from Franklin, 
two at Geeveston and one each from Dover and Huonville. 
The conscription referendum of 1917, like the recruiting drives of the 
same year, seems to have inspired little interest. In early November the 
Huon Times in a mild and even-tempered editorial reiterated its 
support for conscription. The editor argued that as the voluntary system 
had failed to produce the required number of enlistments the Federal 
Government had been left with little alternative. In attempting to stress 
the importance of the issue the paper claimed "we are surely fighting on 
the battlefields of Europe for our homes as though the Hun had actually 
invaded our shores." 22 The paper suggested conscription to he the only 
fair method of maintaining enlistments as it placed "the defence of a 
country equitably upon the manhood of a nation (and) appeals to all fair 
minded citizens."23 The editor claimed he was confident that this time 
conscription would meet with the elector's approval but warned that if it 
were rejected the country might find itself slipping into chaos. 
The Huon Time's coverage of the issue was meagre. This may have 
been due to the brevity of the campaign or may have evidenced 
disinterest. As the polling day neared the Huon Times claimed such 
disinterest was "not confined to either Conscriptionists or anti-
conscriptionists as advocates of neither side have so far been able to 
20 Lake, A Divided Society., p108. 
21 Huon Times, October 19 1917. 
22 ibid., November 9 1917. 
23 ibid. 
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create any pronounced demonstrations of enthusiasm." 24 The prevailing 
feeling seems to have been that it was all a waste of time and money. The 
most noticeable difference between the referendum of 1916 and that of 
1917 was the more active role that was played by both the returned men 
and women's groups. 
Not surprisingly the Huon Times had little to say about the 
referendum result. The electorate of Franklin was one of only six in 
Australia to have reversed its position on conscription. The Huon 
municipality had recorded a small increase in the no vote which now 
reached 35% Huonville itself recorded a three to one vote in favour of 
conscription but the towns of Castle Forbes Bay, Glen Huon and 
Pelverata had all swung from Yes to No. At Cygnet the marginal Yes 
vote of 1916 became a definite No as 58% voted against conscription. In 
Esperance the No vote stood at 72%: no town in the municipality 
recorded a majority in favour of conscription. The size of this No vote in 
Esperance reiterated the hold that the unions had in the area. At Cygnet 
and Huonville it is clear that many orchardists perceived conscription to 
be a real threat to their labour needs and voted accordingly. As well, 
Cygnet's higher than average Catholic population and its growing 
problem with unemployment must also be regarded as potentially 
significant factors in the vote. 24A 
Though rejecting conscription the Huon still maintained a vital 
interest in the Government's plans for soldier settlement. A small 
number of returned men had already taken up properties and there was 
the determination that they should receive the best treatment possible. 
In late November the Huon Times attacked the government's plan to 
resettle soldiers on large estates. Better, the paper claimed, to let the 
men choose properties of their own in areas with which they were 
familiar. The paper strongly supported the ideas of William Shoobridge, 
a prominent orchardist from the Derwent Valley, who had suggested 
property owners be asked either to make a gift of a piece of land to a 
returned man or to rent such land on a nominal basis for a few years. For 
the f-f uon Times the most attractive aspect of the idea lay in the fact 
that returned men would be distributed amongst friends and so "be more 
likely to get assistance and make a success of his occupation than if he 
24 ibid., December 7 1917. 
were located on a Government settlement." 25 
Not all sympathetised with the Shoohridge scheme. The Esperance 
Council felt it placed too great a responsibility upon the soldier to make 
his own way hack into the community when clearly such responsibility lay 
with government. The Council believed the government's recent 
decision to establish Local Advisory Boards, a decision prompted by a 
request from the Table Cape Municipal Council, offered the best 
25A 
protection of the soldiers' interests. These Boards provided a sensible 
compromise between the soldiers' desire to purchase properties of their 
own choice and the requirement that goernment act to protect their 
interests. Composed as these Boards would he of practical minded local 
men it was felt their advice would assure the returned man his best 
guarantee of success. David Dicker also strongly advocated the use of 
such committees believing they would ensure returned men were not 
placed on properties "they (had) no hope of getting a living off." 26 
The establishment of these Local Advisory Boards underlined the 
significant shift in government policy that occurred at the end of 1917. 
There had been no provision for such Boards under the Returned 
Soldiers Settlement Act of 1916. Indeed they would have been 
superfluous as the Government's plans had been entirely focused upon 
resettling soldiers on either Crown Lands or small properties carved 
from larger estates. Such a plan had received ready support from the 
Labor Party. Labor had long believed that the breaking up of these large 
estates would reduce the conservative influence and power of their 
owners, especially their disproportionate representation in the 
Legislative Council. But the government had soon been forced to a de 
facto change in resettlement policy. Indeed, the government had 
contemplated such changes as early as December 1916 when Lee, in a 
submission to Cabinet, had suggested it would be wise policy "to 
encourage soldiers to find land for themselves, and, if they can make 
terms satisfactory to the Board, will finance these transactions. In this 
way the returned soldiers will be distributed over the productive lands of 
the State, and general satisfaction will be given." 27 
The experiences of 1917 would only underline the necessity for such 
25 ibid.. November 27 1917. 
26 ibid., November 16 1917. 
27 PD1/302/212/1/16. 21 December 1916. 
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changes. Few soldiers who returned in that year exercised the option of 
taking up Crown Lands. Those who did so found the land to be poor, 
often that rejected by previous settlers as unprofitable, and soon vacated 
their leases. The aquisition of large estates had also proved difficult. 
This was mainly due to the Legislative Council's decision to exclude 
properties valued at more than 6 000 from compulsory purchase but it 
was also a reflection of the Lee government's reluctance to make these 
compulsory purchases. But the most pressing reason behind the 
government's new policy was undoubtedly that decided preference of 
returned soldiers to purchase properties in areas with which they were 
familiar. Lee was only too ready to accede to such requests. The 
growing power and influence of the returned men ensured such a 
decision to be, at least in a political sense, a most responsible decision 
on Lee's part. As well the new approach was particularly appropriate for 
an area such as the Huon which had few estates siuted to subdivision and 
then at only what would be a prohibitive cost. 
Not all were happy with the Government's new policy. Philip Perry, 
President of the Closer Settlement Board, warned Minister Hayes of the 
possible dangers that might flow from its adoption. Perry was concerned 
that if these properties ever came back into the hands of government 
they would be hard to maintain and difficult to relet. He saw little 
benefit to the state in their purchase believing it merely meant replacing 
one man with another and no new productive lands would be opened up 
in the process. Of course the overriding fear behind Perry's position was 
the threat such a policy posed to government finances. In selecting their 
own properties the soldiers left themselves at the mercy of real estate 
agents and those who saw the profit to be made from resettlement. If the 
government remained the sole purchaser it might be able to impose 
controls on the values of the properties it purchased: to allow the soldier 
to enter the marketplace on his own, perhaps in competition with others, 
invited a sharp increase in the value of land. Such an increase could only 
add to the soldier's eventual indebtednes s , an indebtedness that would 
eventually be borne by the taxpayer. Despite such fears Perry reluctantly 
agreed that "by the judicious purchase of estates in various parts of the 
island"28 it must be possible to satisfy the desires of both the soldiers 
28 Agricultural Bank Files (AB) 19/4/104. 
64 
and the Board. Perhaps inspired by patriotic motives, Perry allowed 
that "properties should be acquired in the Huon district from which so 
many men (had) enlisted." 29 Hayes, while prepared to acknowledge 
such concerns, had still to inform Perry that: 
the government have fully considered this matter and while 
agreeing that the subdivision of large estates is better yet it cannot 
alter its policy at the present time. At the same time for the 
reasons you state, great care must be taken in the purchase of 
farms to prevent them coming back to the Government." 
The government seemed tentative in its new policy. Such nervousness 
was shown in a personal annotation by the Minister for Lands, Alex 
Hean, on a letter of application from a soldier who sought a property at 
Nichols Rivulet. When purchasing the property, Hean was careful to 
warn the Board that: 
great care must be taken in the purchase of orchard properties- and 
I want an assurance....that the Board is of the opinion that the 
applicant can make a fair living and that if the property comes 
back to the Government it can be relet without loss. Great care 
must be made in seeing that the applicant is suitably experienced 
and reliable, as in unskilled hands an orchard can easily 
depreciate in value, very rapidly. 31 
As an orchardist Hean knew the dangers attendant upon their poor 
management. The orchardist's year passed in a practised rhythm which 
when broken quickly turned a valuable asset into a liability. The 
orchardists when voting in the recent conscription referendum had no 
doubt held this fact clearly in mind. 
Perry remained cautious about the government's new policy. On 
December 6 1917 he wrote of these concerns to the Secretary of the 
Board, J. L. McGough, complaining that "if it were not the policy of the 
Government to buy these small areas, I should never recommend them, 
as I consider they are a very risky proposition, especially South of 
Hobart."32 On December 8 the acting President of the Board, G. C. 
Rudge, showed sympathy with Perry's views, warning that although it 
29 ABl. 
30 ibid. 
31 AB 19/182. 
32 ibid. 
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might be "the desire of the Government to assist returned men of this 
class and need to orcharding I fail to see how it can be done without 
risking something."33 
Despite such widespread concern about the government's new policy, 
the Board's annual report for 1917-18 placed it in the best possible light. 
The Board reported that "generallOpeaking, intending settlers prefer to 
take up "ready made" farms in districts with which they are 
acquainted," 34 and suggested that this often proved to be a good step as 
these properties were well equipped with buildings and fences, 
something that the settler found difficult to provide from the small 
advance allowed under the Act. The report acknowledged the Board's 
difficulty in "securing properties which might be regarded as good State 
investments, and at the same time provide full living for the men 
settled."35 and expressed a concern that when pursuing the 
government's revised policy "in many cases what are considered by the 
Board to be exorbitant prices are asked by the vendors, and negotiations 
for suitable properties have failed." 36 The Board was careful though to 
reassure parliament of the great care taken when purchasing properties, 
especially orchards. 
Before the Board purchased any property it usually received 
valuations from three different sources: the Board's own valuator, the 
local agricultural officer (in the Huon the Fruit Inspector) and the newly 
established Local Advisory Boards. Their often different valuatuions 
were then merged so the Board could make its offer. 
Despite the Board's optimistic report some were still far from 
convinced of the wisdom of settling men at this particular time. J. T. H. 
Whitsitt, during a debate in Parliament involving some minor 
amendments to the Resettlement Act, suggested that although 
essentially sympathetic to the government's plan, he believed the time 
was wrong: the present world wide economic downturn had created a 
poor market for orchard produce and there was now the added difficulty 
of obtaining adequate transportation. Whitsitt suggested Parliament 
might just as well ask the men to run into the Derwent as place them on 
33 ibid. 




the land. 37 
The early months of 1918 saw the state's orchardists still caught in 37.\ 
great uncertainty over that year's export crop. The English government's 
decision to place restrictions upon the import of non-essential goods still 
threatened. In January there was some hope when the English 
government announced it would purchase 600 000 bushels of dried fruit 
at 7d a bushel. The decision offered growers at least a small return and 
promised their survival until the next season when trade might return to 
normal. 
By late February the growers' hopes faded when they learned the 
English government's offer stipulated that payments for the fruit would 
not be made until two months after the fruit had reached England. Such 
a delay meant growers would have to find credit to carry them through 
the intervening months. If that credit was not readily available then 
there would be a serious delay in the planting of next year's crop: a delay 
that could mean the difference between ultimate success or failure. 
The news proved doubly disastrous. Encouraged by the English 
decision to import dried fruit, the Huon's evaporating factories had 
immediately begun to expand their processing capacity. Such expansion 
had necessitated the borrowing of money at high rates of interest and the 
plants now faced huge losses. If they were to close, the growers would 
lose one of the few outlets left and many now believed they would be 
fortunate if they received a return sufficient to cover costs. 
In March the growers yet again approached the Federal Government 
stressing that "whatever is to be done must be done at once or it will be 
too late."38 They feared that the present crisis would leave them "down 
and out" and that their traditional markets would be lost to North 
American and South African growers. The Huon Times summed up the 
growers' difficulties stressing the central role shippers had played in the 
matter: 
No sooner is he (the grower) finished with the problems of the 
primary producer and...his fruit safely gathered and packed than 
he is up against adverse market conditions in the shape of bad 
handling on the boats used to convey his produce to the various 
37 Mercury, September 26 1917. 
38 Huon Times, March 1 1918. 
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centres and then being placed in many instances at the mercy of 
agents who would give the wiley Chinese a beating at his own 
game.39 
Premier Lee now approached the Federal Government with the 
proposal that it pay the growers 65% of the English offer immediately 
after their fruit was delivered to the wharf. The proposal provided the 
growers with an immediate return and left the cost of the deferred 
payments to the Federal Government. At the end of March the Federal 
Government announced its acceptance of the Lee proposal, but on the 
understanding that the money was to be a loan, the interest on which had 
to be paid by the growers. The English Government would then be left to 
pay the balance in line with its original offer that is two months after the 
arrival of the fruit in England. Although unhappy with the plan the 
growers had little alternative but to accept and hope that the situation 
would improve by the following season."' 
While the growers looked forward with little more than hope to the 
1919 season, a parliamentary repc. from Dr. C. L. Park, the state's 
Chief Health Officer, threw disturbing light on the workers' conditions 
in the Huon. The report provides valuable evidence as to some of the 
causes of union unrest. Park had inspected 28 houses owned by the Huon 
Timber Company at Hastings, and considered only two to be suitable for 
human habitation. As the majority of the houses lacked drain pipes, 
fresh drinking water was in short supply. Water for drinking, taken from 
the local creek, was contaminated by cow dung and human excrement. 
There was no adequate nightsoil service, and waste was often taken just a 
few hundred yards along a nearby road and dumped at its side. Such 
conditions meant serious outbreaks of typhus were inevitable. 
At least two members of the Local Council, Clark and Dicker, blamed 
the situation on the Huon Timber Company, claiming "it was an 
outrageous thing that people should be charged rent for premises which 
were unfit for human habitation."" Warden Geeves defended the 
company. He claimed the workers were prepared to accept the 
conditions as the company only charged them a nominal rental of Is a 
week. The houses themselves were some of the first to be erected and 
this, coupled with the low rents, meant that it was uneconomic to effect 
39 ibid. 
40 ibid., January 15 1918. 
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repairs. In any case, suggested Geeves, everyone knew that mill hands 
were a notorious floating population who took no pride at all in their 
accommodation. Clark replied that in Dr. Park the area had finally 
found a health inspector who was "outside the mill influence" 41 so the 
workers might now at least hope for an unbiased consideration of their 
needs. Without such help the workers would continue to suffer at the 
hands of the mill owners. 
The problem of health was only one aspect of the difficulties mill 
workers faced. Park's report was a partial documentation of the general 
malaise then prevalent throughout the Esperance region. The 
commencement of war had led to a rapid decline in milling and 
widespread unemployment. Many men, seeing little future in the area, 
had moved elsewhere to seek employment; a number had enlisted. A 
discernible air of depression had begun to fall on these outlying areas of 
the Huon. 
The Government's decision to construct a jetty at Hospital Bay, the 
orchardists' preferred site, brought some hope to the Huon though 
Minister Hayes warned the decision would not provide a complete 
41. 
solution to the Huon's growing economic plight. In his opinion, it was 
most unlikely that interstate boats would be prepared to make regular 
calls at Geeveston. A later upgrading of the port might allow for 
interstate vessels but the government had no intention of carrying out 
such work in the foreseeable future. Despite Hayes's comments the 
growers were pleased with the decision: a decision that encouraged the 
belief that when necessary pressure was placed upon government 
anything was possible. The key to success was persistence and 
organisation. 
There was further good news in July when Hayes officially announced 
the commencement of the Franklin reclamation scheme. With the new 
dredge operating it was hoped the work would soon be completed 
allowing interstate boats to use the wharf. It was hoped too that the 
reclaimed land would prove attractive to new industries. Warden Ryan 
assured those gathered for the official commencement of dredging that 
they would soon see "instead of the present swamp...one of the finest 
promenades in the state."42 
41 ibid . 
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The increasing frequency with which men were returning to the Huon 
from the war also offered some sense of hope. Speakers at welcome 
home celebrations spoke glowingly of the heroic stature of the men and 
of the great deeds they had performed, deeds that were defining a new 
Australia. In October the state's Chief Justice, Sir Herbert Nicholls, a 
vociferous Protestant and Empire loyalist, when unveiling the Esperance 
Roll of Honour at Geeveston, referred to this new Australia. He told the 
crowd of 700 that "the men whose names were on the Board had 
contributed to what he regarded as the making of a new Australia - an 
Australia which, for the first time, a whole civilised world recognised and 
admired - and their status now and henceforth must always be better 
than those who had not gone to war." 43 It is clear that a new and 
powerfully emotive force had entered the Australian consciousness. The 
experiences of those men who had served in the war now set them apart 
from all others. In success or failure such new found status would render 
these men near "untouchable". 
The best news of all was the war's end on 11 November At Franklin a 
small brass band led a large gathering of people in procession. The blare 
of motor car horns, the scream of the S. S. Waldemar's siren and the 
whistle of the dredge broke the silence of the night. Many, in disbelief, 
checked the accuracy of the news with Post Master Wright while others 
sang hymns of thanksgiving. With the exception of a few hardy revellers, 
most were in bed by midnight. 
Huonville, though in festive mood on the Monday evening, restrained 
itself until the following day for its celebrations which centred on a 
procession which moved from Ranelagh to the Huonville Town Hall. 
Although returned men held a prominent place in the procession, the 
Huon Times felt the most notable feature to have been the sheer 
number of motor vehicles on display. No doubt the paper was convinced 
that this display belied the persistent talk of doom and gloom. 
Never before in the history of the district has anything like such an 
assemblage of vehicles been together. The line was considerably 
over a mile in length and included every class of vehicle that could 
be drawn or propelled along the road. Most of them too, were 
tastefully decorated with flowers and shrubs, and nearly all carried 
43 ibid., October 1 1918. 
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one or more national flags. 44 
At Cygnet the ringing of bells and the firing of rockets brought people 
into Mary Street on the Monday night. While speeches were made, some 
fired rifles into the air. During the celebrations someone was seen 
pushing a barrel along the road, an activity that led most of the town's 
young men to believe that here was a chance to begin the true 
celebration. They were to be disappointed, for the supposed barrel of 
beer turned out to be a barrel of tar intended for use in the bonfire lit 
outside the post office. In poignant imagery, these young men were 
reported later standing around gazing at the fire, their faces registering " 
mixed feelings of joy and disappointment." 45 
On the following Tuesday afternoon a general holiday was declared in 
Cygnet and a procession, led by the Fruitgrowers Band and the local 
school children, marched to the Town Hall where they were addressed by 
Father O'Flynn. O'Flynn, like Nicholls, was convinced the war had led 
Australia to a new-found sense of maturity, that it had been in a very real 
sense Australia's baptism as a nation. For O'Flynn "Australia had gone 
to war as a colony and come out of it one of the greatest nations."46 
In early December such new found optimism was cut short by the 
announcement that there would be no shipping space available for 
apples in 1919. The Huon Times railed at what it believed to be such 
blatant unfairness. With all other producers promised shipping, why 
were the orchardists to suffer such treatment. The paper called upon the 
Federal Government to provide some form of immediate assistance to 
growers otherwise the value of the state's orchards would decrease "with 
the result that the State and Federal Government's revenues will 
suffer."47 
The end of the year also witnessed declining optimism over the 
government's plan to settle the ever-increasing number of returned 
soldiers. In August G. M. Foster voiced concern about the Board's 
operations. Foster, an ex-servicemen, had been instrumental in the 
formation of a "soldiers' and patriots' political league" - an organisation 
that aimed "to secure more power and influence for (Foster) and his 
44 ibid., November 12 1918. 
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fellows"48 and provide them with political representation. As such 
Foster held himself to be a spokesman for ex-servicmens' interests. 
Foster was convinced the Board was purchasing properties at too high a 
price and allowing them to be taken up by men of little or no 
qualification. He accused the Board of placing the interests of returned 
men before sound economic practice, arguing that a man's service to his 
country provided no automatic right to resettlement. No doubt Foster 
was also concerned about the dismal prospects such resettlement offered 
the returned man. Foster especially queried the Board's purchase of 
orchards, believing that in the present depressed climate many settlers 
must fail leaving their unsaleable properties in the hands of government. 
The purchase of such properties had forced Foster to consider the 
ultimate cost of the scheme, a cost that he believed would eventually 
have to be borne by the taxpayer. The II uon Times was also concerned 
about the eventual cost of soldier settlement, warning the government's 
plans were likely to cost as much as the recent war. 49 
Minister Hayes assured parliament that although the government was 
still purchasing orchards he had "given instructions not to settle on them 
any but really suitable men." 5 ° Such an assurance did little to allay the 
fears of many. Frederick Burbury was another who feared the 
consequences of the government's present policy. Burbury claimed that 
"a great number of people are of the opinion that too much money had 
been spent for some of the land intended for soldier settlement" 51 and 
that "his experience was that nine out of ten who went to the Government 
and offered land for sale were themselves not doing well. They often 
wanted to unload their properties and seized upon the idea of shoving it 
onto the Government."52 
Others believed the government to be dilatory in the matter of 
resettlement. In December, at a welcome home function at Franklin, 
Councillor Cuthbert attacked the state government over the tardiness of 
its dealings with the returned men. Cuthbert claimed that the 
48 Lake. A Divided Society., p101. 
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government was far too prepared to allow highly paid public servants, 
rather than practical men, to oversee the scheme. He claimed that all 
the public servants did was to send circulars to the local valuation 
committees and let them do all the work, and complained that "if this is 
the best that the government officials can do for those men who have 
saved this country from succumbing to the power of Germany it is time to 
throw up their jobs and let the matter be controlled by men of more 
business like instincts."53 
The Board defended itself against such criticism by claiming that the 
speedy demobilisation of soldiers had stretched its resources to the limit. 
As the Board noted in its official report, "with the signing of the 
Armistice and the consequent demobilisation of the troops, and their 
rapid return to the State, necessity arose for greater expidition in the 
purchase of suitable properties and settlement of the men." 54 It will be 
remembered that state governments had feared just this situation at the 
repatriation conferences of 1915-16. 
The Board also informed Parliament of its difficulties when trying to 
purchase suitable properties. Owners were often either reluctant to sell 
or inclined to seek exorbitant prices. To provide the soldiers with 
greater access to more suitable properties the Board asked Parliament 
to strengthen the compulsory clauses of the Resettlement Act. Given the 
antagonism of many parliamentarians towards compulsory purchase in 
1917, there was little doubt of the response. 
The Board was concerned to purchase properties at a reasonable 
price; it had early realised that if property prices were too high many 
soldiers would be unable to meet their obligations. Then the 
government would face the possibility of being left with many properties 
that could only be disposed of at a loss. As the Board reported: "it was 
essential to always bear in mind the necessity for estates being acquired 
at prices as will allow of prospective settlers meeting their obligations to 
the Crown and obtaining a fair living from their holdings." 55 
From the inception of the scheme there had always been a nervousness 
in government circles as to purchase of orchard properties. The Board's 
report for 1918-1919 reinforced this concern: "It will be readily 
53 Heron Times, December 1 1918. 
54  Closer Settlement Board Report for 1918-19, T. J. P. P., Volume 1,XXXI, 1919-20, Paper No 22. 
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understood that orchards and fruit farms suffer most from inattention 
and neglect of lessees, and it is most essential that only the right class of 
men with experience shall he placed on properties of this description." 56 
The Board had already experienced losses on such properties, though it 
claimed these to be merely the result of the industry's temporary 
difficulties. The report was optimistic that the fruit industry would soon 
revive and the soldier settlers make good. Such optimism was not shared 
by many Huon orchardists. They were convinced the coming season 




A Context of continuing difficulty: 1919-1925. 
For the people of the Huon, indeed for all Tasmanians, the end of 
hostilities in Europe held promise of a return to pre-war economic 
prosperity and the hope that trade links with England, severed in the war 
years, would soon be renewed. This was not to be. Lloyd Robson in 
writing of this period referred to it as "A Dismal Decade". 1 The 
orchardist in this period was to find himself suffering under what seemed 
to be an endless litany of economic reversals. A lack of shipping due to 
German submarine action in the war, British import and price controls, 
the operations of the Navigation Act and the Australian tariffs, the lack 
of co-operation amongst growers, growing union militancy and the 
general economic downturn at the end of the war all made the grower's 
job a difficult one. As well, many growers became increasingly convinced 
that they were the victims of a Hobart based cartel of businessmen whose 
aim was the complete control and manipulation of the orcharding 
industry. 
Any relief that orchardists might have hoped to gain from State and 
Federal Governments was lost in the general financial difficulties of the 
post-war years. The cost of the war had already been paid for in lives - 
now came the time of financial reckoning. Tasmania's economy, fragile 
and dependent on overseas and interstate markets, was severely affected 
by this accrued war debt. Tasmania was to enter into a period of deep 
recession. In an effort to balance the State's finances the Lee 
Nationalist Government instituted a regime of severe economic controls 
that in turn created an unstable, perhaps atrophied, political system. 
For the Huon, so dependent upon one marketable export in its orchards, 
the period was to prove especially difficult. 
These already real pressures were to be exacerbated by increasingly 
difficult and protracted antagonisms between employer and employees, 
especially evident in the timber industry. There was to be an 
intensification of class antagonisms, already evident during the 
conscription referendums of 1916 and 1917. The economic downturn in 
the Huon led to a significant exodus of population from the area. Any 
I Robson, A History of Tasmania: Vol 11., p423. 
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hopes of local economic development, hopes so strongly held in the pre-
war years, would be crushed in these early years of the 1920s. 
But perhaps no group in the Huon would have their spirits crushed so 
completely as the soldier settlers. All those promises of a better future, 
of a land fit for heroes, would come to nought in such difficult times. 
While their experiences will be described in some detail elsewhere they 
necessarily play a role in this particular story as their fates were so 
inextricably involved in the general suffering of the Huon at this time. 
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * ** * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 
Initially 1919 offered the hope of a better year for the growers. The 
orchards hung heavy with fruit and the evaporating plants were readying 
themselves for a busy season. Now that the war had ended there was the 
strong conviction that shipping would return to normal and there would 
be no repeat of what had been a disastrous 1918 season. Any optimism 
about the 1919 season was cut short though when the English Controller 
of Food, in an attempt to protect England's war strained economy, 
established price controls over imported food-stuffs. TasmanianIA 
orchardists were allowed a maximum selling price of 19s 9d. Worse still, 
growers would be expected to pay landing charges of us on each case. 
The Huon Times considered that any attempt to export fruit now would 
be a venture that had "the appearance of a gamble with loaded dice." 2 
With the backing of the Federal Government the growers decided 
that the only way to protect their interests was to form themselves into an 
apple pool. It was believed that the orderly marketing of fruit promised 
the only hope for reasonable returns. The plan to form an apple pool 
also received support from Tasmania's biggest shipper, Henry Jones. 3 
Jones suggested to the growers that controlling the marketing of apples 
at one end gave some security of a reasonable return but suggested that a 
similar syndicate should be formed at the English end so that the growers 
would have a greater control over the retail of fruit in England. 4 
Controlling the market at both ends would give the best possible 
advantage to the growers and help curb, if not break, the retail monopoly 
2 Huon Times, February 14 1919. 
3 Bruce Brown's. I Excel: The Life and Times of Sir henry Jones, (Hobart 1991) characterises Jones in an 
essentially benevolent light. This thesis would argue Jones to have been mainly motivated by self-interest. 
4 Huon Times, March 4 1919. 
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that had for so long been in the hands of the importers. This decision by 
Henry Jones to hack the pool eased the pressure that had been placed on 
the Federal Government which now withdrew. 
But the loss of possible Federal assistance to growers no doubt suited 
Jones's purposes. After all, the Commonwealth government's promised 
assistance to growers had posed a direct threat to that cosy monopoly he 
had long held in the Huon. But the possible intrusion of government was 
not the only threat to Jones's monopoly. There had always been the 
bigger threat that growers might themselves organise into co-operatives - 
and at his expense. To this end, both before and during the war, he had 
attempted to create co-operatives of his own but his efforts had always 
been met with strong resistance from most growers. Such resistance is 
understandable when one considers that the proposed leaders of these 
co-operatives were to be none other than known associates of Jones. 
Indeed most growers were only too aware there could be no possibility of 
independence when men such as T. A. Frankcomb, C. S. Marsh and 
George Shield were involved. That these men had been instrumental in 
the construction of a cool store at Cygnet in 1917 and Huonville in 1919 
only reinforced the fears of most growers. As well Jones's penchant for 
creating small but competing businesses to manipulate the price of fruit 
was widely recognised by Huon growers, many of whom had suffered 
from such machinations on Jones's part. 
Jones's fear of independent co-operatives was finally realised in 1918 
when a number of growers in the Huon organised themselves into the 
Port Huon Fruitgrowers Co-operative. (P. H. F. C.) This organisation, 
based at Geeveston, was composed largely of small growers who had 
combined to protect themselves against the Hobart based shippers and 
the larger orchardists, rumoured to be in league with the shippers. 
Starting in January 1919 the P. H. F. C. already had a packing shed at 
Geeveston and had organised a shipment of 25 000 cases at which 
appeared to many to be the remarkable price of 6s 6d a case. In contrast 
Jones and the other Hobart shippers had offered 6s a case - less 3d a case 
cartage. Clearly the P. H. F. C. threatened the Hobart based shipper's 
monopoly. The Huon Times was a ready supporter of the P. H. F. C. 
arguing it gave the Huon the chance to achieve its long yearned for 
independence. 
The animosity of the P. H. F. C. towards Henry Jones soon became 
obvious. The Manager of the P. H. F. C., J. J. Kennealy, accused Jones of 
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having "submarined" the Tasmanian growers with his plan to establish a 
syndicate of English importers to "protect" the Tasmanian growers' 
interests. 5 Kennealy claimed a member of Jones' London syndicate to 
be a company registered in Hobart and that a deal had been struck 
between the London syndicate and Hobart shippers. With this 
announcement the Huon Times lamented it, "was now a matter of pure 
chance as to the fate of subsequent shipments, in which the fruit grower 
stood to lose and had very little chance of coming out on top." 6 
By April it was clear there were too few ships to carry the crop. 
100,000 cases were being delivered to the wharf in Hobart each week but 
there was space on board the boats for only 23,000 cases every three 
weeks. Fruit had to be left on the open wharf as the surplus could not be 
stored in the overflowing cool stores. It was now necessary to dump fruit 
on the interstate market which offered poor returns. Jones and the other 
shippers were only prepared to offer the growers 4s 6d a case. The price 
was a dangerous one for the grower. 
To compound the growers' problems much of the fruit left on the 
Hobart wharf was damaged by poor handling and inclement weather. 
This had usually been sold to the drying factories, factories owned by 
men such as Henry Jones. Although never paying much it at least offered 
the growers some return. In the middle of April the drying factories 
announced that they would only offer a top price of Is 6d a bushel for 
fruit. The offer proved disastrous. The Huon Times was convinced the 
growers had reached their nadir. "During the past few years the 
fruitgrowers have been having a bad time and this year the climax has 
about been reached - for if there is any worse to come then Heaven help 
the orchardist for he would be incapable of helping himself." 7 
Spurred on by the actions of the drying factories the Manager of 
the P. H. F. C., now R. H. Thompson, announced they would establish 
their own drying factories to break the "octopus power" of the Hobart 
middlemen. Thompson claimed that only the larger growers could now 
expect anything like an income from the season and that the average 
grower could only expect a return equal to one pound a week for his 
labours. Thompson drew the ready comparison between this income and 
5 ibid., March 18 1919. 
6 ibid. 
7 ibid., April 29 1919. 
78 
that of an average worker who received from 8 - 10s a day. No doubt 
many growers, after such a season, were convinced of the need to join 
together into co-operatives to protect their interests. Many of these 
were small growers attempting to eke out an existence on small orchards 
dotted around the Huon. In 1919 their numbers were being swelled by 
many of those men who had returned from the war and Thompson viewed 
the P. H. F. C. as an organisation that could provide them with a measure 
of protection against the fruit industry's monopolists. "Our boys went to 
the war to fight for Australia, liberty and the right to live in civilised 
comfort and security. Is it right that our boys should come back to us to 
face starvation."8 
The orchardist was not the only sufferer in these years. The end of the 
war had seen a rapid increase in the cost of living and just as the 
orchardist sought hope in co-operation so the unionist sought salvation 
in an increased solidarity and a push for better working conditions and 
increased wages. In early 1919 the Australian Workers Union had taken 
a new log of claims for orchard hands to the federal Arbitration Court. 
After the failure of the last season the A. W. U's log of claims posed a 
real threat to many growers who now organised themselves into a branch 
of the Farmers, Stockowners and Orchardists Association and pledged 
themselves to find money for a defence fund. The A. W. U's claims were 
seen by many orchardists as an example of the increasingly Bolshevist 
attitude of the Australian worker. It was also seen as an attack upon the 
returned soldiers. V. W. Shoobridge, a prominent figure in the Farmers, 
Stockowners and Orchardists Association, told a meeting of growers at 
Franklin that "it was very evident that growers could not afford to pay the 
abnormally high rates of wages demanded through the A. W. U. which 
also wanted ... preference to unionists. That meant that a man who had 
been to the war...who was not a member of the union, was to be debarred 
from employment" 9 
Later events at Geeveston would show such comments to be not 
entirely without foundation. The early 1920s were marked by intense 
union agitation. Many unionists believed their principles to easily 
outweigh any claim by returned men for special treatment. Indeed, there 
were many in the union movement who believed the returned men to be 
8 ibid., May 6 1919. 
9 ibid.. February 4 1919. 
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the worker's enemy. After all, if, as they believed, the war had been 
essentially fueled by the idea of capitalist expansion then the returned 
men had been willing agents of capitalism itself. In a sense, it might be 
argued, the returned men who had volunteered to fight on the Western 
Front would now be conscripted to fight on the industrial front. While 
motivated by different ideals, both Thompson and Shoobridge found 
common cause and purpose in recruiting the returned men to their 
cause 
Many of the men were indeed in need of some protection as they, like 
others, were finding it increasingly difficult to find employment in a 
recession - bound Tasmania. To help relieve unemployment amongst the 
returned soldiers the State Government in March provided special 
funding to local councils.' The Huon Council received a grant of £406 
under the scheme and employed men on the beautification of Regatta 
Point, the upgrading of local roads and the clearance of blackbe. ies. 
The Government's decision to restrict the use of the money to 
unemployed soldiers only irritated the H uon Times which argued many 
of the soldiers who had taken up properties in the area would have found 
the extra income from the scheme most useful. The present apple season 
being such a disaster the extra money could have made a big difference 
to their futures. There was unhappiness amongst many of the men who 
were in receipt of the grant. Those working at Geeveston claimed that 
after paying 25s a week for their accommodation, there was little if any 
left on which to live. There was one bright hope. After a two year 
closure it was rumoured that the Huon Timber Company at Geeveston 
was soon to reopen. 
The Government's aid to the unemployed soldiers in the Huon 
illustrated the growing concern held for these men. In July there were 
complaints from the Soldier Fathers Association about unfair treatment 
by Councils which did not give preference to returned men when 
employing new taff. As well, the Association was convinced that the 
Local Council Advisory Boards, established to help the Government in 
the resettlement of the returned men, were merely frustrating the desires 
of soldiers who wished to settle on properties of their choice. It was felt 
these Boards wfre creating serious delays in resettlement. In September 
the local Dover correspondent for the Huon Times complained 
"nothing is being done locally to help our returned warriors 
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desirous of settling in our flourishing community." 10 The resettlement 
of some men carried an occasionally ominous note. The purchase of a 
property at Strathblane by one returned man, W. Seabourne, drew the 
following comment from the local correspondent: "It is hoped that he 
will have luck with it as no one so far seems to have been able to make a 
success of it." 11 Seabourne, wounded in the war, was dead within the 
year. His father, allowed to take over the property, surrendered it in 
1922. 12 
The difficulties faced by both the orchardists and the returned men 
was exacerbated by the sharp rise in inflation at the end of the war. The 
State election of 1919 had been largely fought over the issue of which 
party was best able to control the state's worsening financial situation. 
While the Nationalists under Sir Walter Lee were returned to office, 
there was dissension within the party over the proper course of economic 
policy. Such dissension created instability within government and Lee's 
Ministry soon showed marked signs of indecision. 13 
In early October the Lee Nat7zealists, in an attempt to control 
inflation, introduced an anti-profiteering Bill into Parliament. Even the 
Premier publicly expressed a lack of confidence in the Bill's ability to 
control inflation. The rapid cost rises in soldier settlement underlined 
the Government's difficulties. The if uon Times too was not overly 
optimistic, noting "the public is feeling very keenly the pinch of higher 
prices, and looked to Parliament to do something towards checking the 
cruel but wiley and elusive profiteer" 14 and offered cynical consolation 
when it pointed out that those public servants, employed to oversee Lee's 
legislation, would probably receive the greatest benefit. 
These post-war difficulties created a tense climate, well displayed 
in the outbreak of sectarian difference that occurred in the Huon in 
1919. During the arguments over conscription in 1916 and 1917 there 
was no evidence, at least publicly, of any sectarian division or difficulty 
within the area. The troubles in Ireland, however, seem to have 
10 ibid., September 19 1919. 
11 ibid., July 22 1919. 
12 AB 19/848. 
13 Dicker's election results were most impressive. He easily topped the poll in Franklin. 
14 Huon Times, October 3 1919. 
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radicalised many in the Catholic community, especially at Cygnet. On 
Peace Day 1919 the local Cygnet doctor and avid conscriptionist, G. 
Wade, complained of the failure of the Catholic Church to fly the Union 
Jack. Wade claimed "the nakedness of this pole was a direct insult to 
our returned men, and was regarded by them as such." 15 But the pole 
was far from "naked". 
The Catholic Church had, in celebration of Peace Day, organised a 
Queen Carnival and their flags flew that day. The green of the Queen of 
Erin had flown at the masthead while the red, white and blue of the 
Queen of Peace took bottom position. No doubt this was the real cause 
of Wade's difficulty. One returned man, Clem Lawler, approached the 
local Catholic priest, Father P. J. O'Flynn, and asked him to fly the flag 
of the Queen of Peace at the masthead for the day but O'Flynn refused to 
do so. He did though offer to fly an Australian flag but when Lawler 
returned with the Union Jack O'Flynn refused to fly it until "justice is 
done to my people and country." 16 
When O'Flynn addressed his congregation a few days later to 
defend his actions he did so in Gaelic. He told the congregation that the 
positions of the flags in no way represented disloyalty to Australia but 
had merely reflected the relative positions of the Queens at that time. 
The request to fly the Union Jack had been an insult to both himself and 
his people - the Irish. Having just returned from Ireland he had seen 
first hand the operations of the Black and Tans and it had left him with 
nothing but bitter hatred for the English and their flag. His spirited 
defence met with applause from his congregation. 
There was further sectarian strife in October when, in expectation 
of the then world wide influenza epidemic reaching Cygnet, O'Flynn 
asked Dr. Ingram from the Health Department to visit the Huon. Some 
on the Cygnet Council, responsible for matters of local health, saw 
effrontery in O'Flynn's move. O'Flynn saw it differently and claimed 
that he "would not be doing (his) duty as a Catholic Priest if (he) stood 
by and saw (his) people dying all around...and did not make an effort to 
save them." 17 O'Flynn also managed to obtain the services of a nurse 
15 ibid., August 8 1919. 
16 ibid., August 15 1919. 
17 ibid., October 7 1919. 
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from Hobart but the Council demanded her immediate return. O'Flynn 
suggested the Council's decision to be motivated by sectarian interests 
and suggested the nurse had been ordered back to Hobart "because she 
had been trained at St Vincent's Hospital." 18 The Council claimed its 
actions to be motivated not by sectarian but by financial reasons. This is 
possible, but many saw sectarianism behind the Council's decision. 
For the people of the Huon the recent outbreak of peace in Europe 
was bittersweet: the promised benefits were but a tantalising dream. 
The post-war world had shown itself to be a hard and dangerous place. 
These sentiments were neatly encapsulated in a piece of verse from one 
local orchardist. 
An Orchardist's Troubles 
As I walked out the other night, 
I met poor Smith in sorry plight. 
He's mighty dense who failed to trace, 
Dejection written on his face. 
Why Smith, said I, prop up your jaw, 
It never looked so low beficv , . 
Be careful or it will soon rest, 
Right down upon your blooming chest. 
Cheer up old boy you're giving way, 
The sun will shine another day. 
But Smith he only shook his head, 
And with disconsolation said, n 
I've got no use for wileyWatt, 17 
He'd let our pears and apples rot. 
Instead of helping pull us through, 
By sending just a ship or two, 
The Government is seems to me, 
Gives nothing else but sympathy. 
Of growing fruit I'm mighty sick, 
No wonder men turn Bolshevick. 
Wherever, he said, I look around, 
The fruit lies rotting on the ground. 
Another thing we've got to face, 
It's mighty hard to get a case. 
With freights and labour on the rise, 
Expenses mount up to the skies. 
ft seems to me it's all alike, 
We've got to pay for every strike. 
Whenever there's trouble at the mill, 
The growers have to foot the bill. 
The same upon the wharf applies, 
Whenever lumpers want a rise. 
You're going to hear a sorry tale, 
Why every place must be for sale. 
18 ibid. 
19W. A. Watt was acting Prime Minister, Hughes being overseas in 1918-1919. 
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Unless we get the ships supplied, 
To carry fruit the other side. 
So after bidding him good night, 
I knew that what he said was right. 
I felt that every word was true, 
With shipping troubles, strikes and flu: 
And everything so dreadful dear, 
It meant for Smith a wretched year. 2° 
If for most growers the 1919 season had been disastrous the coming 
season offered little comfort. It began with news that the British Board 
of Trade had allocated space for only 400,00 cases but, after vigourous 
protest from both the growers and the Federal Government, the figure 
was doubled. An allowance of 800,000 cases was still regarded as 
insufficient. The season had been a particularly good one and the 
growers had been hoping to see 1,000,000 cases reach the English 
market. There was consensus that unless they were able to ship 1 000 
000 cases the season would prove unprofitable. The low returns received 
on fruit, the high cost of freight, the increasingly difficult shipping 
conditions and the wages push by the A. W. U. left many growers 
desperate. 
As the Huon Times commented, "we rely absolutely on the 
English fruit shipment to relieve the local markets during the earlier 
part of the season and if this is not up to the requirement the result is 
bound to be heavy shipments to local markets and a consequent dropping 
of prices to a figure that will barely pay for the trouble of sending 
forward the fruit." 21 The situation was an especially difficult one as 
many growers, due to the preceding series of bad seasons, had next to no 
cash reserves and merely lived from season to season, the returns from 
one financing the next. Many too found themselves increasingly at the 
mercy of Hobart - based financiers led by Henry Jones. 
To help alleviate the situation many growers, especially those 
associated with the P. H. F. C., looked to a political solution and called 
for the formation of a Tasmanian Party to represent their interests in 
Parliament. It was felt that representation in Federal and State 
Parliaments would give growers greater control over the allocation of 
shipping space and, with tariff revues in the offing, promise Tasmania 
and themselves an improved financial deal from the Commonwealth. 
20 Huon Times, April 25 1919. 
21 ibid., January 6 1920. 
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The announcement of these new tariffs in April shocked the growers. 
There was yet again the feeling that the politicians had no interest in 
their welfare. The increase in the tariff on sugar was especially 
disappointing. For the grower it represented the triumph of the urban 
middlemen and the manufacturers over the rural sector. The Huon 
Times saw the new tariffs as "a monstrous additional burden imposed 
upon all engaged in rural industry so that overgrown cities may become 
more inflated still."22 It was also believed the tariff system had inspired 
much of the damaging industrial action that had so bedevilled the 
orchardists. Higher tariffs led to a rise in the price of essential goods, in 
turn forcing workers to seek higher wages. In the end the long suffering 
orchardists were expected to pay the price and they felt their only hope 
lay in breaking the nexus between higher tariffs and wage demands. 
Direct parliamentary representation may have been a viable long 
term solution to the growers' problems but the situation in early 1920 
necessitated an immediate solution. As in 1919, the growers believed 
their salvation lay in the formation of an apple pool. With English 
importers offering only 5s a case and growers faced with a shipping bill 
of 7s 7 112d a case the situation seemed bleak. 
In January, Jones yet again announced his preparedness to finance 
a pool which promised a better return than that offered by English 
importers. Significantly Jones' plan meant the growers would have to 
accept responsibility for any losses or gains on the sale of the fruit, an 
important change to the operating procedure of the 1919 pool in which 
the purchasing syndicate accepted such risk. Initially the P. H. F. C. 
made no public comment about the Jones' plan then in February 
announced its intention to purchase fruit at 7s 6d a case. Immediately 
Jones dropped his plans for a fruit pool, now offering growers a price of 
6s a case fruit on board. 
Such actions immediately brought accusations of underhanded 
dealings from the executive of the Central Fruit Committee which 
believed Jones' intentions from the beginning to be the monopolisation 
of the 1920 crop. From various quarters there were calls for a Royal 
Commission and the Huon Times assured its readers that if such a 
Commission were held then we "would hear some funny things then."23 
22 ibid., June 11 1920. 
23 ibid., April 16 1920. 
It was not just the prices offered for the fruit that interested many. The 
way in which space on the boats was allocated was seen to be the chief 
evil of the present system. There was the widely held feeling that Jones 
and other shippers manipulated the allocation of space to suit their own 
interests to the detriment of smaller growers. Such feeling was 
evidenced by Councillor Cripps at a meeting of the Kingborough Council 
when he suggested that: 
to his mind it was all nonsense to say that the Government, so 
called, governed Australia. 	She was governed by certain 
speculators and entirely in their own interests. While a mean 
could get all the space he wanted because he dealt with the right 
firms another man got put off with four or five cases a boat. The 
whole thing was nothing but a swindle from end to end. 24 
Although some growers received a reasonable income from the 
1920 season many received little - in some cases no return - on their fruit. 
It was not uncommon for some orchardists to find themselves owing 
money at the end of the season. 25 It is not surprising that many growers 
now became more convinced their only hope for survival lay in 
cooperation. After all, it was the P. H. F. C. that had forced Jones' hand 
in 1920. 
When in June orchardists met in Hobart to prepare for the 1921 
season they did so in optimistic belief that organisation would lead them 
25A 
to a more secure future. If organised they could overcome those forces 
which had so long ensured their failure. J. P. Piggott, Chairman of the P. 
H. F. C., told the meeting it needed to get behind his movement, a 
movement which now packed and exported 40% to 50% of the State's 
crop. Such a decision by the "disorganised growers", when joined to the 
high packing standards and professional approach of the P. H. F. C., 
would ensure the best possible chance of success. 25B There was a 
discernible feeling amongst many growers that conditions were on the 
improve and the bad times were nearly at an end. This feeling was 
24 ibid . 
25 It is extremely difficult, if not impossible, to gain any accurate figures on the fruit returns, even though 
such figures were published. Published reports in the Huon Times, anecdotal evidence and figures contained 
in soldier settler files would suggest many orchardists were in dire financial straits at the end of the season. 
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underlined by the recent establishment of a State shipping line which 
promised a reduction in freight charges and by news that English price 
controls would soon be lifted. The continuing drought on the mainland 
held promise of a revitalised interstate market. The cost of box timber 
and wrapping paper was increasing and there was as yet no resolution of 
the vexed problem of the allocation of shipping space, but it was felt that 
with cooperation the growers would be able to exert some measure of 
control over the cost increases and so force the shipping agents to 
provide a more equitable allocation of shipping space. 
• 	 - In the Huon the renewed optimism found voice especially amongst 
the boosters on the local councils. The State Government had reopened 
its inquiry into the Huon railway and work continued on the reclamation 
works at Franklin. There were promised extensions to the wharf at Port 
Huon and the government and local Councils were close to an agreement 
over the provision of hydro-electric power to the area. It was rumoured 
too that many of the timber mills, especially the Huon Timber Company, 
would soon reopen so relieving the problem of unemployment. There 
was even the possibility that new industries, such as gold mining at 
Cygnet, could be started which promised a more diverse and sound 
economic base for the area. 
The boosters had not reckoned with higher inflation and even lower 
fruit prices. In August the HuonTimes bleakly noted that "the position 
is daily becoming more acute, hardship is becoming strikingly more 
apparent." 26 In the previous twelve months the local Repatriation 
Committee alone had been forced to distribute £1 529 to 67 men, 
Cl 400 of which had been spent on the unemployed, the medically unfit 
and the soldier settlers. Optimism, no matter how guarded, might give 
hope but it failed to feed and clothe the hungry. 
November saw a reappearance of sectarian difficulties. In a letter 
to the Mercury27 "Absolutely Disgusted" accused the Catholic Church 
at Cygnet of having sent some of the funds raised in the 1919 Princess 
Carnival to the Sint' Fein in Ireland for use in propaganda purposes. In 
his sermon the following week Father O'Flynn denied the charge, 
claiming the money had been used to pay off the Church debt at the local 
Commercial Bank and to help in the education of local Catholic youth. 
26 ihron Times. August 13 1920. 
27 Letter referred to in the Titian Times of November 16 1920. 
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To applause, O'Flynn told his congregation: 
in England..dogs sometimes suffered from the disease 
hydrophobia. When stricken with the disease they went mad or and 
were very dangerous. In Hobart there was a kennel where the 
virus of this disease was cultivated and the poison was sent 
broadcast. Who was safe from it? ...all must be on their guard 
especially should their names be Irish ones such as Meagher, 
Cullen, Mahon, Mannix, McSweeny or Barry against the bite of the 
dog.28 
After the collapse of the planned apple pool for 1921,. 
28A 
growers were 
left to make their own arrangements. Those who shipped with the 
cooperatives, such as the P. H. F. C., received some measure of protection but 
those who didn't were left to the mercy of the middlemen in Hobart. Yet again 
there were accusations that these middlemen allocated space on the boats to 
suit their own purposes. Rumour insisted that the bigger growers, in collusion 
with Henry Jones and his agent Everard Ross, the , General Secretary of the 
Tasmanian branch of the Overseas Committee 29 , received preferential 
treatment. Indeed, as early as August 1920 Albert Ogilvie, Labor Member for 
Franklin, had asked the Minister for Agriculture, J. B. Hayes, whether he was 
"aware that it was freely alleged through the country that Henry Jones and Co 
Ltd unfairly discriminated in favour of certain orchards and/or speculators in 
such allotments." 3°, Hayes denied all knowledge of such practices though it 
was an answer that convinced few. In February 1921 a meeting of the P. H. F. 
C. was told that Henry Jones and the other middlemen had, at the direct 
expense of orchardists, made S 120 000 in the 1920 season alone. Such 
information, it was claimed, came from sources close to the English markets. 
In February Jones and Co. announced that due to the drop in 
demand from overseas markets it was to close its canning factories. The 
decision immediately threatened the employment of some two to 300 
workers and effectively ended what had been an important outlet for 
28 Huon Times. November 16 1920. 
29  The Overseas Committee, essentially a private agency, oversaw the export of, and arranged shipping space 
for. Australia's primary exports. As such it was a most powerful, and consequently controversial, body. 
30 Huon Times, August 6 1920 • 
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many struggling growers. There were immediate accusations that Jones 
and Co., haying made such large profits in the war years, had now, at the 
slightest setback, decided to close its plants. The Huon Times for one 
Orchard Work: Early 1920s. 
had no difficulty in apportioning responsibility. "The blame for lost 
markets, both in London and the East, rests at the doors of the canning 
factories...careless labelling, faulty packing and sometimes the canning 
of fruit of indifferent quality are the grounds of complaint by the London 
buyers."31 The easy profits of the war years had led to slipshod methods 
and now it was the growers who were expected to pay the price. The 
announcement in late February that Jones and co had purchased a 
canning plant in California, a factory that had belonged to Jones's 
associate A. W. Palfreyman, did little to allay public antagonism towards 
Jones. It was just such increasing competition from American producers 
which had helped create the growers' present difficulty. 
As if the closure of the canning factories was not - a severe enough blow, 
news came that space could now only be guaranteed for 670,000 cases 
and that freight was still to be paid at the high 8s a case. Henry Jones 
offered little joy when he remarked "the growers could not pay 8s freight 
31 ibid.. February 15 1921. 
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and get a living out of their shipment." 32 When in March the S. S. Port 
Denison suffered fire damage and the S. S. Northumberland found itself 
strike bound in New Zealand growers knew the season held all the 
portents of disaster. They would now be unable to ship their first export 
crops until April and their lucrative early markets had been lost. English 
buyers now realising the Tasmanian fruit would have to compete with 
that from South Africa and America, decided against advancing the cost 
of freight. Already many Covent Garden buyers were offering a mere 8s 
a case for fruit. In April growers learned that space for their fruit was to 
be further reduced to 580 000 cases. The situation, as growers knew, had 
its irony: if they had been able to get their early fruit away then this new 
reduction in space would have pushed the price of fruit to excellent 
levels. Now only the larger growers could possibly sustain the expected 
losses on the season. Most small growers would be left with little - many 
would find themselves in debt. A mere 400 000 cases of what could have 
been a 1 000 000 eventually reached the English markets. 33 
The poor returns the majority of orchardists received for their 1921 
shipment did not abate the A. W. U's push for improved wages for 
orchard workers. The growers were adamant that any increase in wages 
from the then 9s or lOs a day spelt disaster for the industry. But while 
the orchardists prepared to fight a Federal push for wage increases there 
was an equally ominous development closer to home when the State 
Wages Board decided to grant local council roadworkers an extra 2s a 
week. The Huonville and Cygnet Councils immediately rejected the 
decision. Councillor Harrison from Cygnet warned the "wage of fourteen 
shillings a day for roadmen potentially fixed a similar wage for orchard 
hands and every other worker in the district. Cygnet district could not 
stand such a wage which might be alright in a timber getting or mining 
district, but was far too high for a fruit growing or farming district which 
could not pay such high wages."34 Some believe workers already 
received a very good wage. Councillor Norris from Cygnet complained 
"some of these men took their family to a picture shoe every week. The 
orchardists could not afford it." 35 Both Norris and Harris received little 
32 ibid., February 18 1921. 
33 Figures taken from the Huon Times, March 4 1921. 
34 ibid., January 22 1921. 
35 ibid., August 9 1921. 
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comfort when Claud Coad, one of the "affluent" workers, wrote to the 
lition Times claiming the Council only wanted to put its "hoot on the 
worker's head." 36 Coad claimed that "due to his low wages he and his 
family were at that time compelled to, "sleep under bags...poverty is no 
disgrace, but it's very inconvenient." 37 With local landlords such as 
Harvey and Harrison asking anything from 12s to one pound a week rent 
the extra 2s would no doubt have been a great help to men such as Coad. 
As he noted in his letter "these two gentlemen will not knock anything off 
the rent although so keen to cut down the wages." 38 
Within weeks Cygnet Warden, Robert Harvey, informed Council that a 
professional agitator and not Coad had written the letter and Coad now 
regretted his role in the matter. True or otherwise, Harvey's claims 
underlined the real fear many Huon employers held - the entry of any 
union, and especially the A. W. U., into what had been until recently the 
closed world of the Huon. It was a world in which the worker had 
traditionally known his place. The lines of social division had been 
clearly drawn. In an attempt to circumvent the decision of the State 
Wages Board the Cygnet Council decided not to employ anyone known to 
be an A. W. U. member. As Councillor Harrison argued "if these men 
are not employed they will get out of the union quick and lively. By 
boycotting them before they get a hold in the district we shall prevent 
them getting a hold."39 
Local councils and orchardists were not the only recipients of union 
attention. The recently reopened Huon Timber Company at Geeveston 
soon found itself in dispute with the unions. When the mill was first 
reopened, in late 1920, there had been a dispute over the Company's 
request that employee continue working in wet weather. When the 
bushmen refused to comply with the request there had been sackings, but 
mill workers striking in sympathy had forced the company to relent. 
In December 1920 there was further trouble when the company 
decided a recent Federal decision to award workers a 44 hour week 
excluded travelling time. Instead the company offered workers an extra 




39 ibid., May 25 1921. 
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reluctantly the workers agreed to the offer but in February the issue of 
travelling time yet again became a matter of dispute. To overcome the 
difficulty of travel to and from the increasingly remote stands of timber, 
the company planned to erect huts so workers might spend the week in 
the bush close to the work site. The workers were advised by union 
representatives to reject the plan. Melbourne Timber Union Workers 
representative, A. McDonald, quoting Joe Hill, told the workers to stand 
firm on the issue. If they did, he suggested, the time would soon come 
when for every 20s they produced the worker would receive a pound in 
wages. The Huon Times, in reporting the completion of the huts, 
underplayed union concerns and merely noted "for various reasons, 
financial and otherwise, the scheme meets with a great deal of 
opposition from the men concerned."" When, in early June, the 
workers discovered the company intended to charge them 21s a week 
rent for the privilege of working away from their families, they 
threatened strike action. They were too late. At the beginning of August 
the mill closed down throwing 12G . en Out of work. A small staff was 
kept to maintain the plant and machinery while the company made plans 
for the future. 
The closure of the mill was seen by many to be tht result of 
intransigent union demands but there were other, more worrying, 
difficulties.4°A Like the orchardists the mills now faced increasing 
competition from overseas suppliers, especially those with lower wage 
rates in south-east Asia. Many of the mills had failed to reafforest and 
now found themselves increasingly isolated from ready supplies of 
timber. At Southport bushmen were now only working a 20 hour week if 
travelling time was taken into consideration. 
The closure of the Huon Timber Company mill and the increasingly 
difficult economic circumstances of the orchardists led to increased 
unemployment in the Huon. Traditionally rural workers had always 
found themselves near the poverty line - often paid more in kind than 
cash. The post-war economic crash now made their conditions near 
intolerable. Many now began to wonder why, given the present economic 
circumstances, one group in the community should receive what was felt 
to be favoured treatment. That group was of course the returned men. 
There were growing complaints about the continued fundraising in aid of 
" ibid.. May 13 1921. 
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these men and many believed the time had come for help to be given to 
those who needed it, rather than those who claimed it as a patriotic right. 
C. L. Tanner, Secretary of the Huon Branch of the Returned 
Servicemens League, defended his members against such charges, 
reminding the community that during the recent war "nothing was too 
good for the men who enlisted. And those poor soft-hearted creatures 
were soft enough to believe they were going to get all that was promised. 
What a disappointment when they returned." 41 
Many of the unemployed felt they hadgood reason to complain of the 
benefits the returned men received. The unemployment grant of 1919 to 
Huon Councils had been restricted to the returned men who were also 
often in receipt of special pensions and special funding from the 
Repatriation Department and its local committees. Many of them had 
been assisted onto properties, paid no rates and, in their Returned 
Servicemens League, had a powerful and emotive voice to push their 
case. Despite these seeming advantages, the reality was that the majority 
of the returned men were suffering too - those on the land perhaps more 
than most. 
To add to these growing tensions the Catholic Church now embroiled 
itself in further controversy. In April Dr Barry, Catholic Coadjutor 
Archbishop of Tasmania, addressed the Catholic community at Cygnet 
on what he believed were the English injustices in Ireland. Had not 45 
000 Irishmen fought for the English in the war, asked Barry, and now 
those who had survived were betrayed by the very Government they had 
fought for. Barry argued that when the English betrayed these men "they 
betrayed also the men whose names are on your roll of honour" 42 He 
told his audience each Black and Tan made at least £200 a week in this 
plunder of Ireland. Barry was ably supported in such claims by Father 
Murphey who proudly declared all Catholics in Cygnet to be "Sinn 
Feiners to the back bone and the spinal marrow." 43 The Huon Times 
felt compelled to admonish both Barry and Murphey for what it 
described as their "intemperate" attacks on the English Government. No 
doubt many orchardists, given their recent treatment at the hands of the 
English Government, stood in silent support of the 
41 ibid.. June 10 1921. 
42 ibid.. April 26 1921. 
43 ibid.. April 15 1921. 
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two priests. 
Towards the end of the year the growers readied themselves for the 
coming season. The State election of 1922 offered the chance, through 
the P. H. F. C., to make real their long time threat to seek direct 
representation in Parliament. There was a feeling abroad that "the 
system of co-operation should be extended to politics." 44 Most farmers 
believed Parliament had only served the interests of the commercial 
sector and that the time had now arrived for such interest to be 
challenged. Many farmers had fallen under the influence of what they 
saw as the successful Farmers Party in New Zealand and sought to 
replicate such success in Tasmania. The Iluon Times suggested the 
time was now right for such a move as "the balance of power between the 
two parties which now exists is so narrow as to make it possible for a 
third party to control both sides by using the one side or the other to 
secure everything that is necessary for their own protection and 
advancement."45 
In the election the P. H. F. C. endorsed two candidates in 
Franklin. They were to stand as representatives of the newly formed 
Country Party, an organisation founded on the mainland in January 1919 
in reaction to what was believed to be Prime Minister Hughes's 
indifference to rural interests. The Country Party claimed the rural 
sector had for too long bolstered the city worker - the time had now 
arrived for the rural worker to receive due recognition for his labours. 
The candidates chosen to represent the interests of the P. H. F. C. were 
its then manager, J. P. Piggott and local orchardist B. J. Pearsall. These 
two were soon joined by former National Party member W. H. Dixon. At 
least publicly, the group stood as representatives of the smaller growers, 
opposed to what they considered the happy arrangement then existing 
between the larger orchardists, the Hobart shippers and the Lee 
Government. They were equally opposed to the two classes they 
believed dominant in the political system - the idle rich and the idle 
poor. The former they felt should be taxed and the latter punished. 
The Country Party, while generally supportive of Federation, 
argued its disappointment to the primary producer. While Federation 
had initially promised a simpler system of Government and trade, it had 
44 ibid., October 7 1921. 
45 ibid. 
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in reality led to the proliferation of government departments and 
regulations, an iniquitous system of tariffs and the infamous Navigation 
Act46 , all of which worked against the interests of the orchardists. As 
well, the decision to establish a Federal award for wages in the 
Arbitration Court, had placed undue strain upon the already suffering 
primary producer. The awards granted by the Arbitration Court, so it 
was felt, were based upon urban, not rural conditions, and took no 
account of the conditions then applying in the rural sector. The time had 
come to make Federation work for the primary producer. 
The Country Party was equally unhappy with the state Government, 
believing it had been only half-hearted in the promises it had made to 
the rural sector. Taxes were too high and the newly established State 
shipping line, whilst regarded as a positive step, still did not go far 
enough to be of real benefit to the orchardist. Like the Federal 
Arbitration Court the State Wages Board also posed a threat to the small 
farmer. The Party called for government assistance in the construction 
of cool stores and for government control of the Hydro Electric 
Department. Of especial interest to the Country Party was the 
construction of better roads in rural areas to help reduce the high cost of 
placing produce on the market. The Country Party's policies were well 
received in the Huon. 
In December the P. H. F. C. opened its new pulping plant at Huonville. 
The 1 500 strong crowd attending the opening ceremony was enthusiastic 
as speaker after speaker outlined the potential benefits growers would 
receive if the co-operative system was extended to politics. The 
commercial success of the P. H. F. C. seemed to give the guarantee that 
political success must soon follow. 46 '‘ 
Understandably the Country Party took special interest in the growing 
problems of soldier settlement. Pearsall was particularly critical of the 
Government's handling of the issue and complained that unless 
something was soon done to alleviate the difficulties in the scheme the 
State would find itself bankrupt. He warned that "a great deal of money 
would be lost in connection with it, because while many had been 
46 A Federal Act designed to protect the Australian Maritime industry but considered by successive 
Tasmanian Governments to have imposed an unfair tax burden upon the State. it was held to have increased 
the state's shipping costs and to have left Tasmania at the mercy of inter-state and overseas shippers. 
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successful, others should never have been put on the land because they 
knew nothing about it or existing conditions." 47 Dixon reminded the 
electors that, with the State debt now standing at £21 000 000, the issue 
had reached crisis point. He warned the scheme "would ultimately result 
in a loss to the State exchequer and provision would have to be made 
good for the loss." 48 
The Labor Party too was strongly opposed to what it saw as the 
Government's incapacity to deal with the problem of soldier settlement. 
It also warned that the scheme must inevitably prove a burden on the 
State's finances unless the Federal Government could be forced to 
accept a greater responsibility. Not surprisingly the Government was 
rather more sanguine. The Minister then responsible for the scheme, 
Alex Hean, assured the electorate all monies so far spent had been 
wisely spent. He argued that the Government's expenditure on land had 
been a sound investment and that, although "the cost of the land 
purchases ...was two-hundred and fifty-thousand pounds..if it were sold 
again...would bring more than that amount." 49 Hean's claims reassured 
few. When the Ringarooma branch of the R. S. L. called upon the 
Government to revalue the property of soldier settlers 5 ° the Huon 
branches were quick to give support. The Huon Times was also 
extremely critical of the government's management of soldier 
settlement. In March the paper editorialised on Hean's failings. The 
paper noted: 
he never was a brilliant man...and he had seen his best. Mr. Hean 
has not shown high skill in the purchase of farms for the 
settlement of the returned soldiers. The scheme of settlement too 
has been screamingly unscientific. Practical farmers were in many 
instances bought out at fancy prices and men of no experience put 
in their stead. Thus the basis of certain failure was laid. The crop 
will be reaped hereafter - when the incidental heartbreak has been 
sustained by those who will recognise that they cannot meet the 
accumulated pressure of higher interest on their holdings, with 
47 HuonTimes,May 2 1922. 
48 ibid., May 12 1922. 
49 ibid., May 19 1922. 
50 ibid., May 12 1922. 
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dear labour and relatively low prices for product. 5 I 
The soldier settlers, unemployed or otherwise,, had become a problem 
for the whole community. 
The election result saw the return of the Lee Government, but 
only through the assistance of the Country Party. The Government and 
the Labor Party each held twelve seats, the Country Party five and Bass 
returned an independent, J. A. Jensen. Piggott was the lone Country 
Party representative for Franklin. He was soon to learn that holding the 
balance of power gave the right to frustrate but rarely to legislate. 
Perhaps the most surprising result in Franklin was the poor showing of 
David Dicker, who lost his seat. Dicker had run foul of the Timber 
Workers Union and the Tasmanian Trades and Labour Council and had 
been expelled from the Labor party. Running as an independent 
Laborite he had managed to gain only 750 votes, a poor contrast to the 3 
600 votes gained in the last election. The fact that fewer than 50% of 
electors at Dover bothered to cast a vote was no doubt instrumental in 
Dicker's demise. Such a low vote led to calls for the introduction of 
compulsory voting. 
If Piggott and his fellow country Party members were in any need of 
reassurance when urging a better deal for orchardists such assurance was 
ready to hand in the disastrous 1922 apple season. Yet again growers 
suffered a terrible year. In February "Spike Nail", in a letter to the 
Huon Times, put the position succinctly: 
There were some fine crops down here last year, but I suppose it 
will be the agents who will benefit chiefly by this. The grower 
always comes out of the deal on the worst side. If the weather and 
pests (insects) don't beat him you can bet the shipping companies 
and the agents will. They take it turn and turn about. 52 
As was now de rigeur, the season's initial prospects seemed promising. 
Initial overtures to the Federal Government to reduce the cost of 
transport were well received; there was the hope that the initial good 
prices of last season would hold firm and the news that some boats 
destined for the overseas trade were prepared to load at Port Huon. As 
well, a large number of steamers were ready to call at Port Huon for the 
interstate markets. The opening in January of a new P. H. F. C. packing 
51 ibid., March 3 1922. 
52 ibid., February 28 1922. 
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shed at Claremont also held the promise of a better season. In March 
the Heton Times spoke glowingly of the season's prospects: by April the 
glow had faded. 
• - 
Loading Apples at the Hobart Wharves: early 1920s. 
Difficulty continued over the allocation of space. Many growers had 
exceeded their quotas but due to the disorganization on the wharves it 
was impossible to determine who they were. To make matters worse the 
packaging of pears in non-standard cases had led to a waste of valuable 
space on the boats. 
The first English shipment in the S. S. Moreton Bay proved a great 
disappointment. Picked early to catch the best prices, the fruit had 
arrived in an immature state. Within weeks a further fourteen boats had 
docked in England producing a glut on the market: over 1 000 000 cases 
arrived in the space of seven weeks. Due to problems with refrigeration 
much of this fruit had also arrived in poor condition. In general the fruit 
attracted only a low price of from 9s to 15s a case. In July F. W. Moore 
and Co Ltd, Jones' agent in London, wired that since their last report 
"prices have fallen, and at the end of last week more nearly approached 
pre-war levels, a disturbing fact, in view of existing high freight and 
charges."53 In fact so much fruit had arrived on the market it had to be 
sold on the streets by the van load. As it had cost the grower some 13s to 
53 ibid.. July 4 1922. 
98 
14s a case 54 to place the fruit on the market the prospects were indeed 
bleak. The annual report of the P. H. F. C. described the season as a 
disastrous one - especially in relation to the difficulty of shipping the 
crop to market. 
There were renewed calls for the Federal Government to intervene on 
the growers' behalf. South African growers, due to their government's 
subsidy, managed to ship their fruit at Is 7d a case while Australian 
growers had been forced to pay 6s to 8s a case. Growers also believed 
there was a need for better distribution and marketing and suggested the 
Federal government help them to establish new Asian markets. The 
Huon Times strongly supported such a move because: 
with every organisation upon which the grower is dependent for 
production of his apples bleeding him to the last drop he must 
surely realise now that if it is only to satisfy the demands of the 
shipping companies, the manure and spray merchants, the- saw 
millers and his numerous other dependents it is up to him to make 
arrangements for ensuring better returns than he has been getting 
in the past. 55 
In October E. F. Blyth, Minister for Lands and Mines, informed 
parliament of the concern the Government held for the fruit industry. 
He told Parliament of the "difficulty in some cases in collecting the 
interest due to the (Agricultural) Bank on loans which have been made 
to orchardists. Experience has shown that the orchardist's business is a 
much more hazardous one than that of an ordinary farmer, and the 
trustees •are now very reluctant to lend State funds on this class of 
security." 56 Federally Prime Minister Hughes also voiced his concern at 
the plight of Australia's fruit industry. He promised a meeting of 
Victorian growers that he would see the cost of freight for the 1923 
season reduced to 5s a case. Many of these growers were returned men 
and their presence provided special impetus to Hughes' effort. He told 
the meeting his government "was endeavouring to find new markets, and 
if we are successful it will mean that every penny and more of the twelve 
million or thirteen million pounds spent in settling soldiers on orchard 
54 ibid., August 25 1922. 
55 ibid., October 17 1922. 
56  Ministerial Statement of the Minister for Lands and Mines, T. J. P. P., VoILXXXVII, 1922-23, Paper No. 
33. 
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lands will have been wasted." 57 The Huon Times pronounced itself 
unimpressed. The paper claimed there was "nothing heroic in Mr 
Hughes or any of the shipping companies bringing the freight down to 
five shillings this season. It is just double the pre-war rate and therefore 
must allow an enormous margin of profit." 58 The paper claimed 
shippers had made 168 000 in the 1922 season alone and suggested 
what was really needed was a reduction on the disastrously high tariff on 
sugar and the repeal of the Navigation Act. This, it was believed, would 
truly give Hughes heroic stature in the eyes of the growers. For his part 
Hughes seemed to be either incapable of, or unwilling to accept, the 
Huon Time's mantle of hero. 
In August a meeting of the R. S. L. at Franklin discussed the plight of 
those members who had taken up orchards in the Huon. The recent 
season giving such low returns left most unable to pay expenses let alone 
interest on advances. The meeting resolved to approach Hughes for 
help, outlining their problems in a most detailed letter: 
We desire to appeal to you to assist the large numbers of our 
members who have taken up fruitgrowing in the district. As you 
are probably aware orcharding is practically the sole industry of 
the Huon, and a very large proportion of its young men went to the 
war. On returning those in a position to do so secured orchards, 
and although they are quite satisfied that the prices paid were 
good values their experience of the past year has been almost 
disastrous for a great many of them. The principal cause of the 
failure to make good had bee the poor returns that are coming to 
hand from the English market, in several instances the soldiers 
actually receiving accounts for balances due to cover the costs of 
freight and commissions. There are well over a hundred members 
of our association engaged in fruit growing on their own account 
and on their behalf our association appeals to you, if possible, to 
secure a reduction in the freight on the overseas vessels and also 
to take steps to ensure the fruit being carried in a more 
satisfactory manner than it was done during the past season.... 
To give you some instance of the returns which are coming to 
hand lately, here are a few:- for 100 cases 5d in stamps: out of 
57 Huon Times, November 7 1922. 
58 ibid. 
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another 100, 47 carted to the tip, 26 cases sold 6d each: in three 
successive shipments one soldier is 5 pounds in debt for freight 
and commission: numerous instances can he given of fruit only 
realising 1/6d per case or less. Even when the fruit is insured the 
average is said to be only 12/6d and from this 9s 6d will be 
deducted for freight, insurance etc leaving 3/- to pay for case 
material, cultivation, nails, paper, spraying etc. Another year with 
the costs as high as this and not one of us will be able to hold on to 
our properties. 59 
When Hughes visited Hobart in December he met with a deputation 
from the Huon R. S. L. which asked for a reduction in freight costs from 
the promised 5s to 4s a case, and financial relief for embattled settlers. 
The deputation reinforced the desperation of many settlers by pointing 
out that in their last season they had only received an average 2s 6d a 
case for fruit. As had been the case in Victoria, Hughes was told that 
'unless some of the returned soldiers obtained relief next season either 
by a reduction of freight or a guarantee that their fruit would be landed 
in good condition they would be unable to carry on." 6° Although some 
confusion prevailed about Hughes' comments, it is clear he was 
unimpressed. He reputedly told the deputation: 
you tell me it costs 14s 6d to sell a case of apples on the English 
market and if 2s 6d is your return, then you are losing 12s per case, 
so what is the good of the reduction of a shilling ....If this is the 
state of the apple industry it would be better to sit like this (Mr 
Hughes folded his arms) or cut your orchards out and put the land 
to some other use. Why, it would be better to come catching 
butterflies with us. You know there is such a thing as putting a 
case too badly. 61 
Hughes said he had been reliably informed by the shippers that 5s was 
the lowest they could go before they themselves incurred a loss and he 
had to accept such advice. He did promise that if reelected he would 
ensure temperature controls were fitted to Commonwealth owned boats 
and that if extra funds were needed to help growers overcome their 
59 ibid., August 11 1922. 
60 ibid., December 5 1922. 
61 ibid. 
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present difficulties then his government would make them available "as 
it would be poor policy on the part of the Government not to assist the 
returned men...after so much had been spent, when a little more would 
tide them over this unsettled and troublesome period." 62 
Hughes' promises rang hollow to the deputation. 	Even fellow 
Nationalists expressed disappointment. When the member for Franklin, 
Nationalist W. J. McWilliams, spoke in the Huon, he derided Hughes's 
sarcastic manner. McWilliams told his meetings that the price on fruit 
was set by English and not Australian interests and that all shipping lines 
should fly the skull and crossbones. If shippers dropped their charge on 
freight to 4s a case then more fruit could be sold bringing greater profits 
to all. The reality was, so he claimed, that a compromise would be 
reached and 4s 6d was the best growers could expect. "The war service 
homes and soldier settlement have proved positive tragedies - the entire 
state revenue would not meet this loss in ten years. And Hughes' 
Government asks you to give them a majority to allow this muddle and 
wanton waste of your money to continue." 63 The ability or otherwise of 
the Federal Government to assist the increasingly desperate soldier 
settlers was not their only matter of concern. The State Government 
also found difficulty in providing a solution to their problems. 
Parliament proved indecisive: prepared to tinker with the problem it 
ultimately agreed with the soldiers that the only hope of salvation lay in 
63A 
assistance from the Federal Government. 
While the conditions for orchardists, especially the soldier settlers, 
deteriorated during 1922, the problem between the unions and the Huon 
Timber Company reached crisis point. The dispute was at base an 
attempt by an employer to challenge the authority of the Federal 
Arbitration Court to make decisions for all Australian workers. There 
was indeed an accusation that the dispute had originated from advice 
given to the Huon Timber Company by officers of the State Industrial 
Department, at the instigation of the Lee Government. When Lee 
attempted to establish an independent board to arbitrate the dispute, 
the Secretary of the Timber Workers Union refused to attend on the 
ground that the dispute had "practically originated in your own 
62 ibid., December 8 1922. 
63 ibid. 
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Department through the action of the Industrial Officer advising the 
Iluon Timher Compam and its fictitious contractor . '" to work at 
Geeveston under the State Wages Board agreement rather than the 
Federal agreement. Certainly the workers' conditions were a matter of 
public comment. 
Indeed the report of the local health inspector at Ramsgate was the 
subject of parliamentary debate when Albert Ogilvie raised the issue of 
McDougall and Co's decision to increase rent on several of its worker's 
houses already declared uninhabitable. The report painted a disturbing 
picture of the conditions under which many of the workers had to exist. 
One house the inspector reported on consisted of only two rooms, eight 
foot by eight foot, with a ceiling height of seven foot. The house was 
occupied by seven people, five of whom were children. The occupants all 
slept in one room. When the inspector opened the door of another house 
\ 
ten dogs ran out. Sewage was also a problem and typhoid a regular guest. 
When the Huon Timber Company closed in 1921 work had not entirely 
ceased. No doubt intending overcome the earlier problem of housing 
workers in the hush, the company hired contract labourers to construct a 
tramway to its more distant timber stands. It had employed one L. Rapp 
from Dover as overseer and he in turn had hired non-union labourers 
from Hobart to carry out the work. These men had no sooner taken up 
residence at Mrs Doubles' Boarding House at Geeveston when local 
unionists cut off their food supply. In late May an altercation took place 
at the local picture theatre between Rapp's men and several local 
unionists. The following evening Mrs Double's kitchen was blown up 
though no one was seriously injured. 
648 
Police from Hobart called to investigate the bombing, found 
themselves instead playing the role of intermediary and arranged a truce 
between Rapp's men and the unionists. The police were concerned that 
any provocation on their part might merely inflame what was already an 
explosive situation. The truce was short lived. Further violence followed 
when Rapp's men were assaulted with rocks and fence posts and 
threatened with pistols. The police arrested several unionists who, due 
to the deep interest in the case, were tried in a special court convened at 
the Geeveston Town Hall. The trial proved inconclusive. The 
64 ibid.. July 4 1922. 
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magistrate believed none of the witnesses for the defence and the 
prosecutor requested those found guilty be given only light sentences. 
After two unionists were found guilty charges against all other 
defendants were dropped, on condition Rapp's men were left in peace. 
H u on Timber Company Geeveston. 
The case had though reopened old wounds. In court Rapp was 
portrayed as having been a German sympathiser in the war. One 
defendant accused him of not playing the game, complaining that when 
he "was at the war bleeding, you tried to pull the flag down, and now you 
are trying to pull down our conditions." 65 Rapp's actions transcended 
the industrial arena: issues of patriotism were now paramount. Oddly 
the Huon Times seemed pleased with the troubles. Its Geeveston 
correspondent happily commenting "although we all deplore the present 
industrial troubles at Geeveston, there is no doubt that it has put the old 
town on the map. She hasn't been on her hind legs since the conscription 
referendum, when the old girl certainly did stand up and take 
considerable notice." 66 
The agreed upon truce did not last long. In June there was further 
65 ibid., June 9 1922. 
66 ibid., June 13 1922. 
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violence when the Thither Company's bridge at Kermandie was homhed: 
there were further assaults on Rapp's men. Attempts by both Ogilvie 
and the Government failed to resolve the issue. Not until October was 
the dispute finally settled when a new manager dismissed Rapp and his 
men and gave assurances that only unionists would in future be employed 
at the mill. The conflict at an end it was hoped the mill would soon 
reopen. 
The promised reopening of the mill was to he the only good news in 
1922. After extensive and protracted investigation the government 
announced in June that it had finally decided against the construction of 
a rail link from Hobart to the Huon. The cost of such a proposal far 
outweighed the gains, especially with the area now having an overseas 
outlet for its fruit at Port Huon and with motor transport rapidly 
replacing rail in other parts of the state. 
The nightmare through which the Huon was passing seemed tangible. 
Nothing more clearly emphasised this perhaps than the failure of the 
Huonville High Schoo16 .6A Following persistent pressure the Government 
established the nucleus of such a school in 1921 providing children for 
the first time with the chance to continue their education beyond primary 
school without having to leave the area. The government's decision to 
site the school in Huonville aroused fierce parochial antagonisms and its 
request that the land for the school he provided by the community 
aroused feelings of between those wealthier members of the area 
and their workers. The school's protagonists had long argued it would 
help stem the exodus of young people to Hobart and give local children 
opportunities equal to those in the larger urban areas. The school 
especially offered children of the lower middle class and the workers the 
same opportunities enjoyed by the more affluent who traditionally sent 
the;r children to hoarding school in Hobart. 
After two years it was apparent that the vast majority of labourers 
perceived small advantage in post - primary education while larger 
landowners continued to send their children to school in Hobart. Fund 
raising efforts to support the school failed and it was closed in 1923 after 
student numbers fell to uneconomic levels. The school's closure 
emphasised the importance labouring families placed on the income to 
be derived from their children. For most of Tasmania's rural workers 
children were as good as money in the bank. The closure also clarified 
the stark division between the worker and his employer. Rather than 
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breaking down class divisions the High School had served to highlight 
t hem. 
The closure of the High school was soon seen to be merely another 
example of the continuing failure of the Huon to attract development. 
By 1923 the litany of such failure was long: the railway, the reclamation 
works, the timber industry, the High School and the continued attempts 
to attract and develop new industries in the area. A pall of despond had 
settled over the region. The greatest concern of all though still lay with 
the apple industry, for if it collapsed there was very little the area could 
offer anyone. As if in need of some collective reassurance growers faced 
the coming season with the only thing left them - hope. 
Orchard Work: carly 
The earliest reports suggested the Huon could yet again expect to 
export a bumper crop. The seasonable rains and mild winter had 
produced excellent prospects. The only impediments to success lay, as 
usual, in the high cost of freight and the vagaries of the English market: 
With every organization upon which the grower is dependent for 
the production of his apples bleeding him to the last drop he must 
surely realise now that if it is to only satisfy the demands of the 
shipping companies, the labour unions, the manure and spray 
merchant. the saw mills and his numerous other dependents it is 
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up to him to make arrangements for ensuring better returns than 
he has been getting in the past. 67 
In January growers received the depressing news that the freight 
charges for 1923 were to he set at 5s a case. Such news provoked a 
widespread feeling that once again growers were being asked to 
subsidise the shippers. Worse still, the unseasonably wet and cold 
weather which had set in before Christmas continued into January, both 
retarding the growth of the crop and encouraging the development of 
"Black Spot" where growers had delayed spraying. One member of the 
Huon Council despairingly noted that until " fruitgrowers were in a 
position to get out of the pawn shop they would never be any better off. 
Their fruit was pawned directly it left the orchards. They were 
loonies."68 
In late January, following enormous pressure on State and 
Federal Governments and Commonwealth and private shipping lines, 
68A 
the freight on fruit was reduced to 4s and 4s 6d a case respectively. Such 
heartening news was soon offset by reports in May on the first shipment 
to England, reports which suggested growers, as with every season since 
the war, faced disaster. The first shipments had arrived in England in a 
most immature condition. Much of the fruit had been frozen on board 
the boats and was now afflicted with brown rot. The Huorz Times 
reiterated its frequent warning as to the stupidity of these shipments. "To 
go on year after year sending further supplies of such fruit in the hope 
that nature could possibly be fooled for once is nothing short of 
imbecility"69 Worse still, this early shipment established a had 
reputation for fruit arriving later in the season and as this fruit had to 
compete with that from America and South Africa there was very little 
chance commercial prices would be obtained by Tasmanian growers. 
Those growers lucky enough to see their fruit arrive in good condition 
now faced a new and more dangerous obstacle. By 1923 England's 
economy was falling into deep recession. Millions were unemployed and 
the bottom fell out of the fruit market. Returns on fruit of the best 
67 ibid., October 17 1922. 
68 ibid., January 9 1923. 
69 ibid., May 1 1923. 
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quality ranged from 1 Is 6d to 15s 6d a case. 7() By the end of June this 
price had, in many instances, dropped to a pitiable 4s a case. With the 
average return on a case now realising 9s and the grower needing Ms 6d 
to make any kind of profit the vast majority of growers looked to lose 
heavily on the season. 
In August the plight of the Huon orchardists was raised in the 
House of Representatives by the Nationalist member for Franklin, A. F. 
Seabrook. Seabrook, while acknowledging the Navigation Act and 
consequent union demands precluded any possibility of lower freight 
rates, asked Parliament to provide the orchardists with a bounty similar 
to that given Queensland sugar producers. In arguing his case Seabrook 
painted a depressing picture of Tasmania's apple industry. He told the 
House there was "no sector of producers which has suffered more during 
the last four or five years than - the apple growers. One grower who sent 
twenty-five cases of apples to England received only seven pence, and in 
another instance a returned soldier exported twenty-five cases of apples, 
which realised five pounds five shillings in London, but after expenses 
were paid he received only 13/9d."71 Unfortunately for the orchardist, 
his apples did not play such an essential role as sugar in the Australian 
economy and parliament was offered little comfort. 
The recession in the fruit industry and the unemployment that had 
resulted from the closure of the Huon Timber Company now forced many 
in the Huon to look elsewhere for work. In August 72 the Huon Times 
drew attention to the number of predominantly young people, especially 
from Cygnet, who were leaving the area. The mainland, the zinc works at 
Hobart and the cement factory on Maria Island offered more attractive 
prospects. Although difficult to determine with any great accuracy, it 
would seem the exodus was substantial. Using the Commonwealth 
census of 1911 and 1922 it appears both Esperance (12%) and Port 
Cygnet (22%) suffered dramatic population losses while, somewhat 
paradoxically, Huon managed to increase its population by some 11%. 
The figure probably suggests many from Esperance and Port Cygnet had 
moved to the Huon Municipality looking for work, especially as it by now 
had become the recognised "capital" of the region. Of course 
70 ibid., June 1 1923. 
71 ibid., August 24 1923. 
72 ibid., August 10 1923. 
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it is significant that figures for the following, more crucial years, are not 
available. Reports in the Huon Times suggest the peak out-movement 
occurred between 1923 and 1927. If this is so then the peak figures 
would have been much higher than those suggested above. Certainly, the 
Commonwealth census of 1933 reveals that neither Port Cygnet nor 
Esperance had by then managed to restore their population levels to 
those of 1911. Towns such as Strathblane, Hythe and Hastings now 
became little more than place names on a map. 
But the Huon had no monopoly on such suffering. The whole state 
continued in deep recession. In October 1923 Premier Lee, despite an 
increasingly hostile backbench, moved to cut public expenditure and 
increase taxes. The decision forced a small number of dissident 
Nationals to cross the floor and Lyons was installed as Premier of a 
Minority Labor government. 
By January 1924 the Huon believed itself to be a community under 
siege. The Huon Times laconically noted "the orchardist is not looking 
forward with much hope tc the immediate future." 73 The crop appeared 
smaller than previous year's and black spot had reappeared in most 
orchards. The paper was highly critical of the Huon's over reliance on 
fruit and suggested growers must diversify into other crops, especially 
vegetables. The paper bemoaned a situation where growers, in deep 
financial strife, happily imported expensive vegetables from other areas 
of the state, vegetables which could easily he grown in the Huon. To 
survive, the area must not only seek new markets for its fruit but diversify 
into other areas of agriculture. 
Following appeals to the Federal Government the quota on the export 
of fruit affected by black spot was raised and permission was given to 
73A 
ship 450 000 cases of such fruit. The decision upset mainland growers 
who were fearful that the export of such fruit would lower returns on all 
Australian fruit. They vowed to lobby the Federal Government until the 
decision was rescinded. For its part, the Huon Times argued the export 
of this blemished fruit to be an economic necessity. There were 
instances in the Huon "of growers who would in a normal season ship 
3,000 to 6,000 cases not being able to find as many as a hundred cases of 
clean fruit." 74 The paper suggested this move by mainland growers was a 
73 ibid.. January 8 1924. 
74 ibid.. January 29 1924. 
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cynical exercise to capitalise on the high returns expected from English 
markets now the supply of Tasmanian fruit had been so considerably 
reduced. 
In February the acting Prime Minister, Earle Page, visited the 
Huon for a first-hand look at the plight of orchardists. To the grower's 
dismay he spent a mere hour in the area. He did provide growers with an 
assurance though that the Government would not how to mainland 
pressures over its decision to increase the quota on blemished fruit. 
Within a week Page's reassurances rang hollow when Tasmanian growers 
were informed of the special conditions under which such fruit was to be 
74A 
exported. Not only had each case to be marked "blemished", each apple 
had to be wrapped in paper marked "blemished". Operating on such 
small profit margins, many growers now believed the export of such fruit 
uneconomic. Worse still, the first consignment of this fruit to the 
mainland had been rejected, forcing growers to pay the shipping costs. 
Mainland growers soon renewed their attacks on the Federal 
Government's decision to all" the overseas export of such fruit. 
In March the Huon Times editorialised on what it referred to as 
the Huon's time of stress: 
In yet another year Fate, in the guise of nature, has destroyed the 
levies of the growers. The vast extent of the damage caused this 
season by the disastrous weather in the Huon orchards is becoming 
more and more apparent day by day, and the small grower in too 
many cases in faced with absolute ruin. Already many have been 
forced to relinquish their holdings and go out and seek other work 
to enable them to provide their families with the absolute 
necessities of life. It is heartbreaking to think that these men, who 
have put in years of toil, and have successfully met their various 
engagements and calls for interest, should now at one fell swoop 
be stripped of the whole of their labours by a relentless fate, 
against which they cannot possibly provide a safeguard. 75 
Many growers were living off credit from local shopkeepers but that 
situation could not continue indefinitely. 	The situation promised 
commercial disaster for the whole of the Huon unless the government 
found some way to help them. The paper suggested growers might be 
given a moratorium on debt similar to that given the North-West Coast 
75 ibid., March 11 1924. 
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potato growers when they had suffered from the "blight". The State 
Government was quick to reject such a suggestion. 
The first reports of the prices prevailing on the English market 
only reinforced the gloom that hung over the Huon. The blemished fruit 
had not only attracted low prices but had encouraged American growers 
to glut the market with their own sub-standard fruit. This in turn had 
resulted in a further reduction on price. The Huon Times reported that 
as a consequence "all the early shipments from this state have proved 
unremunerative, if not actually showing a loss." 76 More worrying still 
was the rumour that due to Tasmania's inability adequately to supply 
mainland markets with good quality fruit the Federal Government was 
considering the idea of lifting its restriction on the importation of 
American fruit. 
In June the State Government acted to help the growers. 
Although not prepared to make direct money grants it would to offer 
credits for the purchase of orchard materials such as chemicals for 
spraying. Within weeks over 160 growers had approached the 
Government for relief at an estimated cost of £7 000 to the State's 
taxpayers.'
6A The government's offer gave immediate boost to the 
distributors of such goods - firms such as Henry Jones and Co. 
When growers received their first returns in July it was clear the 
season had been the worst on record: many received little or no income 
at all for their fruit. A significant contribution to the grower's losses had 
resulted from the way payments for shipping had been altered. The 
English-based shippers had for the first time decided the cost of freight 
should be paid for in Tasmania, not England. This meant dramatic 
increases in costs for growers due to the poor exchange rate between the 
Australian and English pound. The Huon Times cited the example of 
one grower who, having made £325 on his fruit had then to pay £12 on 
the exchange, £18 on the commission and £290 on freight. The grower 
received a return of a mere £13. 77 
One direct and obvious consequence of the season's failure was a 
marked increase in unemployment, especially at Port Cygnet. 
Understandably the smaller growers, given their reduced crop, 
attempted to save money by carrying out orchard work themselves. The 
76 ibid., May 25 1924. 
77 ibid., July 4 1924. 
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larger growers, reluctant to increase the size of their investment, had 
reduced the size of their casual labour force. Many of the 
overcommitted smaller growers were forced to leave their properties. In 
July the Huon Times reported 27 families to have left the Cygnet area 
over the past few weeks. One such family had left a property which in a 
good year had produced 1 000 bushels. In 1924 the family had only 
managed to produce fourteen bushels from the property. In the middle 
of July many of the unemployed gathered in Cygnet to discuss their 
situation. Those who attended the meeting heard the heartening news 
that the State Government was prepared to provide £3 000 for 
roadworks in the area in an attempt to relieve their unemployment. The 
Government's grant proved insufficient. In September the Huon Times 
was complaining that the Government was not doing enough and noted 
the departure of yet a further 40 to 50 families from the area. The paper 
claimed "the exodus of casual labourers from the district had been 
greater than at any other period of its history." 78 The renewal of the A. 
W. U.'s push for wage increases and the closure of the band saw mill at 
Geeveston, following a long and protracted dispute, did little to relieve 
the situation. The mill's closure reportedly cost the area a Cl 000 a 
month in lost wages. 79 The Government's attempt to sell building 
blocks on land reclaimed from the dredging works at Franklin 
exemplified the situation; the blocks failed to attract a single bidder. 
Having failed to sell the land the Government now decided to donate it 
to the townspeople as a site for a recreation ground on condition they 
grassed and landscaped the area within three years. This reclamation 
site, described by one Huon Times' correspondent as a monument to 
"waste and apathy" 80 had cost the Tasmanian taxpayer £24 000. 
There was some relief. The Government, at the urging of the 
local community, continued the extension of its electricity supply to the 
area while Franklin announced it was to revive its annual regatta. The 
radio grew in popularity and the motor car became an increasingly 
common sight on the roads. The Government promised to upgrade the 
78 ibid., September 5 1924. 
79 Brown in / Excel misrepresents Jones's role. His assertion that overcutting and increased overseas 
competition forced Jones to "keep wages low" ignores Jones's basic motivation: to ensure timber workers were 
paid at the lower state rather than the higher federal award. And that at the Lee Government's conivance. 
80 Huon Times, July 25 1924. 
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Huon Highway, to commence construction of a new bridge at Huonville 
and to provide funding for an extension to the wharf at Port Huon. 
Local Geeveston growers arranged finance for the construction of a new 
cool store. The Port Huon Fruitgrowers Association, in the election of 
Hedley Calvert to the Legislative Council, continued its successful push 
for industry representation in Parliament. In contrast to the pre-war 
dreams of the Huon's boosters, these successes may have been somewhat 
muted, nevertheless, they encouraged orchardists at such a difficult 
time. Of course the orchardists' greatest hope lay in the possibility of a 
good season: after nine consecutively disastrous seasons such hope was 
all many had left. 
The Huon Times became more strident in its call for growers to learn 
from past experiences, especially in relation to the 1923 and 1924 
seasons. The paper warned growers to export only the best of their fruit 
and advised it should not be picked too early for "to sell large quantities 
of inferior fruit only (depressed) the market." 81 There must especially 
be no export of fruit afflicted by diseases such as "black spot". The 
presentation and packaging should be of a high standard and the 
labelling accurate. Unless growers acted to restore the high reputation 
Tasmanian fruit had once held on the English market there could be no 
future for the industry. Early indications were auspicious: the weather 
had been kind, the crop substantial and the news from America 
suggested their season would be a poor one, their crop reduced by nearly 
40%. 
Despite all positive indications and in the face of sage advice given 
by the Huon Times the season proved yet again to be generally 
disappointing. Those who had shipped early and sent good fruit received 
excellent returns but by the end of July there had been a sharp drop in 
prices as vast quantities of fruit, often arriving in poor condition, flooded 
the English market. There was a widespread feeling that much of the 
fruit shipped in the second half of the year should never have been 
sent. 82 Widespread union unrest in England also added to the growers' 
burden. For the smaller growers, such as soldier settlers, the returns 
were particularly poor. Yet again many received bills rather than 
81 ibid., January 6 1925. 
82 ibid., September 26 1925. 
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income for fruit. The /Ilion Times' warnings had been in vain. The 
harsh economic circumstances of the time probably left many growers 
with little option but to ship what they could. 
As the Huon, along with the rest of the state, sank further into 
economic difficulty, Lyons went to the polls. As leader of a minority 
government he had found his position intolerable. Yet again the P. H. F. 
C. fielded candidates, supposedly standing as independents but in reality 
representing the interests of the new Country Party. For once it is 
notable that the campaign meetings in the Huon laid little stress on 
parochial issues but rather focused on matters of national import. 
Economics had pushed Federation to the forefront of political debate. 
The Navigation act and State and Commonwealth financial 
arrangements had by now become crucial. All political groups agreed 
Tasmania had suffered financially from its entry into the Commonwealth 
and there was the clear perception the time had come to review the 
state's financial dealings with that body. 
During the election campaign the Labor Party received support 
from the Country Party candidates. Their leader, J. P. Piggott, claimed 
Lyons' Government had been a good government because it had 
effectively been non-party. Its reliance upon the support of 
independents meant it was unable to implement Labour policy, so 
forcing it to represent the interests of the people rather than of a specific 
section of the community. For their part Piggott and his fellow 
candidates were concerned about the rising strength of the unions and 
what they saw as the unreasonably high tariffs that were so adversely 
affecting primary exports while aiding urban industrial businesses. He 
was even more concerned about the drift of young Tasmanians to the 
mainland. For Piggott, Tasmania had "become the nursery of the 
Commonwealth" 83 and it needed to act quickly to stem the flow of young 
people to the mainland and work to attract new settlers to the state. Any 
failure to achieve this aim would, so he believed, have a marked effect 
upon the productive capacity of the State's rural sector. 
The election results were a triumph for the Labour Party. In 
gaining sixteen seats it became the first party ever to hold office in its 
own right. In the Huon a great deal of cross-voting had taken place, due 
83 ibid., May 19 1925. 
114 
(so the Huon Times argued)," to personalities rather than political 
parties having been the issue. The fact that the three biggest vote getters 
in the Huon were the Labor Party's Albert Ogilvie, long standing 
Nationalist member J. W. Evans and independent Country Party member 
Peter Murdoch gives credence to such a view. The declaration of the 
polls in Franklin left the Nationalists with only one seat. The 
independent Country Party held two seats and the Labor Party three. 
The Labor Party was now free to deal with the State's financial 
difficulties - difficulties that largely resulted from the burgeoning debt 
on soldier settlement. 
84 ibid., June 5 1925. 
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Chapter Six. 
Resettlement and the Political Response:1919-1925. 
The Labor Party had held office for some 20 months before the 
decisive victory of June 1925. Since October 1923 the Party had 
struggled to resuscitate the state's crippled economy but had been 
frustrated by its role as a minority government, the continued depression 
in the state's rural sector and its inability to deal effectively with the 
continuing problem of soldier settlement. While the causes of the rural 
depression were largely the result of external factors the crisis in soldier 
settlement was essentially the consequence of National Party policy 
making, designed more to meet the needs of political survival than the 
requirements of an effective administration. 
Of course Tasmania had always faced a major difficulty in repatriating 
its returned men, its small industrial base virtually precluding all other 
options to resettlement. But Tasmania's post-war depression gave added 
impetus to the soldiers' desire to acquire a farm or orchard. No doubt 
many of these men, when facing unemployment, saw resettlement as 
their only alternative. At the least it offered a home and hope - 
especially to a soldier with a family. It was a dangerous situation for the 
state. But such dangers were considerably heightened when the 
Commonwealth Government, despite promises to the contrary, hastily 
repatriated the soldiers from Europe.m Its actions overwhelmed the 
already limited resources of the Board which had to abandon all plans 
for an orderly and staged process of repatriation. Whatever hope the 
scheme may have had for success was fatally crippled at this point. 
Each step in the process of resettlement was fundamentally flawed, as 
the following material drawn from the Huon will show. No real attempt 
was ever made to properly assess a soldier's ability to manage a property. 
That these unselected men were then allowed a near uncontrolled 
freedom to purchase properties throughout the state led to a rapid 
inflation in the price of land and the purchase of many properties of 
dubious quality. The unwelcome interference of Local Councils, avid to 
maintain land values, and land agents hungry for profits, only added to 
the danger of the situation. 
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But such dangers had long been widely recognised. In 1916 the 
Esperance Council, in criticising government intentions to settle men at 
Dover, had pointed out the inherent weaknesses of any plans to resettle 
men in Tasmania. Throughout 1916 and 1917 parliamentarians of all 
persuasions, and in both Houses of Parliament, had repeatedly warned of 
the catastrophe to come. Even the Board had displayed a decided 
nervousness towards the government's plans for resettlement. But the 
early warnings of men such as David Dicker, J. T. H. Whitsitt and the 
Board's own Philip Ferry went largely unheeded by government. 
An already dangerous situation was then made worse by inept decision 
making on the part of the government and Lee's continued rejection of 
any revaluation of settlers' properties. As resettlement foundered the 
government attempted to keep such knowledge from the Tasmanian 
electors. Rather allow the state to fall deeper into debt than face the 
wrath of the electorate. But Lee's adoption of such an approach clearly 
indicated desperation on his part. To isolate the general community 
from the settlers' failure wasq!,,iinply impossible. After all, the soldiers in 
their R. S. L. had a most powerful and public voice and Parliament, 
through the Newton and Hurst inquiries, repeatedly brought the settler's 
plight to public attention. 
All attempts to relieve the settlers' difficulties eventually focused on 
the issue of revaluations. For many revaluations offered a solution to a 
system which had become an economic threat to the state. But Lee's 
opposition to revaluations was trenchant, an attitude that would help 
bring about the eventual downfall of his government. Lee's opposition 
A2 
to revaluations was based on five distinct grounds. He believed the 
government's original terms of settlement had been generous and argued 
that talk of revaluations simply encouraged those who were in a position 
to pay to defer their repayments in the expectation of further benefits. 
Lee was also aware that the purchase of many farms had simply involved 
the financially convenient transfer of a property from a father to a son 
and that to offer revaluations in these cases simply meant an increase in 
the original prices paid for the properties. Lee's final, and arguably 
most important reasons for refusing revaluations, stemmed from the 
economic and political consequences of the decision. To offer 
revaluations in the present climate of depression would place an 
unfortunate burden on the state's taxpayers, and would most certainly 
expose the government's mismanagement of soldier settlement to the 
117 
public. In Lee's opinion a revaluation meant tacit admission of the 
scheme's failure and invited electoral destruction. Better to tamper with 
the scheme. But such tampering on Lee's part merely delayed the 
inevitable and passed responsibility for the scheme's success or failure to 
the settlers. Few of these were in a position to accept the challenge. 
Perhaps no other place in Tasmania provides more clear evidence of 
the tragedy that surrounded soldier settlement than the Huon. Over 160 
menl, or 42% of the 385 who enlisted from the Huon 2 , availed 
themselves of the government's offer. Remarkably only four settlers, or 
some 2.7% of this total, had enlisted from outside the area. Such facts 
underline the settlers' insistence on purchasing properties of their own 
choice and highlights one of the scheme's main difficulties. 
The Huon, due to its topography, held few large estates. Consequently 
most of the properties purchased were small in size. While a number of 
these properties were devoted to mixed farming, mainly around the 
southern towns of Dover and Southport, the majority were orchards 
centred on the northern towns of Huonville and Cygnet. From the 
evidence available it would seem the vast majority of these properties, 
67% or more, were purchased from relatives 3 though the figure is likely 
much higher than this. Between 1917 and 1922 the government spent 
£156 070 in the purchase of these properties. 4 
The purchase of these orchards proved a large and somewhat risky 
investment, though the government's initial reluctance to purchase such 
properties was quickly overcome by its desire to satisfy the demands of 
the returned men who held such a strong moral claim on the state. 
The purchase of these Huon properties and the resettlement of its 
men particularised the difficulties the government faced over 
resettlement. That the government's response merely compounded such 
difficulties was only too obvious. The consequences of this for the settler 
will be discussed in the following chapter. 
The process of repatriation proved relatively simple. Soldiers wishing 
to take up properties experienced little difficulty in finding someone 
I While this figure is drawn from the AB19 files it must be treated with caution due to the incomplete nature 
of those files. Evidence suggests the total number of settlers may have been closer to 175. 
2 Figure derived from L. Broinowski, (ed)., Tasmania's War Record 1914-1918, (Hobart, 1920). 
3 Figure derived from the AB19 files on the Huon. 
4 Figure drawn from the annual reports of the Closer Settlement Department, 1917-1922. 
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prepared to sell, especially relatives as noted above. On his return the 
soldier first completed an application form 5 which sought information 
about his war service, marital status, previous experience and working 
capital. After registering an interest in a property the common practice 
was for the soldier to approach, or in many cases be approached by, a 
land holder willing to sell all or part of his property to the Board. The 
application for and offer of land to the Board would often be sent 
simultaneously.° In a number of cases it is clear from a study of the 
handwriting that the letters of application were often written by the same 
person - in some cases it is clear that the person writing the letters was 
neither the would be purchaser or owner of the property but some third 
party. Evidently that third party was usually a local real estate agent or 
the owner of several properties in the Huon. To these people the 
Government's rush to purchase properties offered rich prospects. In a 
significant (but indeterminate) number of cases the soldier purchased 
his property from a relative - usually a parent. This appeared to offer 
mutual benefits. The soldier returned to a property with which he was 
familiar and had access to the funds his family derived from the 
Government's purchase. The family was both able to pass the property 
on to the son and receive financial compensation in the process. On at 
least two occasions returned men purchased their own properties - at 
well below valuation. This meant the soldier purchased a property with 
which he was familiar, acquired useful working capital and ensured his 
repayments were not too onerous. As might be expected these men were 
highly successful. 
Having notified the Board of the property he wished to purchase, the 
soldier next had to establish his competence as a farmer or orchardist. 
The process proved relatively simple. When submitting his application 
for a farm the soldier was required to include at least three testimonials 
attesting his competence. As well the soldier had to provide details of 
previous experience. The vast majority of the Huon's settlers, some 
75%, claimed to have had a background in orcharding. The remainder 
overwhelmingly claimed their previous occupation to have been that of a 
5 Lands and Surveys Department, (LSD)., 190. 
6 That there was collusion between the vendor and purchaser in many of these cases is clear. It must though 
be kept in mind that while discussion of the process of repatriation is of a state-wide nature the examples are 
drawn specifically from the Huon. There is little doubt though that they reflected the wider pattern. 
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general labourer; usually performing work related to orcharding. A 
small number of applicants claimed no experience in farming; here were 
ironmongers, deckhands, sawmillers and a solitary teacher. Except for 
the teacher none of those applying for a property came from what might 
be called the professional or semi-professional classes. 
It is probable that men in applying for a property regarded its 
possession as a step up the highly stratified social ladder of the Huon. In 
this case the Soldier Settlement Scheme offered the returned men the 
possibility of a recognisable social advancement. The ability of a man to 
run an orchard was determined either by the local fruit expert, a Local 
Advisory Board composed of local councillors and appointed by the 
Board to offer advice on both properties and applicants, or the 
Government's official evaluator in the Huon - W. F. Grace Calvert. On 
occasion two or three may have worked on a recommendation together. 
They agreed often but not always. The process appears to have been 
cosmetic for no applicant was ever refused a property. The 
establishment of an applicant's ability seems to have been a mere 
procedural step and there was never any real attempt to vet the 
applications. 
This contradicts the Board's official reports which continually stressed 
the effort made to assure that only qualified settlers gained a property. 
Such practice also failed to meet the assurances required by Senator E. 
D. Millen, Federal Minister for Defence and Repatriation, who had 
demanded from the States a guarantee that correct screening processes 
would be put in place to safeguard the Federal Government's 
investment. At the 1916 Federal Conference in Melbourne Millen had 
argued that "it would be very injurious to the scheme if the impression 
were allowed to get abroad that every returned soldier was by reason of 
being such, entitled to ask for a piece of land...soldiers...cannot as a right 
demand land, but must prove this suitability to become land occupiers." 7 
The most reasonable explanation for Tasmania's defective screening 
process probably related yet again to the pressures under which the 
Board was operating. It is possible too that the temptation of acquiring 
Federal funds, at a time of severe restrictions on overseas borrowings, 
7 Report of the Resolutions, Proceedings and Debates of the Conference of Representatives of the 
Commonwealth and State Governments and of the Federal Parliamentary War Committee, February 1916., C. 
P. P., Vol 1 Session 1914-1917., Paper No 299. 
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proved too alluring. No doubt if the Board had applied vigour then it 
would have faced both the wrath of the majority of Tasmanians and the 
increasingly powerful R. S. L. No political party wished to be seen as 
acting contrary to the interests of the returned men. Any concerns 
Millen may have had were subsumed under the political realities of the 
situation. 
Some did though warn as to the dangers of settling unqualified men on 
farms, especially orchards. It will be remembered that Alex Hean had, 
as Minister in 1917, sought specific reassurances from Board President 
Philip Perry that only carefully selected men would be placed on 
orchards while J. B. Hayes as Minister in 1918 had been forced to 
reassure a doubting G. M. Foster that only suitably qualified settlers 
would be given orchards. Throughout January to May 1919 the Huon 
Times had repeatedly expressed concern as to the Government's plans to 
settle unskilled men, remarking "the very eagerness of the Board in 
endeavouring to do good...is likely to lead to their undoing and inflict 
very great hardships on the very ones it is intended to benefit."8 In 
February the paper continued to cast doubts upon the wisdom of the 
scheme and complained that "in too many instances in this district at 
least, men have been placed on orchard properties who have not even an 
elementary knowledge of those attributes which go to make up a 
successful orchardist and will no doubt fall into error for want of 
knowledge." 9 In April the attacks continued. The Huon Times endorsed 
the views of F. J. Hyndes, Nationalist candidate in the then House of 
Assembly elections, who warned "it is just as absurd to propose making 
farmers or orchardists of returned soldiers as to attempt to make all of 
them doctors or carpenters." 1 ° 
• The Board often received unsolicited advice from the general public. 
In May 1919 T. Wilson of Dover warned the Board of the unsuitability of 
one Thomas Dale who had applied for a property in the area. Wilson 
reported: 
who ever has recommended him (Dale) has given you false 
references, has he isn't adapted for that of orcharding at all, has 
8 thipn Times, January 1 1919. 
9 ibid., February 7 1919. 
10 ibid., April 11919, 
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you can find out for yourself, he doesn't know a plum tree from an 
apple, also both W. Seabourne and him are too fond of the hotel, 
and have made there brags that they will have the farms for the 
time being and make a few pounds and clear out." 11 
That a number of soldiers intended to take advantage of the system must 
be only too apparent and was widely recognised in Board reports. The 
Government's offer of free rent and board appeared a most attractive 
proposition to many settlers. Despite Wilson's advice Dale was given a 
property in September 1919 but surrendered it in November 1922. 
The letters that passed between the soldiers and the Board present us 
with an interesting picture of the varied pressures placed on the Board 
during the years 1919 and 1920, the peak period for property purchases. 
A significant number of these letters were sent between the months of 
October and April when the fruit season was at its height. The letters 
continually urged the Board to speed up the selection process SG the 
soldier might gain the value of the crop and allow him a good start on the 
land. Such a sale was in the interests of the property owner too as he was 
able to offer the property at a higher valuation - especially considering 
the crisis the fruit industry was experiencing at the time. If the 
Government purchased the property then the owner was assured of a 
good price for his crop - an assurance he did not have if he was to market 
the apples through the usual outlets. 
Patrick Smith of Franklin provides a typical example. In November 
1919 he wrote to the Board "I have fill in the form in Hobart and the are 
two testimonials and one from two reliable land owners and I will be 
much obliged if you push my place through as soon as possible for I want 
to get this crop and I no place to live." 12 As Smith's letter suggest, the 
need to purchase a property to gain the crop, strong economic incentive 
as it was, was often overshadowed by the distress the soldier suffered 
while awaiting the Board's decision. Many of the soldiers, especially 
married men, were faced with a difficult time upon their return. 
Although the Government had promised employment it had found it 
difficult, given Tasmania's worsening economic climate, to keep such a 
commitment. Many soldiers saw the Government's offer of a property to 




Smith wrote again "If I have not got it by the 21 I will not have a roof over 
my head and I am a married man and will have to shift out of the place I 
am in and I cannot get a place about hear so you can see I am in a very 
poor state for I have no home of my own at all." 13 Smith was not alone. 
Russel Ayres, in similar circumstances at Ranelagh, wrote to the Board 
in March 1920 "I have no house to live in while I am waiting to get fixed 
up and to keep myself and my wife in lodgins while waiting on the Board 
os costing me a good sum of money." 14 
Some soldiers in their applications displayed an open belligerence 
towards the Board. Charles Armstrong from Cygnet wrote in October 
1920, having apparently applied for six properties in the previous twelve 
• months. He was near breaking point: 
My mother, father and all my friends live in Cygnet and this is my 
home and I want a property here. I consider I have been treated 
very badly and unless I receive some satisfactory reply within four 
days I will certainly have my case brought before parliament. 15 
Unfortunately for Armstrong his application for a property coincided 
with the Board's decision in October 1920 "to discontinue the policy of 
acquiring and settling returned soldiers on single properties." 16 By the 
end of 1920 the Board had already cancelled leases on 142 properties 
and was keen to place new applicants on these. 17 
The 1920-1921 report of the now Returned Soldiers' and Closer 
Settlement Board stressed the continued pressure under which it had 
operated. Indeed that the government should have seen fit to establish a 
separate Ministry under Alex Hean solely to oversee resettlement clearly 
underlines the Board's comments. Such pressure had necessitated the 
secondment of four officers of the Crown Law Department merely to 
expedite conveyancing. Even then many soldiers found themselves in 
possession of properties before they had received legal title. The Board 
Secretary, J. L. McGough, commented "it was only by continuous 




16 ibid . 
17 Returned Soldiers' and Closer Settlement Board: Report for 1918-1919,1'. J. P. P., Vol 1,XXXI, 1919-1920, 
Paper No. 58. 
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staff that the results were attained." 18 By now the Board had provided 
farm holdings for 1 000 returned men. Board President G. C. Rudge 
reported that during the year 790 of 1 873 properties on offer had been 
purchased "at prices which...were such as provided a good security to the 
State, and ensured the success of the settler, provided he were willing to 
work." 19 Sixty-five of these properties had been purchased for settlers in 
the Huon. This brought the total number of such properties to 110, a 
figure which represented some 77% of the final number to be purchased. 
And this in a two year period between June 1919 and June 1921. 
The rate at which these purchases had been made led to a rapid 
increase in land prices, acknowledged by Rudge in his report: "The 
numerous purchases made by the Crown for the returned soldiers were 
responsible for an inflation of values, but this was inevitable." 20 This 
inflationary process made it difficult for the Board to purchase what it 
considered to be suitable properties. Indeed, the pressure placed upon 
the Board had been so great that it had been unable to provide the 
Government with financial statements for the years 1918-1920. In effect, 
neither the Government nor the Board had any clear idea of the 
scheme's financial ramifications for State Treasury. There was a certain 
nervousness in some quarters. In June 1921 the Minister responsible for 
soldier Settlement, Alexander Hean, reported to Parliament: 
Owing to the great demand for land, far in excess of estimates, it 
has been necessary to expend money beyond the authorisation of 
Parliament....lt is necessary, however, to obtain Parliamentary 
sanction to the borrowing of an additional sum of £100 000 to 
cover purchases already made and further acquisitions. This will 
bring the total amount authorised to be raised to £2 350 000. It 
is anticipated that this sum will enable the soldier settlement to be 
completed. 21 
In December E. H. Pretyman, the Auditor-General, questioned the 
Board's financial responsibility after finding certain of its practises to be 
18 Returned Soldiers' and Closer Settlement Board: Report for 1919-1920, T. J. P. P., Vol 1,XXXIII, 1920- 
1921. Paper No 22. 
19 ibid. 
20 ibid . 
21 Ministerial Statement of Minister For Lands and Works Alexander 11ean 1919-1920, T. J. P. P., Vol 
LXXXIII, 1920-1921, Paper No 38. 
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inconsistent with a proper system of accounting. Pretyman was also 
concerned at the large State borrowings required to fund the scheme, 
borrowings rarely sanctioned by Parliament. While acknowledging such 
practises to be essentially the result of the agreement entered into 
between the Federal and State Governments, that is, monies expended 
on repatriation would be "reimbursed" by Federal Government, he 
warned "overdraft borrowing is unauthorised by Parliament and during 
the period in question the Treasurer was embarrassed by intimations 
from the bank (Commonwealth)...that it would be necessary to stop 
further credit."22 Pretyman claimed the present system of accounting to 
be the result of the government's misunderstanding of the 
Commonwealth's role in resettlement. The State Government, so he 
claimed, erroneously believed the financial responsibility for soldier 
settlement to rest with the Federal Government -the sole responsibility 
of the State Government then being the acquisition of land. As he noted, 
there "seems to have grown the idea, on the part of the States, that the 
whole matter of land settlement is a responsibility belonging to the 
Commonwealth. I maintain that it is not." 23 Pretyman's concern was 
soon dismissed by Government. The situation did not improve. In 
October 1922 the then Minister, E. F. B. Blyth, informed Parliament 
"Ministers have under consideration the question of endeavouring to 
secure additional financial assistance from the Commonwealth 
Government in view of the cost to the State being so much in excess of 
anticipation." 24 The scheme had become a financial disaster for the 
Government. 
These financial concerns were soon exacerbated by the rapid 
escalation in the number of men leaving their properties. Rudge claimed 
such departures resulted from either the settlers' belief that farming "did 
not call for any special exertion" 25 or their "want of 
knowledge, thrift and perseverance"26 or from the fact that the interest 
22 Returned Soldier Settlement: Papers and Correspondence Between the Auditor-General and the 
Honourable the Minister for Lands, T. J. P. P., Vol LXXXV, 1921-1922, Paper No 62. 
23 ibid. 
24 Ministerial Statement of the Minister for Lands and Mines E. F. B. Blyth 19 October 1922, 1'. J. P. P., Vol 




free period had come to and end. The claim effectively transferred the 
responsibility for failure from the Board to the settlers. It was not the 
process of resettlement that was at fault but the settlers themselves. At 
least Rudge was able to report these departures to have eased pressure 
on the Board's purchases though the settlers still had a decided 
preference for selecting properties of their choice rather than moving 
onto vacant properties in unfamiliar parts of the state. That the settlers 
were allowed, even encouraged in their choice, only underlined the 
scheme's failings. 
If the Board's process of screening prospective settlers had been ill-
judged then its practice of selecting properties was even more flawed. 
This is not surprising when those who selected settlers were also asked to 
approve properties for purchase. Although the Government believed 
local men could provide the best advice it meant in practice that those 
possessed of substantial local business interests oversaw the purchase of 
land in their area. This caused more bias than insight. 
The major information the Board sought from its advisors, both local 
and departmental, was the value that might be placed upon a property 
and its ability to support a man and his family. When it came to 
valuations it is clear that the Local Advisory Board provided valuations 
which were consistently, sometimes significantly, higher than that of 
either Grace Calvert or the local fruit expert. It is also clear that there 
was often confusion as to whether a property could adequately support a 
man and his family. A large number of the properties purchased by the 
Board were, according to the assessor's reports, in a poor condition. 
There was a suspicion amongst some members of the Board that certain 
owners were taking advantage of the resettlement scheme to divest 
themselves of second rate properties. The combined pressure of soldiers 
waiting to purchase and a depressed fruit industry more than likely 
helped owners of marginal properties make the decision to sell. Of 
course the fact that a property was in poor condition need not have 
necessarily precluded it from purchase. The reports on properties 
clearly show the widely held belief that marginal properties might prove 
suitable providing the settler was of the right quality. Given the 
problems related to the selection of settlers such an idea seems 
somewhat misplaced. Many of the settlers' files contain comments such 
as "a good man no difficulty of a living in 2-3 years time." 27 This belief 
AB19/1926. 
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that the returned soldiers would prove capable of working what was 
considered a poor property into a payable one perhaps had its genesis in 
the early repatriation conferences. There prevailed the notion that after 
spending years in the trenches the peace and quite of a farm would assist 
men to return to a more normal form of existence. Many proponents of 
the repatriation scheme in Tasmania certainly made such points. W. 
Shoobridge, it will be remembered, had suggested settling returned men 
in close proximity so that the camaraderie established at the front might 
be retained on their return. The Board in allowing soldiers to settle on 
properties of their choice, close to family and friends, tacitly recognised 
the rehabilitatory function of the scheme. 
All this begged the question of what was a good man. The Board 
found difficulty in determining the answer to that question. No man who 
applied for a property was rejected even when, in the case of George 
Mason's application for a property at Police Point, the Local Advisory 
Board informed the Board that: 
it is not advisable to let him have it as he is working 5 days .a week 
and received 10/- per day & is also receiving a pension and 
informing me he will be able to be in the property one day a week 
which would be useless & of course he wants stock for sure. I think 
in this district you will have enough failures in the land later as I 
can see that some don't intend to try. 28 
Mason, who had been unsuccessful in previous applications, eventually 
received his property because the time had come to "give him a trial." 29 
He surrendered his lease fourteen months later, after leasing a car 
provided him by the Board to the local hotel owner at Dover. A similar 
case was that of William Seabourn at Raminea. In Seabourn's case the 
Local Advisory Board reported: 
In this case the committee consider the applicant most unsuitable 
to deal with such a property. He is a young fellow without any 
orchard experience, & more over cannot be called a sober man. 
The committee regretfully feel they cannot recommend granting 
the application." 





would seem to have been that any man deserved a property provided he 
was a returnee. Even if Mason and Seabourn were exceptions to the rule, 
the belief that a good man might turn a poor property to advantage was a 
sentiment too obviously optimistic in the Huon. Its converse was the 
misleading, though for the Government's part useful idea, that any 
settler in difficulty was himself the cause of such difficulty; no blame 
could attach to the Government's policy of acquiring farms. Evidence 
suggests that even where a genuine trier took up a poor property the 
chance of success was small. Poor properties produced poor prospects: 
an axiom clear to many, but not to the Board. 
The Huon Times was convinced the Government had seriously erred 
in selecting its properties. The paper believed evidence for its stand lay 
readily to hand in the recent experiences of those Anglo-Indian settlers 
who had taken up properties in the Tamar Valley. Most of these men 
had been English officers from India looking to an easy retirement in 
Tasmania. Their experience proved disastrous and many lost their life 
savings in such ventures. The paper noted that the government: 
having induced these men to invest, by advertising and other 
methods, ...(seemed) to have come to the conclusion that here 
their duty ended, and...passed them on to astute speculators who, 
we fear in too many cases, have not failed to unload all sorts of so- 
called orchard properties on to these unsuspecting clients. 31 
The Huon Times felt the situation to be especially despicable, for 
despite such experiences the Tasmanian Agent-General in London was 
at present continuing to lure British manufacturers and soldiers to take 
up similar properties in the State. At least one would-be Anglo-Indian 
settler had the foresight, unlike so many of his compatriots, to 
investigate the properties on offer before investing. The Huon Times 
reported his conclusion which underlined the danger of purchasing 
orchards in Tasmania. "As a matter of fact, whilst allowing that there 
may be good orchards in Tasmania, he had not been able to see one." 32 
Concern over these Anglo-Indian investors was such that it eventually 
led the State Government to hold an inquiry in late 1920. 33 
What action the Government took then seems to have been 
31 Iluon T imes, July 21 1920. 
32 ibid. 
33 ibid., December 3 1920. 
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ineffectual. The problems continued. In 1923 W. E. Cowper, an English 
ex-serviceman, arrived in Tasmania hoping to take up a soldier 
settlement property. Having rejected orcharding properties in the 
Launceston area he travelled south in hope of finding a suitable property 
there. Upon arriving in Hobart Cowper approached officers of the local 
R. S. L. who promptly advised him to look to some other means of 
repatriation; advice he readily accepted. From Melbourne Cowper 
wrote a detailed and revealing letter of his experiences to Premier Lee. 
Cowper told Lee that at the R. S. L. headquarters he had met a Mr. 
Francombe "one of the largest fruitgrowers in Tasmania" 34 who had 
painted a poor picture of any orchard property that might be for sale. 
(The "Francombe in question was undoubtedly T. A. Frankcomb from 
Huonville.) According to Cowper "Francombe" claimed that in 
Tasmania "good paying orchards were few and far between, and were 
rarely, if ever, for sale, and that there were hundreds of had orchards on 
unsuitable land and in unsuitable positions for every good paying 
orchard property." 35 "Francombe", as President of the Huon Branch of 
the R. S. L., had not been so generous in his advice to other would be 
settlers in the Huon. 
The experience of A. S. Brennan gave ready substance to 
"Francombe's" comments. In 1923 Brennan accepted a lease on a 
vacated soldier settlement property at Franklin. Brennan, as a former 
packing instructor with the Department of Agriculture, was able to 
provide an experienced appraisal of the property he proposed renting. 
He complained it was difficult to spray for pests as there was no 
permanent water supply. The fences were inadequate and the house and 
outbuildings were in a state of disrepair. But it was the orchard that 
proved his greatest problem. Although the property consisted of 23 
acres, only half were of practical use. The orchard itself occupieda mere 
three and a half acres, divided into three separate blocks due to the 
contour of the land. This meant that while the orchard was compact, it 
was expensive to work. 
The orchard consisted of 514 apple and pear trees, 40 plum trees and 
17 cherry trees - the last of which had to be grubbed due to disease. 
There were over 20 varieties of apple and pear trees, few of which were 
34 PD1/384/176/5/23, 4 February 1922. 
35 ibid. 
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valuable in a commercial sense. Brennan expected to make a loss until 
the orchard was reworked to more commercial lines of fruit. He 
estimated that the most fruit he might expect to pick in the fruit season 
could amount to no more than 600 cases, a number insufficient to pay 
interest and rent on the property. 
Commentary such as the above too easily leads to the view that the 
Board, in purchasing a property, looked only to those deemed capable of 
supporting a man and his family through work carried out solely on the 
property. This was not always so. The Board regularly purchased 
properties knowing full well they would not provide a full living to the 
settler. A significant number of properties was purchased in the 
expectation that the settler would derive additional income from outside 
labour. Admittedly the Board was not well disposed to such properties 
and as a rule purchased them only after being pressed by the would be 
settler. Nevertheless, the Board, in purchasing such properties, 
redefined the type of property deemed appropriate for resettlement. All 
this is apparent in comments passed by the official evaluators. On one 
occasion the Local Advisory Board at Cygnet informed the Board that a 
property it had been asked to evaluate would not provide "a full 
living..but...would be a cheap and handy home for a working man."36 
Grace Calvert remarked of another property "so long as work was 
obtainable at the sawmill, all would be well but if this closed down a man 
would only exist on this." 37 Another time Grace Calvert informed the 
Board "this property would never keep a man and his family, but by 
working on it some 4 to 5 acres of small fruit could be grown...the lessee 
will have to earn most of his income from outside." 38 On a further 
occasion Grace Calvert noted of another property "the only good thing 
about this property is the one and a quarter acres of raspberries. I 
certainly cannot see a full living & interest to be made off the 
property. ”39 








the properties it was purchasing in the Huon were of a poor quality." 
The Board was also aware that the productive areas of these properties 
was small and often carried varieties of apples and other fruit which were 
economically unviable. As remarked above, the purchase of many of 
these properties wherein the settler was expected to supplement his 
income from labouring off the property essentially reworked the 
definition of a workable property under the terms of the Act'. The 
evidence suggests such a reworking to have been the consequence of 
necessity, that up to 1922 when it was able to cease purchasing 
properties, the Board had been acting in a climate far removed from 
conventional economic rationality. The rapid return of the men, the 
sense of debt they were owed and the varied demands they made added 
fuel to this irrational economic climate. 
Local Huon pressures played their part too. Throughout 1919 there 
had been numerous complaints about the Board's operations. While a 
number of these complaints related to the supposed poor treatment of 
certain soldiers, the majority dealt with the vexed problem of property 
evaluations. If the selection of both properties and men had taxed the 
Board to the limit then the issue of valuation raised real difficulties. 
In January 1919 there were complaints from the Cygnet Council over 
the Board's valuations. Councillor Norris, a member of the Local 
Advisory Board, complained that in early 1918 he had valued a property 
for a local soldier at Cl 700 only to find that the Board's offer was £1 
400 . Norris claimed that while the owner and the soldier were both 
satisfied with his valuation the Board had rejected it. He warned that if 
the Board treated future valuations in a similar manner then "there 
would not be a soldier settlement in the district." 41 Other Councillors 
were quick to support Norris. Many claimed knowledge of other 
occasions when men had been refused assistance due to the Board's 
valuations being substantially lower than those of the Local Advisory 
Board. The Cygnet Council believed the root of the problem lay in the 
Board's decision to use farming properties as a benchmark for valuations 
and argued this to be unreasonable for while orchards might be small 
their productive value was usually high. No ready comparison could be 
40 Close scrutiny of what evidence is available on the AB19 files suggests near 80% of properties in theliuon 
received similar comment. 
41 !Ilion Times, January 14 1919. 
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drawn between an acre of grazing land and an acre of orchard land. 
The fact that the Board's valuations affected all property valuations in 
the Huon was salient. Councillor Harris warned that if the Board 
pursued its present policy then the consequence would he a general 
decline in the value of all properties in the area. 42 Of further concern to 
the Cygnet Council was the Government's decision to allow soldier 
42A 
settlers remission on their rates for four years. The Council considered 
this to be unfair and argued that the Government should reimburse local 
Councils for lost income. The potential threat of the Board's valuations 
to general property values and the loss of rates posed a grave threat to 
local orchardists. The growing crisis in the fruit industry meant the 
rateable value of their properties was the only financial security many 
growers had. 
42B 
February 1919 witnessed renewed criticism of the Board's operations. 
There were claims that it had acted upon the purchase of some 
properties without reference to the local advisory committee at all. 
There was puzzlement among many on the Cygnet Council as to how the 
Board arrived at valuations without having sought the advice of the Local 
Advisory Board, that body of men chosen to provide the Board with the 
benefits of local knowledge. There were fears too that the Board had 
allowed land agents to play a role in the purchase of some properties. It 
was argued that these men had only their commission at heart, not the 
interests of the soldier. The Board had long been aware of such danger, 
but what if a member of one of the Local Advisory Boards was also a land 
agent? Robert Harvey, a member of the Cygnet Advisory Board and a 
leading estate agent provides such a case. 
Harvey was a leading member of the Cygnet community and a local 
businessman of note. He held interests in a wide range of commercial 
ventures from orcharding to retailing and sawmilling. Appointed to be 
one of the local valuators he had soon come to the notice of Grace 
Calvert, the Government's representative in the area. Grace Calvert was 
unimpressed with Harvey's advice and regularly reported such misgivings 
to the Board. In 1919 Grace Calvert had been asked to place a valuation 
on one of Harvey's properties at Nichols Rivulet. Harvey had put the 
property on the market for £2 500 but Grace Calvert reported "the 
value placed on this property is absurd, it would not pay interest on £2 
42 ibid . 
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500. It is in frightfully had order. The old orchard neglected and full of 
blackberries."43 Grace Calvert warned that "should the local valuation 
be anything like the amount of the offer, I consider that the matter 
should he gone into."'" The Local Advisory Board estimated the 
property to be worth Cl 860 and suggested that "a few hundred pounds 
of work spent on scrubbing to get it in shape but then it should be 
reproductive for 2 men." 45 Harvey eventually accepted Cl 500 and the 
property was taken up by a William Stanton. In 1923, however, Stanton's 
lease was cancelled and the property returned to Harvey at a very much 
reduced rental. When evaluating another Harvey property at Cygnet in 
1920 Grace Calvert reluctantly, but no doubt perceptively, informed 
Rudge "I always have a very suspicious feeling about me when R. H. is so 
deeply solicitous about a man's welfare. It's beastly of me I know."46 
Of course Calvert's reservations about Harvey merely gave expression 
to the long held fears of many. The State Government and the Board had 
always been concerned that their entry into the property market would 
lead to inflationary land prices. Indeed, early conferences held to plan 
repatriation had been keenly aware of the issue. In an attempt to curb 
such a possibility acting Prime Minister W. A. Watt had written to 
Premier Lee in November 1918 to ask whether it might be possible for 
the Board to work with the Commonwealth Taxation Department "with a 
view to preventing the payment of prices which are generally in excess of 
values declared to for taxation purposes by the owners of such 
properties."47 Though well intentioned the suggestion proved 
ineffective. The question of inflated values would soon become as much 
a political as an economic problem. As W. E. Cowper told Lee in 1923: 
properties were bought for soldier settlement at exorbitant prices 
from "friends of the family", and the prices at which the soldiers 
were allowed to take up the land were in many cases so high as to 
make it utterly impossible for them to make a living and overhead 
charges. 48 
43 AB19/1114. 
44 ibid . 
45 ibid. 
46 AB19/4226. 
47 PD1/323/176/10/18. 11 November 1918. 
48 PD1/384/176/5/23, 4 February 1922. 
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The consequent rapid increase in land prices would have been more 
rapid but for the actions of men such as Grace Calvert. There the Board 
gained some control over inflated land prices: that all land purchased in 
the Huon carried a price that marked the compromise between the 
Board and local valuators attests this fact. But for the work of men such 
as Grace Calvert the eventual cost to the State and failure rate among 
settlers would have been much higher. The Board's preparedness to bow 
to the soldiers' desire to settle on small properties close to their local 
communities and families was a prime factor in the rapid inflation in the 
price of land. Having conceded that, one must yet again keep in mind the 
pressures places upon the Board at this time, most of all from the 
soldiers themselves. 
In December 1919 Lee met representatives of the Sailors and Soldiers 
Fathers Association in Launceston to discuss what they felt to be the 
slowness of resettlement. 	The deputation claimed that delays in 
purchasing properties fuelled already inflated land prices. 	The 
Government's tardiness in purchasing Lade's Estate near Ringarooma 
was seen to be a typical example. Such tardiness, it was claimed, had 
caused the price of the property to increase by £6 an acre. The owners of 
these properties, realising the pressure the Board was under, simply set 
their own prices. One member of the deputation, a local land agent by 
profession, told Lee the North-West Coast "was crawling with soldiers 
who could not get land"49 and that many were now leaving the State to 
try their luck on the mainland. Minister Hayes assured Lee the 
deputation's claims were unfounded. Hayes claimed the delays in the 
purchase of properties were usually the fault of the returned men who 
often persisted in selecting properties already rejected by the Board. 
But what Hayes conveniently forgot to tell Lee, if the Board's practice of 
purchasing properties in the Huon is to be regarded as typical, was that 
many of these properties were eventually purchased anyway. The 
Board's position was clearly an invidious one: damned by some for haste 
and castigated for caution by others. 
The difficulties confronting the Government over Soldier Settlement 
had not passed unnoticed in Parliament. From its inception the scheme 
had been the subject of often bitter debate but the rapid increase in 
Board activity between 1918 - 1920 led to a growing uneasiness amongst 
49 PD1/339/176/3/19, 2 December 1919. 
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most members of Parliament. In January 1920 the Treasurer, Sir Elliot 
Lewis, warned Lee the State faced a financial crisis if the present 
expenditures on soldier settlement were not curbed or financial 
assistance was not provided by the Federal Government. Lewis blamed 
the situation on the rapidity with which men had returned to the State, 
pointing out that the original estimate of 800 settlers by 1920 "has been 
largely exceeded, 920 men having already settled, quite 200 applications 
are, at present, being dealt with, and probably another 400 men will have 
to be provided for." 50 More worrying, claimed Lewis, was the 
impossibility of accurately estimating the final number to be settled and 
the cost of that settlement. As Lewis noted: 
the earliest arrivals were mainly men who had returned owing to 
injuries received, and the per percentage of applications for land 
was low. The men who returned after the Armistice was signed, 
for the most part, physically fit, and a large proportion had 
enlisted from farming districts, and the per centage of applications 
for land was consequently much higher. 51 
Following Lewis's warning Lee wrote to Prime Minister Hughes 
seeking an extra £2 226 703 in assistance. Hughes agreed to advance 
the State £500 000 which he claimed, when added to the monies already 
provided, would pay for the Tasmanian scheme up until December 31 
1919. Any further payments were to he discussed at a future date. 
Hughes's commentary was scathing. He criticised Lee for having 
exceeded the resettlement quota as decided at the Premiers' Conference 
of January 1919 and chastised him for having failed to notify the Federal 
Government of such excess - as was required. Hughes's anger was 
motivated by the potential damage Lee's claim posed to his Government. 
Hughes's Nationalists had failed to gain a majority in the Federal 
election of December 1919 and now held office only with the support of 
eleven independents. When these independents formed themselves into 
the Country Party on January 22, Hughes's position became critical. 
To add to Hughes's difficulties, soldiers' organisations were now 
claiming his Government was doing far too little to help the returned 
men. Hughes had found difficulty raising sufficient money to satisfy 
their demands. If he lest the support of both the soldiers and the 
50  PD1/354/176/25/5, Treasury File 25/5/20 (Enclosed), 17 January 1919. 
51 ibid. 
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Country Party he faced political destruction. Hughes warned Lee his 
request was "calculated to embarrass my Government, and, if followed 
generally by the States, might be accompanied by consequences of a 
serious nature: 52 While not spelt out it was clear Hughes referred to 
his own political demise and the consequent danger that the Labor Party 
might gain office Federally. As a good Nationalist Lee no doubt was 
aware of this possibility. 
But Lee faced embarrassment of his own. Unprepared to raise State 
taxes to cover the surging cost of soldier settlement he could see no other 
course but to seek help from the Federal Government. His approach to 
State Parliament in late 1920 for an extra £ 1 000 000 to help fund 
shortfalls in the cost of soldier settlement had met with a decidedly 
52A 
hostile reception in the Legislative Council. There was widespread 
criticism of the manner in which the resettlement scheme had been run 
and deep concern for the plight of those many soldiers already settled. It 
would, he cynical to suggest the recent enfranchisement of soldiers for 
Legislative Council elections to have provided the catalyst for such 
response. The Legislative Council had long been critical of the 
Government's program of repatriation. Councillors still believed the 
scheme merely replaced experienced farmers with inexperienced 
soldiers and despite the Government's arguments to the contrary felt 
such dispossession was unlikely to further the State's interests. The view 
was still widely held in Council that the resettlement scheme had been a 
pretext for the dissolution of Tasmania's larger estates. While still 
vociferous in such arguments, the Legislative Council now harbored a 
new fear that overshadowed all else: a fear for the fate of those soldiers 
struggling to make a living on their farms. 
Some Councillors were critical of the prices that had been paid for 
properties - especially the smaller farms as typified by purchases in the 
Huon. John Hope claimed "some of the valuators who have 
recommended the purchasing of blocks would not have taken them 
themselves at the same price." 53 James McDonald, a former member of 
the Clarence Advisory Board, claimed he had seen soldiers settled on 
properties not recommended by his Board and suggested that an 
independent inquiry into such purchases would no doubt bring in a 
52 ibid. 
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report critical of the Government's present policy. He was convinced 
"many returned men who had been placed on the land were going to do 
no good to themselves or the State." 54 With high prices leading to high 
interest rates McDonald was "very doubtful as to whether they were 
conferring a benefit on" 55 the soldiers. Most Councillors believed that 
the final cost of settling soldiers in Tasmania would run into millions of 
pounds and that if some form of revaluation was not soon offered the 
soldiers they would leave their farms in droves. 
Alan Wardlaw defended the Government. He argued that the 
Government's land purchases would prove a sound investment and that 
even if the soldier's departures necessitated the sale of their properties 
the Government would realize a considerable profit on its investment. 
Wardlaw reminded Council that "whatever happened, they must fulfil 
their promises to the returned men." 56 
In August 1921 the growing plight of many settlers was raised in the 
House of Assembly when J. A. Hurst, a returned soldier, moved to 
restructure the interest repayments on settler's loans. Hurst claimed his 
experiences as a farmer had shown him that a soldier living on a property 
valued at £1 800, in receipt of advances for stock, implements and 
buildings, forced to pay £250 interest in the first eighteen months, faced 
a demand that "was an impossibility"57 because "too much altogether 
had been paid for the land."58 Hurst claimed to be in receipt of letters 
from settlers in every part of the State asking him to do something to 
help them through their present difficulties. He told Parliament "with 
the high price of stock and seed prevailing, the soldiers were unable to 
make anything from the property, and few of them knew they had to 
make half-yearly instalments for the stock, seed and implements." 59 
Hurst's reference to the lack of understanding amongst settlers as to 
their financial obligations is significant. If the settlers in the Huon were 
at all typical then Hurst's point is a most telling one. Many settlers in the 
54 ibid. 
55 ibid. 
56 Ibid., December 2 1920. 




Iluon were possessed of poor literary skills; indeed a number were 
illiterate. It is likely few understood the financial contracts into which 
they entered. Many of their letters suggest they believed the properties 
they held to have been a reward from a grateful Government for the 
services they had given the State. No doubt this view was reinforced by 
the Government's decision to waive interest repayments in the first 
eighteen months and to allow men of little or no capital to take up 
properties. Those first demands of interest no doubt created 
consternation amongst many settlers. 
Hurst believed that unless something was soon done then the State 
could only expect to suffer huge losses as soldiers increasingly opted to 
leave their properties when unable to meet their interest commitments. 
Better, argued Hurst, to keep the soldiers on the land than to allow them 
to leave. Either way the State faced a heavy financial responsibility. To 
this end Hurst moved to reschedule the rates of interest. The original 
Act allowed for an interest free period after which soldiers were 
expected to pay interest cc 5% on loans. Hurst believed that to ask 
soldiers to pay 5% interest immediately after their interest free period 
was unreasonable. Better, he suggested, to gradually raise the rate of 
interest to 5% over five years then hold it at that level for a further two 
years. Hurst proposed the settlers then pay interest at 5 1 /2% for the 
next twelve years to compensate the State for lost interest. After that 
59A 
time interest should return to 5% for the duration of the loan. 
Hurst's proposal was rejected by the Government. Minister for Lands 
and Works, Alexander Hean, argued that acceptance of Hurst's proposal 
would cost the taxpayers £120 000, and this on top of the £200 000 
recently borrowed to help fund the scheme. Hean further argued that if 
the Government agreed to the recommendation it would only result in a 
paltry saving of £23 to each settler. The believed the cost of redrawing 
the soldier's contracts alone could not justify such a small saving. While 
Hean acknowledged Hurst's proposal was designed to help the State's 
finances as much as the soldiers' interest he reminded Parliament that 
"the Government had never looked upon this as a payable business 
proposition: although it was endeavoured as far as possible to run it on 
business lines."" While rejecting Hurst's proposal the Government did 
offer to provide some financial relief and proposed that the time for 
60 ibid., August 31 1921. 
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repayment of loans on stock and buildings he extended from five to 25 
years. Hean claimed this would reduce a settler's repayment on an 
average loan of Doc) from £75 to £30 a year. Of course Hurst's move 
had come at a most inopportune moment for government. As a result of 
the collapse of the rural sector the State's economy was rapidly sliding 
into recession - if not depression. 
But E. F. B. Blyth warned the House that neither Hurst nor Hean had 
offered a solution that tackled the real cause of the problem - the high 
prices paid for the settlers' properties. Blythe argued that unless this 
issue was speedily addressed the State faced calamity over resettlement. 
He reminded Parliament that out "of 47 men who had been settled on the 
Whiteford Hills no I and 2 in the past when things were normal, only six 
were successful, and how did they expect soldiers to make a success on 
this property when conditions were so abnormal." 61 
Throughout September debate on Hurst's motion continued. J. C. 
Newton claimed that: 
The soldiers had started out on the land with the idea that all they 
had to do was to display sufficient energy and all would be well. 
However, during the last season all farms had a had time but the 
soldiers were in a worse plight than the ordinary farmer. They 
were not as well equipped in the way of finance or of physical 
condition. They had been lured onto the land by the attractive 
pamphlets which had been distributed to them. 62 
Newton assured Parliament that another season like the last would see 
the majority of settlers forced from the land. 
Throughout the debate the Labor Party found itself sympathetic to 
Hean's proposal, believing it offered the settlers as good a deal as 
Hurst's. In supporting the Government, Leader of the Opposition, J. A. 
Lyons noted that but for Hurst's efforts little would have been done to 
help the men despite the fact that "it was known for some time that the 
soldiers were up against it." 63 Lyons believed there would soon come a 
time when the whole issue of soldier resettlement would have to be 
reexamined. 
Hean's motion to alter the Act was accepted. Repayments on advances 
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on stock and seed were now to be repaid over an eleven year period - the 
first twelve months to be interest free. Repayment of advances for 
buildings was to be over a 25 year period - the first five years interest 
free. Most members of the House were now in general agreement that 
the repatriation scheme was in trouble, its cost inevitably to be borne by 
the taxpayer. Happy to tamper with the scheme, Parliament was 
reluctant to take any decisive step to ensure its financial viability. Better 
perhaps to wait for improved economic circumstances to assist the 
settler's lot. The politicians found themselves in a dilemma: to help the 
soldiers might incur the wrath of the taxpayers who would have to foot 
the Bill, to act decisively and terminate the leases of settlers who were 
obviously failing would have led to a public outcry over the shabby 
treatment of its returned heroes. For any political party to have taken a 
clear stance on the issue would have invited electoral defeat. The whole 
situation seems to have neutralised the possibility of clear political 
action. 
Indecision rarely offers solutions. In September 1921 Parliament yet 
again debated the increasingly perplexing problem of soldier settlement 
and, at Newton's insistence, established a Select Committee to 
investigate the matter. Newton was appointed Chairman of a Committee 
which included J. A. Hurst, W. H. Dixon, P. G. Pollard and William 
Sheridan. The Committee was asked to report upon the settlement and 
supervision of returned settlers, the advisability of cutting up Crown 
Lands under lease and on any improvements settlers may have made to 
their holdings. Over the next three months the Committee travelled the 
State interviewing 110 witnesses, 67 of whom were soldier settlers. It 
managed to hold meetings at both Cygnet and Franklin. 
While Newton's Committee carried out its investigation the Labor 
Party moved a motion of no confidence in the Government's handling of 
the State's economy. The growing cost of soldier settlement figured 
prominently in debate. Lyons claimed that "there was no check upon 
expenditure in the Soldier Settlement Department" 64 and reiterated 
Labor's long held belief that the soldiers had been deceived. "Ministers 
knew very well, if they know anything about the possibilities of working 
the land at a profit, that their (soldiers) terms were millstones around 
64 Mercury, October 27 1921. 
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the neck of the Taxpayers and the soldier settlers."65 Lyons argued that 
the Lee Government's aim had always been to protect the interests of the 
big landholders and the State's middlemen and called for stiffer taxes on 
land to bring property prices under control. "There was a tragedy 
ahead," warned Lyons, "if returned soldiers and others were put on 
estates and driven off because of high values. They could not go on as 
they had in the past - sit down and wait for the deluge to come." 66 Of 
course Lyons's comments broke no new ground. After all, such thinking 
had underpinned earlier Labor criticism of the soldier settlement 
scheme during debate on the original Bill in 1916 and 1917. 
Lyons's motion of no confidence received strong support from fellow 
Laborites Robert Cosgrove and Albert Ogilvie. Cosgrove was convinced 
the Newton Committee's report would once and for all determine that 
too high a price had been paid for the settlers' properties. It was this, 
claimed Cosgrove, that explained the government's coolness towards the 
Committee's activities. 
Naturally under these circumstances the Premier would regard the 
activities of a select committee on Soldier Settlement with 
coolness. Ministers knew they had made a mess of soldier 
settlement. Increased expenditure would be necessary but it was 
desired to hush things up. 67 
Ogilvie's comments amplified Lyons's claims that the struggling settlers 
were unlikely to receive assistance from a government that had, as its 
primary aim, the furtherance of business interests. After all, claimed 
Ogilvie: 
it was impossible for the one Government to represent Sir Henry 
Jones and the small farmer. Instead of being called a Nationalist 
Government it should be called an I.X. L. Government. 
Everywhere they went they found Sir Henry Jones and when the 
Government wanted an Agent-General they appointed his 
colleague Mr Ashbolt.68 
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Such criticism was no doubt well based. Brown's69 analysis of Jones's 
interlocking business interests certainly gives credibility to Ogilvie's 
claims. Indeed the belief in Jones's overwhelming influence on 
government had been, after all, the main impetus behind most of the 
planned developments in the Huon both before and after the war. It will 
no doubt be remembered that the P. H. F. C.'s main aim was in fact the 
breaking of Jones's monopoly over the state's fruit industry. 
Lee steadfastly rejected the Labor Party's claims. He argued that all his 
government's attempts to assist settlers had been undermined by the 
present worldwide downturn in trade, a situation he held to be the major 
cause of all the State's difficulties. But Lee's defence of the Soldier 
Settlement Department did little for his argument. Lee claimed that 
"some of the men who had gone on the properties would never succeed if 
put on the best properties in the country. They had no adaptability for 
farming."70 When asked why there had been no inquiry into the 
suitability of settlers Lee could only reply that "the position was that a 
man came back from the war and wanted to go on the land. He had to be 
given an opportunity. The Soldier Settlement Board made every 
investigation possible." 71 Lee's comfortable majority allowed him to 
brush the censure motion aside. Would that it were as easy to brush 
aside the truth. 
The Newton Committee's report of December 1921 proved highly 
critical of the Board's operations. While conceding that the Board had 
attempted an exercise unique in Tasmanian experience and with the 
added difficulty of attempting to settle men who were scarred both 
physically and mentally, the Committee argued that a better 
performance might have been expected. Significantly the Committee 
placed great emphasis on the physical and mental condition of the 
settlers, believing such conditions had proved an impediment to 
successful settlement, the first public acknowledgement of such a fact. 
Early in its report the Committee, in outlining the reasons for the 
resettlement scheme, claimed it had in part been established so that 
"settlers should be given a fair and reasonable start in civil life after the 
strenuous and nerve-wracking experience in the late war, and also to 
69 Brown, I Excel., passim. 
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some extent compensate for the sacrifice made for the State and 
Empire." 72 The Committee returned to the issue of disabled men when 
discussing the inflationary effect of the Board's purchasing policy, noting 
that in very many cases the value of properties had risen to such an 
extent that even despite the high value of primary products then being 
received "settlers who were physically fit would only have...a medium 
chance of making good." 73 
Newton and his fellow Committee members criticised the Local 
Advisory Boards. They agreed their appointment was in theory a 
sensible step and that in some areas of the State these Boards had 
carried out their duties in a responsible manner. But the Committee 
found that in too many cases the Local Advisory Boards had proved 
incompetent and had helped inflate the price of land. The Committee 
also believed a number of properties they had recommended were 
unsuitable for soldier settlement. As the Committee commented: 
While the Local Advisory Boards were, in some districts, a very 
great help to the Department in arriving at fair values, in other 
districts the values placed on properties were above those of the 
Government, and too often a compromise was made between the 
exalted local valuation and that of the Department. 74 
Of course the Committee felt the Government's own valuators had often 
proved less than helpful. They too had often recommended properties at 
too high a valuation or in too poor a condition. 
The report made special reference to orcharding properties, 
suggesting many when purchased had been old and worn out and that 
men taking them up found it difficult to make a living. The report 
claimed "the system of settling orchardists is far from satisfactory either 
to the settler or to the Department...and orcharding properties 
purchased...cannot be expected to afford a living to the soldiers or to 
return interest to the Department." 75 
The Mercury was highly critical of the Committee's report. The paper 
claimed that the money spent on travelling had been a waste, and 






questioned the impartiality of those who had given evidence and the 
competency of the Committee's members. The paper commented: 
even at the risk of giving offence, we are compelled to say that we 
do not consider that the members comprising the committee are 
capable of dealing with so big and comprehensive a question and 
we cannot believe that Parliament will accept their conclusions as 
they stand without ample confirmation. 76 
The Mercury believed Parliament had only given consent to the 
Committee's establishment because many members of Parliament "did 
not like to oppose the motion for fear of being considered unsympathetic 
to the soldiers." 77 For the Mercury the situation was simple: those 
soldiers who wouldn't make a go of it couldn't be saved and those who 
would be successful needed no help. In between, the paper argued, were 
soldiers who needed some assistance "made up of those who have had 
bad seasons or losses due to special cases." 78 
The Examiner wasP more nervous than critical. It felt the report to be 
a serious indictment of past practices and claimed that "for the most part 
the soldier could realise his dream of going on to a particular farm only 
by paying more than the market value, and thus consented to carry a 
millstone around his neck." 79 While admitting that a percentage of 
failures was to be expected the paper still felt that: 
we cannot help being nervous on the score of the percentage of 
success. This report is most disquietening. If the position is really 
as the report states it cannot be allowed to continue. There must 
be radical changes. The whole business will have to he put on a 
much sounder footing. And the sooner the better. 8° 
The Newton Committee recommended wide ranging changes to the 
process of soldier settlement. The most significant of these was that the 
settlers, unless shown to have been negligent, should have their arrears 
capitalised from January 1 1921, the interest on such arrears to be paid 
at a rate of 4% for the next five years. The Committee also 
recommended that only 4% interest be levied on properties purchased at 
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inflated prices, that a permanent system of supervisors be established to 
provide settlers with proper advice on the management of their 
properties and that in the case of properties considered too small to 
support a man and his family the settler be given extra land, either from 
the subdivision of other properties or the allocation of bush runs on 
Crown Lands. That the Committee used Government figures to support 
its arguments added strength to its recommendations. When these 
figures showed that only 36.5% of the monies owed by settlers had been 
paid by October 31 1921 it was clear something needed to be done. 
In January 1922 Newton's report was debated in the House of 
Assembly. Minister Hean was quick to attack its findings. He claimed 
the Committee had misunderstood the State's financial agreement with 
the Federal Government, believed its attacks on the Advisory Boards to 
have been misdirected and criticised the way in which its statistics had 
been gathered. Hean suggested it would be impossible to implement 
many of the Committee's financial recommendations and defended the 
Board, pointing out that only 40 to 50 of the 1 400 properties under its 
control had been shown to have been negligently purchased. Hean 
believed the real problem with soldier settlement lay in the downturn in 
farm income, a downturn which affected the whole of the community, not 
just the soldier settlers. Such criticism met little sympathy among fellow 
parliamentarians. 
Hurst, a Committee member, claimed Hean was deliberately 
understating the seriousness of the situation and suggested that unless 
something was soon done fully 70% of settlers would be forced to vacate 
their properties. He assured parliament that if it adopted the 
Committee's recommendations then that failure rate would drop to a 
figure between ten and twelve percent. Not surprisingly Newton too 
disagreed with Hean's criticisms, warning of imminent disaster if the 
recommendations were not adopted. Newton reiterated the major 
finding of the Committee; that too high a price had been paid for many 
of the properties, especially those which had involved Local Advisory 
Boards. He told Parliament that after investigating one such overvalued 
property he had advised the settler to "pack up immediately, take the 
next train and get away.” 81 
There was a decided air of pessimism in the House of Assembly's 
81 Mercury, January 18 1922. 
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debate over Newton's report. Most believed soldier settlement to be in 
trouble; the soldiers clearly needed help but there was uncertainty 
among members as to the level of assistance that might be offered. R. E. 
Snowden argued that as the taxpayer must eventually hear the added cost 
of resettlement he should be told so now. To delay the inevitable was 
stupidity on the part of Government. J. T. H. Whitsitt was adamant that 
responsibility for the scheme lay with the Commonwealth and urged the 
State's federal representatives to take the issue up with the Prime 
Minister. Whitsitt was scathing in his criticism of J. H. Carruthers, 
father of the "million farms" scheme. Whitsitt suggested anyone able to 
fund a successful resettlement scheme on money borrowed at 6% should 
be crowned King of Australia; he attacked the high interest rates levied 
on the settlers. Even in good times the capable farmer found difficulty in 
meeting interest demands of 4% - what chance the settler in the present 
economic climate meeting interest repayments of 5%. In Whitsitt's 
opinion Committees such as Newton's served only a limited purpose - 
what was needed was a Royal Commission. 
At the end of January Parliament was thrown into uproar when the 
Minister for Agriculture, J. B. Hayes, accused Newton of having used his 
parliamentary position to influence valuations on certain properties. 
Hayes's accusation was based on information received from one of the 
Government's own Fruit Experts, J. M. Ward, who claimed Newton had 
"used his political influence to secure a higher price for certain property 
then recommended by the Government valuers." 82 Ward had claimed 
such practice to be widespread and persistent among politicians, many of 
whom regularly attempted to gain higher valuations for properties 
belonging to one of their constituents. Indeed Ward claimed to have 
regularly met the then Minister, Alex Hean, to discuss the possibility of 
increasing the Board's valuation on a number of properties. Ward 
claimed he "had full opportunity of perusing the letters asking for such 
increases."83 Ward was convinced political interference had led to the 
higher prices paid for much of the land. 
Newton's defence was that he had only written to Hean on those 
occasions when the Board had ignored the advice of the Local Advisory 
Board, a situation he claimed often undermined the good work being 
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done by such bodies. He claimed that his letters merely suggested 
various valuators meet to discuss their differences and that they were in 
no way attempts to influence the purchase price on any property. 
Hurst, having seen the letter upon which Ward's claims had been 
based, declared Newton's interpretation correct. He believed Hean's 
accusations were part of an orchestrated attack on the Committee's 
findings and claimed the attack to have been instigated by the Mercury, 
that long-time apologist for National Party policy. No doubt Hurst's 
claims were at least partly motivated by the Mercury's suggestion that 
he stood to gain financially from any implementation of the Committee's 
findings. Certainly his denial of such a suggestion bespoke contempt for 
a paper that "when the lists of casualties were coming through from 
Gallipoli, doubled its rates for the death notices of soldiers." 84 Towards 
the end of January, Hurst moved that funding for Hean's amendments to 
the Soldier Settlement Act be reduced by one pound. The success of 
such a move would of course necessitate parliament's adoption of that 
more wide-ranging revaluation recommended by the Newton Committee. 
Lee vehemently opposed the move. One pound or £10 000, it made no 
difference to him. If Hurst's amendment were accepted there was still 
no way the State could afford the £200 000 revaluation would cost. It 
was not right, warned Lee, for Parliament to "tinker" with the 
Government's economic policy. 
Initially the House divided equally over Hurst's motion but it was lost 
when the Chairman of Committees' voted with the Government. On 
remark that such a step was improper, the motion was resubmitted and 
passed. The Government had been defeated on the floor of the House. 
Lyons immediately moved a motion of no confidence but without the 
support of Independent J. T. H. Whitsitt the move must be seen only as a 
gesture on Lyon's part. Whitsitt was prepared to vote with the Labor 
Party when necessary but was not prepared to force the Nationals from 
office. He had little sympathy for the Lee Government but less for the 
Labor Party and its socialist philosophy. 
Hean's amendments lost, Whitsitt moved the adoption of the Newton 
Committee's recommendations. R. E. Snowden warned there was a real 
danger the soldiers might be dragged into the political arena. He for one 
84 ibid. 
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did not wish to see the politicisation of repatriation. The Labor Party 
believed the soldiers had been "dragged in long ago" 85 and at their own 
instigation, because they now realised the only way to attain their rights 
was through parliamentary action. 
The Nationals still faced the consequences of adopting Newton's 
recommendations. Lee claimed any general revaluation of soldiers' 
holdings would be matched by a decline in the value of all farming 
properties. He suggested many soldiers had got themselves into their 
present difficulties because of their desire for big houses and 
outbuildings and their incessant demands for more generous advances to 
fund such developments. Lee was dismayed that they would now attempt 
to renege on their obligations. Even if the Government endorsed 
general revaluations the cost to the taxpayer and the limited benefits to 
be derived by the settlers would not provide a sufficient justification. 
Lee warned the longer the issue was debated the more costly the scheme 
would become as many soldiers were withholding their payments until 
Parliament made a final decision. 
Hurst felt Lee's arguments ridiculous and suggested present anomalies 
in the system necessitated general revaluation. Why was it, Hurst asked, 
that civilians were able to take up properties, vacated by soldier settlers, 
at much lower rentals? How could the Government refuse to revalue 
original leases but relet vacant properties at lesser rentals to civilian 
tenants? 
Lee argued lower rentals were necessary. 	Vacant properties, 
especially orchards, lost value rapidly and it was important that tenants 
be found quickly so that taxpayers interests might be protected. He 
reminded Parliament that the Board already held properties which had 
lost value after their being left vacant too long and suggested it would be 
absurd to "reduce the undeteriorated properties similarly.n 86 
These long held fears over soldier settlement continued throughout 
1922, the issue frequently the subject of parliamentary debate. Some 
believed the Commonwealth had abrogated its responsibility in the 
matter; others that the State Government had proved impossibly 
incompetent in administration. All though realised that something 
needed to be done else the State faced economic ruin. 
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J. A. Jensen, a former member of the Labor Party but now an Independent, was highly 
critical of the government's purchasing policies. He suggested: 
all the money spent on Repatriation was absolutely due to the 
returned soldiers, hut the way it had been spent was wrong, and the 
method of carrying out the Repatriation scheme had not been the 
best. The fertility had gone from most of the land, and it had been 
artificially manured. In many cases the Government had 
purchased from the father on behalf of the son, and the money had 
remained in the family whether the son remained on the land or 
not. 87 
Such criticism was not without foundation, especially in an area like 
the Huon where, it will he remembered, some 67% of properties had 
been purchased from family or friends. While this fact was never 
acknowledged publicly by Lee there can he no doubt he was aware of the 
situation. Indeed, it may have even played a not insignificant role in his 
aT 
continued reluctance to grant generai fevaluations to the settlers. After 
all, when a settler purchased a property from his family it often meant 
the family kept the property while acquiring useful capital. Certainly the 
Huon settlers' files show that many of them received substantial 
financial help from their families - money no doubt derived from the 
"sale" of these properties. Revaluations, from Lee's point of view then, 
must in many cases have merely appeared to he nothing more than a 
further payment to a settler who had already received much from his 
artificial "purchase" of a property and offered no benefit to those 
soldiers in need. 
Peter Murdoch, like Jensen, was equally critical of the government's manner of 
acquiring properties. 	 He claimed the 
Government was sending men around the country assessing local values 
who knew nothing about the work," and suggested, "he would rather his 
boys be in gaol than on some of the land which had been provided for 
returned soldiers."88 Murdoch claimed some of the people involved in 
such purchases to be speculators whose actions had cost the State and 
the settlers dearly. 
In June 1922 the state went to the polls. While the Nationalists were 
returned to office they did so onlv through the support of what was soon 
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to be an increasingly disaffected Country Party. Indeed, in early August the leader of the 
Country Party, E. F. B. Blyth, moved a motion of no confidence in Lee's economic 
management. 88A The Government's continued difficulties with soldier settlement yet 
again figured prominently in debate. 
_ 
Although the no-confidence motion was defeated it 
is clear that the debate seriously unsettled the confidence of many 
coalition members and .1. B. Hayes soon replaced Lee as Premier. Given 
the States economic difficulties and the uncertainty of Country Party 
support. Hayes's coalition Government was fragile. 
By 1923 the Hayes' Government considered the settlement of returned 
men to be complete. The portfolio of Minister for Lands and Soldier 
Settlement was abolished and responsibility for soldier settlement 
returned to the Minister for Lands and Works, Edward Hobbs. Hobbs 
claimed the main work now facing the Board to he the evening out of any 
anomalies which might have crept into the system. 89 In an attempt to 
overcome these anomalies the Board, acting in its capacity of Board of 
Review, instituted a series of investigations into the difficulties that still 
confronted many of its settlers. When the Board was satisfied a settler 
had a genuine grievance it offered him either a remission of rent or 
interest, a reduction in rental or a temporary suspension of arrears on 
rental for periods ranging from two to ten years. But there would be no 
revaluations. Hobbs believed a general revaluations of all soldier 
settlement properties would have placed too large a hurden on an 
already financially strained government. The Board, long an opponent 
of any revaluation, was not surprisingly fully supportive of Hobbs's 
position. But there were many who disagreed with both Hobbs and the 
Board. J. A. Hurst was one such individual. 
A former member of the Newton Committee Hurst had become 
increasingly convinced that only a general revaluation would save the 
resettlement scheme from complete failure. Consequently, at Lyons's 
instigation, Hurst moved in early 1923 for yet another select committee 
to inquire into the costs and appropriate administrative procedures 
necessary for a complete revaluation of soldier settlement properties. 
Such a move was welcomed by those who believed the situation of most 
settlers to have grown desperate. 
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24, Paper No 14. 
150 
The Examiner for one was convinced the situation had now reached 
crisis point and that the time had come to expose the duplicitous 
behaviour of both government and settler. The editor claimed the 
government's accounting procedures were designed to keep the real cost 
of settlement from the public, its Board reports presented in such a way 
as to portray the scheme in the best possible light, and urged the 
adoption of a more business-like approach to resettlement. "It has too 
long," railed the editor, "been the plaything of politicians."9() The paper 
suggested it was time the government finally placed fair values on 
settlers' properties, wrote them down at taxpayers' expense and allowed 
the settlers to either succeed or fail as the case may be. 
But there was though a certain smugness about the Examiner' s 
position. While it clearly believed the Hurst Committee promised the 
genuine settlers a real hope of success it was convinced that it would also 
expose those settlers who had simply been using the system to their 
advantage - and that at taxpayers' expense. The editor readily supported 
Lee's claims that: 
some soldiers in arrears sent their children to private boarding 
schools, and always rode first class on the railway. Those could 
pay the Government instalments if they liked, hut it was obvious 
that they would not pay whilst there seemed a chance of 
Parliament agreeing to pile the liability on the already seriously 
accumulated losses in soldier settlement. 91 
The Hurst Committee was appointed in March 1923 and comprised 
Hurst as Chairman, Minister for Lands E. F. B. Blyth, Frank Marriot, J. 
A. Lyons the Leader of the Opposition and J. H. Cleary. The 
Committee's report proposed the division of the state into six districts 
along the lines of the Board's earlier decision of September 1922. It was 
suggested each district have its own Board composed of local men, 
representatives of the R. S. L. and the local Board Inspector, to 
investigate applications for remissions of rent and interest and inquire 
into those cases where properties had been over valued at the time of 
purchase. It was also proposed that a central Board be established in 
Hobart to adjudicate disputes between these local Boards and the 
Minister. The Committee believed the Boards would cost the taxpayer 
90 Examiner, March 3 1923. 
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£4 329 annually and although it was considered likely 1 000 settlers 
would seek remissions it was felt only 125 would, on the evidence it had 
gathered, qualify for such assistance. 92 
The Examiner greeted the Committee's report with disdain, due 
mainly to its failure to recommend a general revaluation of settlers' 
properties. It was also highly critical of the Committee's proposal to 
establish six seperate Boards to handle settlers' complaints. Better, the 
paper argued, to establish one central Board for "a general invitation to 
appeal to half a dozen Boards which may treat similar cases in half a 
dozen different ways does not strike....as a solution to the problem." 93 
In the Examiner's view these six Boards only added complexity to an 
already unnecessarily complicated system. 
Hurst• was also highly critical of his own 	Committee's 
recommendations. He remained convinced that the settlers' only hope 
lay in a general revaluation but accepted his Committee's report on the 
ground that it at least offered the settlers some hope. Most 
parliamentarians, while in accord with Hurst's views, were also 
reluctantly forced to accept the Committee's recommendations. 
But the critics had no need to worry. Hayes's move to introduce a Bill 
embodying the Hurst Committee's recommendations was overtaken by 
political events. In August 1923 he was forced from office, the victim of 
a hostile backbench grown disillusioned at his inability to solve the 
State's economic difficulties. Hayes was no doubt relieved to be able to 
take up the vacated senate seat of T. J. Bakhap. Lee, at Hayes's 
conivance, now found himself Premier again. The Bill was soon 
forgotten in the ensuing political turmoil and the Board was left free to 
carry out its own unconvincing attempts at revaluation. 
In September Lee faced renewed criticism over the government's 
management of soldier settlement. Lyons, in what by now had become 
near ritual, believed the government's continued mismanagement of the 
scheme to epitomise the poor manner in which the State's finances were 
being run. He told parliament the time had come for Government to 
face the issue before it was too late. He suggested the government was 
totally responsible for the settlers' plight because it had so seriously 
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underestimated the number of men who would wish to take up 
properties. Such a situation, so Lyons claimed, had then been 
aggravated by the government's cost cutting decision to cease retraining 
schemes which had virtually forced returned men to take up properties. 
Peter Murdoch too told parliament it was time the State "squared the 
ledger." He suggested "the future as regarded the settlement (of 
soldiers) was not going to be better than the past. The Government was 
selling places and was not getting as much for them as it had given."94 
Tasmania must be prepared to pay increased taxes to reduce the State's 
debts. The Nationalists had continually rejected such an option 
preferring instead to reduce Government expenditure. 
In October Lee: 
stunned Tasmania when he announced retrenchments in the public 
service, abolition of the agent-general's office in London, 
reduction in the number of members in Parliament, introduced 
fees for high school students and abolition of medical inspections 
and dental clinics for schoolchildren. 95 
A proposal to increase taxation severed relations with long time 
Nationalist supporters. It was too much. In discussion over budget 
estimates C. W. Grant, E. F. Blyth and Peter Murdoch crossed the floor 
and voted with the Labor Party. The Lee government fell. Joseph Lyons 
now became Premier of a State disunited, debt ridden and facing 
financial and personal disaster over soldier settlement. 
The most urgent problem the Lyons' government faced when taking 
office was the management of the Tasmanian economy. The depression 
that had set in by 1920, the economic ineptitude of successive Nationalist 
governments and Federal legislation relating to tarrifs and the 
Navigation Act, all combined to bring Tasmania's economy to a parlous 
state. Orchardists in particular had experienced extremely difficult 
times. But the main factor driving Tasmania towards bankruptcy was 
undoubtedly the continued failure of its soldier settlement scheme. 
Lyons's first act on taking office was the preparation of a special case 
in support of a claim for financial assistance from the Federal 
Government. This memorandum, tabled in Parliament on November 30 
94 ibid . 
95 Robson, A History of Tasmania Vol II, pp.391 -392. 
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1923, 96 clearly showed the cost of soldier settlement was driving the 
state to the econoMic brink. 
The memorandum described "the position of the State Treasury in 
regard to soldier settlement (as) extremely serious." 97 Lyons suggested 
the sole responsibility for this state of affairs lay with the 
Commonwealth Government which had .induced the state during the 
early years of the war to accept too great a responsibility for soldier 
•settlement. In Lyons's view Tasmania's present economic crisis was the 
result of the Commonwealth's abrogation of responsibility for soldier 
settlement. Lyons misread the situation. At those conferences the 
states, ever mistrustful of any expansion of Commonwealth powers, had 
strongly stressed the idea of state's rights and had forced the 
Commonwealth Government to allow them to administer the scheme.. 
Such a stand on Tasmania's part had cost the state dearly. No doubt the 
states at that time believed such an agreement promised access to 
overseas funds ., such access having been denied them from the 
commencement of hostilities. Mu.. •s ostensibly received for soldier 
settlement might possibly be used to continue the funding of large scale 
developments within the states. As Kent Fedorowich has shown 98 it was 
just this promised access to overseas funds that encouraged the 
Australian states to allow for the settlement of Imperial soldiers and 
presumably the sane attitudes held sway at a more local level. In a very 
real sense then the Tasmanian government's decision to uphold State's 
rights had brought about the present financial crisis. 
The memorandum specifically noted the role patriotism had played in 
the present crisis: "There was at the time throughout Australia an 
impulse of generosity which carried Governments, as well as individuals, 
somewhat out of their depths." 99 But by late 1923 this patriotism had 
placed a millstone around the State's financial neck: by the end of June 
1923 the deficit on soldier settlement had reached £232 000. That the 
government had been forced to raise £500 000 to cover its immediate 
96 Memorandum in Support of Tasmania's Claim to Special Consideration from the Parliament of the 
Commonwealth., T. J. P. P., Vol 1.XXXIX 1923-1924, Paper No 74. 
97 ibid. 
98 K. Fedorowich, The assisted emigration of British ex-servicemen to the Dominions, 1914-1922, 
Emigrants and Empire (Manchester 1990). 
99 Memorandum in Support of "Fasmania's Claim,. op cit. 
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responsibilities had not helped. 	As Lyons warned, when the 
Commonwealth rebate on soldier settlement ceased "the State's position 
will become utterly impossible."" )() 
The reports of the Returned Soldiers' and Closer Settlement 
Department for the period 1920 - 1925 present an equally depressing 
picture. There were continued references to "the alarming increase in 
the number of voluntary surrenders" 1 , of the need to write off debts 
totalling £87 990 102  and to the worsening financial situation of many 
settlers. By June 1924 over 300 settlers throughout the state owed the 
Department more than £150 each. 1()3 The Department's reports offered 
little hope of improvement. Indeed, over a two year period between 1922 
and 1924, 512 leases had been cancelled 1 " and the Board, now 
justifiably regarding itself as the largest real estate agent in Tasmania, 
was finding difficulty in either selling or leasing the vast number of 
vacant properties it now held. Each of these cancellations or surrenders 
added further to the State's burden of debt. 
The government's attempts to sell or lease unwanted assets 
demonstrated it was most unlikely to recoup even a small amount of 
monies spent on their purchase. Auctions of stock and equipment also 
provided small comfort. Those held in the Huon between February and 
June 1923 only managed to realise some £948. 105 Small though it may 
have been it was still an amount far in excess of that earned by the 
majority of settlers on their orchards in the Huon. It is to their 
particularities that we must now turn. 
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101 Returned Soldiers' and Closer Settlement Department: Report for 1922-1923, T. J. P. P., Vol 1,XXXIX, 
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102 Returned Soldiers' and Closer Settlement Department: Report for 1923-1924, T. J. P. P., Vol X . C1, 1924- 
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Chapter Seven. 
The I luon Settlers' Experiences: 1919-1925. 
That soldier settlement in the ikon proved di s astro u s i s hev ond 
IA 
dispute. Some ()Mir (65) of settlers left their properties between 1919 
and 1925 - their average period of resettlement lasting just a mere two 
years and seven months. 2 Some left voluntarily hut the majority had 
little choice. 	That the scale of the disaster was widely and early 
recognised has already been noted previously. 	Parliament, mainly 
through the efforts of the Newton and Hurst inquiries, did at times 
attempt to redress the settlers' difficulties hut such efforts were 
necessarily compromised by political and economic considerations and 
uenerally extended rather than resolved a settler's difficulties. The 
Board's'own varied attempts to reorganise a settler's deht too often only 
served to delay the inevitable and increase the ultimate burden to the 
taxpayer. Any attempts to rectify faults in what was at heart a 
fundamentally flawed scheme had necessarily to fail. While government 
action. well intentioned or not. often only exacerhated the settlers' 
problems. there were other. perhaps more significant factors. which led 
to their exodus. 
A settler's failure often stemmed from his choice of property - or as 
many critics argued. his lack of choice. The productive capacity of many 
properties was small - too small to provide a settler with an income 
sufficient to provide both a living and pay rent and interest. While many 
such properties had been purchased in the expectation that a settler 
might derive income from local employment the depression in the Huon 
rendered such a proposition impossible. Many properties suffered from 
specific prohlems such as ease of access. distance to wharves or non-
commercial varieties of fruit. Nearly all properties suffered the ravages 
of "Black Spot". 
Health was yet another factor that forced many settlers to leave their 
properties. Many settlers who declared themselves fit upon their return 
were often soon suffering the delayed physical and psychological 
consequences of war. Their failing health denied them any opportunity 
2 Figure derived from AB19 Files. 
of working their properties effectively. Of course it must he conceded 
that there were some who never had any intention of working their 
properties at all. 
But undoubtedly the most significant cause of failure stemmed from 
the collapse of the fruit industry in the early 1920s. The high cost of 
transport and lack of shipping space, continued poor seasons, the 
machinations of prominent businessmen such as Henry Jones, increased 
competition from South African and North American growers and the 
continued refusal of Federal assistance all conspired to make the 
growers' position impossible. It was a situation beyond the control of 
either the growers or the state government. It was not long before such 
tragedy was manifest in the settlers' experiences. The following pages 
present the grim story at grass roots level. 
Within months of settling on his property at Ranelagh a disillusioned 
Russel Ayres had written a letter to the Board which anticipated the 
widespread complaint of many. Before the war Ayres had been a farm 
labourer in the Huon, as such conversant with local conditions, hut 
within twelve months he found himself in debt, unable to meet 
repayments on interest let alone principle. The need to build a house 
added to his indebtedness hut the poor returns on fruit in his first season 
assured from the outset his position would he untenable. Ayres' letter 
refuted any suggestion of incompetence on his part. He claimed his 
present position had resulted from the poor business sense of the Board, 
the collapse of the English fruit market, and the low returns that then 
prevailed for small fruit. 
When the Board purchased the property it had done so on the 
understanding that it produced four tons of small fruit and 1 000 to 1 200 
bushels of apples a year. Even after improvements Ayres claimed it 
produced no more than two tons of small fruit and only six to 700 bushels 
of apples. This serious underestimation of the property's productive 
capacity when linked to the high returns that prevailed at the time of 
purchase meant it had been greatly overvalued. Even if the returns on 
fruit had not fallen so dramatically it was clear Ayres would experience 
difficulty in meeting his commitments. As well, Ayres claimed the 
property's viability to be threatened by the lack of a good road which 
made "it ... almost impossible for (him) to remove(his) produce at 
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times." 3 The local council was unwilling to provide assistance. No doubt 
local councils felt little responsibility in providing services to soldier 
settlers who were initially not required to pay rates on their properties. 
Of course the loss of such rates hampered a council's ability to provide 
such services. 
The returns from the English market proved disastrous and Ayres, like 
other growers, was forced to rely on income derived from small fruit. 
But small fruit returned a mere penny halfpenny a pound. After the cost 
of manuring and picking he received "nothing, and my holding is allowing 
no profits at all until the markets improve."4 Ayres claimed that as the 
government had placed . soldiers on such unremunerative properties it 
had responsibility to find new markets for the fruit and to give assistance 
in terms of marketing and freight. He did not expect to receive much 
help and claimed the attitude of the Tasmanian Government was to "help 
yourself or go without." 5 Like many growers, soldier settler or 
otherwise, Ayres was convinced that the only hope lay in the move to co-
operation.. He urged the Board to use . its influence to pressure the 
government to give assistance to the state's new co-operatives, such as 
the P. H. F. C. "Like myself there are a good many soldiers in it, & it is a 
hard fight for us, as the other firms are out to heat us, hut if this was done 
it will be a had day for soldier settlement." 6 Such comments were soon 
reinforced by other settlers who complained to the Board about the 
difficulties they faced over the inflated valuations on their properties, 
their poor returns for fruit and the lack of assistance provided by 
government. 
In 1920 Alex Woods complained to the Board about the valuation of 
£1 000 on his property at Ranelagh, claiming the former owner had paid 
a mere 16s a year in land tax. For Woods such valuation showed the total 
disregard the government held for returned soldiers. "I thought," Woods 
told the Board, "it was the duty of all concerned to see we were not taken 
in this sort of thing and that we returned men were to he placed on such 






it will be impossible for me to even exist on this farm". 7 Woods too had 
suffered poor returns on fruit which exacerbated his difficulties with 
overvaluation. 
Now sir, when the time comes I will have to pay taxes on one 
thousand pounds when the property is not worth it. If I had to do 
so, I could not live on it. I have been here just over one year, and 
have worked the place well and my net returns have been seventy 
pounds for small fruit and twenty pounds and I cannot see anything 
more in it for years, so how can I pay taxes and capital and keep my 
wife and children out of this. 8 
Woods urged an immediate revaluation of his property, convinced it 
was the only hope he had. Despite intervention by the Huon R. S. L., he 
was forced to vacate his property at the end of 1921. 
Like Ayres, George Woolley at Glen Huon faced a problem over roads 
- or the lack of them. His position was precarious as he had to cross 
private property over a bridle track to reach his holding. If the owner of 
the adjoining land barred access his position would be untenable. Of 
course the lack of an access road meant the crops he grew would be 
"worse then useless" to him. 9 Woolley received his road but in 1932 was 
given fourteen days notice to vacate after his arrears had risen to 
£634. 10 
Despite the Board's awareness of such settlers' complaints its reports 
to Parliament, as noted earlier, continually sought to reassure. The 
Board constantly stressed the care taken when purchasing properties, 
assuring government that "in all cases the aim...was to secure good value 
as an investment for the State, and to acquire holdings capable of 
providing a living for a man." 11 The Board suggested those soldiers who 
left their properties did so because either the interest free period had 
expired or the soldier was not a "trier". The Board believed itself in no 
way responsible for the settlers' predicament and provided constant 
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faith was that the present depression in the fruit industry would not last 
indefinitely and that the soldiers would eventually make good. The fact 
that 97 leases had been cancelled during the year seems not to have 
shaken the Board's confidence. The Board was not alone in such 
optimism. At the unveiling of the Franklin war memorial in 1921 W. H. 
Dixon had assured those present that while: 
existing conditions for these diggers who had gone on the land 
might not be very bright...they were hopeful that as time went on 
these conditions would improve...Financially speaking they were 
in a very had position hut he was hopeful that in Tasmania there 
would be very little and perhaps no fresh taxation and that would 
be a relief to many people. 12 
Tasmania's bigger landowners no doubt gained solace from Dixon's 
comments but they offered little hope to the soldier settlers whose 
position continued to deteriorate. It was just this unwillingness on the 
part of the Lee Government to raise taxes that partially precluded any 
hope of financial assistance to the now hard pressed settlers. 
As the world wide depression deepened its effects undermined the 
efforts of each settler in the Huon. In June 1922 Charles Armstrong 
received a demand for arrears of some £34 on his property at Cygnet. He 
could only inform the Board that he had "never been able to turn a pound 
off the place. It is nothing but hard work and no returns." 13 Like so 
many other settlers Armstrong insisted his property had been a poor 
purchase. "There is nothing on it to encourage a man to work. There is 
nothing cleared or cultivated, only what I have done myself." 14 
Armstrong had been forced to work off the property just to keep his wife 
and family but this merely precluded the proper working of his own 
place. His only hope, so he claimed, was for the Board to grant a two 
year extension on his repayments. 
In August Armstrong received a visit from the government Inspector 
who reported him to be a good worker only needing adequate 
supervision to overcome his difficulties. The Inspector claimed such 
difficulties to be principally related to the property itself as there was 
"practically no income from this property at time of purchase, so 




Armstrong has had to work away and consequently has not had much 
chance of improving property." 15 It was suggested that Armstrong's 
debts be capitalised for two years and that he only he asked to pay the 
lease on his home. This new financial arrangement offered little as it 
failed to address Armstrong's basic problem - his property was an 
uneconomic proposition. Unable to gain a living he was forced to 
surrender his lease in 1923, £942 in debt to the Board. 
At Snake Plains Gordon Harding found himself in a similar position. 
After three years he had only managed to repay the Board £45 and was 
now £106 in arrears. In an attempt to gain some return the Board 
decided, against Harding's wishes, to sell off 20 acres of his property. 
Harding's reply was bitter: 
I should like to ask you if you though it possible for me to meet the 
interest demanded close on two hundred pounds in three years in 
the neglected state the place was in when I cam on it. Do you think 
for one minute that you could do it and live keep your wife and 
family from starving. Whatever you produce you don't get your 
expenses out of it. Swede, turnips, two pound five shillings ton. 
Potatoes from three to five pounds a ton. It don't pay for the 
manure you use, let alone pay the interest on the place. I failed 
entirely with my English fruit never got enough out of them to 
clear expenses. 16 
Harding made much of the face that even after years of hard work he 
might still lose his property because of "not being able to meet those 
nice little bills you are so often sending me." 17 The Board was 
unimpressed: Harding was judged not to be a genuine "trier". In 
November 1922 the Board threatened to cancel Harding's lease unless 
he took immediate steps to improve his financial position and the 
condition of his property. He was given just seven days to reply. At the 
end of November Harding informed the Board he intended to leave the 
property in January 1923, or earlier "as I haven't made a cats living since 
I have been on it." 18 But by mid-December 1922 he had surrendered his 






Cyril Batchler of Cradoc offers yet a further example of the difficulties 
experienced by settlers at this time. He had taken up his property in the 
rush Of 1919 and now, in 1922, following three had seasons, was forced to 
ask the Board whether he might lease his property to a third party. 
Batchler, like so many others, blamed his lack of success on the Board's 
decision to purchase what he believed to he a poor property. As he told 
the Board in July "first years crop 448 c/ss, second 500, third, that is this 
year 750; a total for three years of 1698 c/ss. When I agreed to lease the 
property the owner told me that 1000 c/ss was the average crop. Had I 
got this amount I could have paid my way." 19 Batchler was soon forced 
to reconsider his position following the receipt of a paltry 3s a case on his 
English fruit. The Property was simply unpayable. Whether it produced 
the promised 1 000 cases a year was now immaterial. A 1 000 cases at 3s 
a case meant a return of only £150 "out of which I must spend on chaff 
(cis), spraying material (f15), repairs (C3) and interest (c6) about 
£100 leaving only £50 to live on." 2() To add to his difficulties Batchler 
was now fined for non-payment of Federal taxes. Like many returned 
soldiers, Batchler was under the impression that he had been granted an 
exemption from such taxes as part of his resettlement process. He 
bitterly noted that: 
an influential resident told me I had made the mistake of 
improving the place and trying to crop a property totally unsuited 
to cropping when I ought to have just done my orchard work and 
went out to work the rest of the time as he had never known the 
place to pay anyone who owned it in the past. 21 
The litany of complaint continued. At the end of 1922 Arthur 
Heatly asked the Board whether he might surrender his property at 
Cradoc. He was convinced any further efforts on his part promised only a 
bleak future. He had already offered the property to a number of 
prospective purchasers but it had been consistently rejected on the basis 
that it was either too big for a local or too small for large scale farming. 
Heatly assured the Board his decision had not been made in haste: 
I have give it a good go and by every way possible to make it pay, 
But I now find under the conditions I have not got a chance. I can 
19 AB19/691. 
20 ibid . 
21 ibid. 
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grow the crops alright but when Harvest comes, and the selling of 
the produce, there is so much expense in getting it too market at 
the right time, not being in the possession to hold it and wait for 
the better prices. 22 
Like so many others Heatly had been forced to work off the property but 
even so, as he told the Board "if it had not been for my pension I would 
have been out before this." 23 Heatly struggled along for a further three 
years until the Board finally cancelled his lease in 1925. He left the 
property owing £95 in arrears alone. Heatly, like Woods, Ayres, 
Batchler and Woolley, typified the settlers' experiences at this time. 
There was a common complaint about the inability of the properties to 
support a man and his family, a sense that soldier settlers had somehow 
been let down, promises not made good. The settlers believed their 
properties to be in most cases the major obstacle to success. They held 
themselves to be "triers" despite government Inspector's reports to the 
contrary. But even when a property met with a settler's approbation the 
collapse of international markets for fruit led to financial ruin. The 
returns on fruit did not allow the repayment of rent and arrears and 
often left little for the soldier and his family. The settlers were 
convinced that the government believed its responsibility ended with the 
purchase of the properties. Certainly their calls for help had been 
largely ignored by a government which appeared to be either incapable 
or unwilling to offer assistance. At times the Board attempted to find a 
solution to the settlers' financial difficulties through innovative 
interpretations of the Act - but such innovations, in most cases, merely 
delayed departure and substantially increased a soldier's level of 
indebtedness. Politieal realities necessitated the government place its 
faith in improved international trade rather than acknowledging it 
resettlement scheme to be fundamentally flawed. Of course any 
government seen to be evicting large numbers of soldier settlers, heavily 
in debt or otherwise, would be demonstrating a most remarkable lack of 
patriotism and the R. S. L. was ever ready to remind government of its 
patriotic responsibility. The difficulty for government lay in discovering 
a solution that necessitated the least expenditure on the part of the 




properties which for many had become their Gardens of Gesthemanie. 
The Government's qualms had been partially overcome at the 
beginning of 1922 when it adopted the recommendations of the Newton 
Committee but the decision provided only limited relief to few settlers. 
Indeed, it may have exacerbated the situation. One consequence of 
Newton's report was the extension of advances to settlers. Those 
advances to June 1920 had totalled £143 885 hut between June 1921 and 
June 1922 that figure nearly doubled to £204 800. The Board was soon 
nervous about such a dramatic increase in the level of settler 
indebtedness and became concerned at the way in which much of the 
money was being spent. President of the Board, G. C. Rudge noted that 
"to a greater extent than previously has advantage been taken by lessee 
to obtain advances on improvements in order to meet any arrears of rent, 
interest etc."24 The fact that many settlers used these advances to repay 
debt forced their immediate curtailment. In 1922-23 £101 708 was 
allocated to advances: in 1923-24 £18 899. Of course the Board's 
innovative interpretation and the Government's adoption of the Newton 
Committee's recommendations were a mere panacea: if there was a 
solution to the settlers' difficulties then that solution was revaluation. 
But revaluation would have amounted to a tacit admission of fault on the 
government's behalf and necessitated increased levels of taxation. The 
solution was politically unacceptable. 
The Board's decision to alter its system of inspection was yet a further 
attempt to aid settlers while providing greater protection to the State's 
interests. Strong emphasis had always been placed upon the Inspector's 
role, that "personal link" between the soldiers and the Department, but 
the rapid extension of advances now rendered such a role crucial. The 
Board replaced its old Inspectors, men recruited from local councils, 
with Inspectors appointed by the Board, each of whom was responsible 
for one of the six new districts into which the State was divkled. 25 
Qualification rather than interest was now the criterion for appointment 
as the Board adopted a more professional approach. But this increasing 
bureaucratization failed to produce a more "hard headed" business 
24 Returned Soldiers and Closer Settlement Department Report For 1921-22, 1'. J. P. P.. Vol.1,XXXVII, 1922- 
23, Paper No 28. 
25 ibid., Under this new system the I luon was referred to as District 4 and placed under the care of Inspector 
E. J. Jennings. 
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approach, if that had indeed been the aim, for in general the new 
Inspectors were themselves returned men, sympathetic to the settlers' 
plight. An unintended consequence of the reorganization was to he the 
increasing remoteness of the settlers from the Board, a remoteness that 
left the settlers more isolated than ever. 
The new Inspectors were told to place special emphasis upon those 
settlers seen to he at risk 26 while those perceived to be successful were 
to be granted greater autonomy. The Inspector's role in encouraging as 
many settlers as possible to continue with their holdings was given 
special emphasis. Rudge informed parliament that such encouragement 
had "prevailed on the settler not to vacate his leasehold, and by judicious 
encouragement succeeded in getting him to try again, where otherwise 
he would have surrendered his lease, and consequently would have lost 
the opportunity which settlement on the land would have given him." 27 
Of course this" judicious encouragement" Inspectors offered, helped 
ensure that the enormous difficulties under which the settler was 
labouring did not become too apparent to the wider community. The 
effect of such practise was to the loss that the state would ultimately have 
to accept. Certainly the number of cancellations increased markedly - 
some 285 settlers leaving their properties in 1922 alone. This meant the 
total number of vacated properties now stood at 626. 
In yet a further attempt to help settlers the Board now made ready use 
of a 1917 amendment to the Soldier Settlement Act 28 which allowed a 
settler to sell off sections of his property. Such sales provided the settler 
with an immediate source of cash with which to meet repayments and 
lowered the interest on his property. While a large number of the 
Huon's settlers took advantage of this amendment, especially those who 
would ultimately prove successful, for the majority it simply meant the 
temporary deferment of their departure. 29 
In April 1923 the government embarked upon the most notable of its 
many attempts to provide assistance to settlers when, at the instigation 
of the Hurst Committee, it introduced a Bill that allowed for limited 
26 ibid . 
27 ibid. 
28 Soldiers' Settlement Board: Report For 1917-18, T. J. P. P., Vol I,XXIX, 1918-19, Paper No. 40. 
29 Information derived from a study of the AB19 Files on the Mon. 
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suspensions and remissions of arrears and selective revaluations of 
properties. Since the scheme's inception the Board had allowed for such 
measures hut in an ad hoc and decidedly limited manner. Under Hurst's 
proposal the Board was to establish an independent Board of Review 
which would investigate settlers' complaints over valuations and 
unreasonable demands of interest. In this way it was hoped an 
independent adjudication might give some real relief to those in need, 
unhampered by the constraints of government policy. But unfortunately 
for the settlers, the change of government in October 1923 led to the 
deferment of such plans. In the interim, however, the Board decided to 
act as its own Board of Review. But its limited concessions only 
antagonised the settlers who had hoped for a great deal more. 
In early 1922 the Board ceased purchasing properties. While the Act 
had established March 31 1922 as the endpoint for such purchases there 
was in fact no need anyway. The continued departures of settlers had 
obviated any necessity for purchases. The Board, now in Possession of a 
large number of vacated properties, soon had no choice hut to let them 
to civilian settlers. This led to acute embarrassment for both the Board 
and the Government and to a sense of injustice within the community. It 
also meant the state lost significant sums on rentals as civilians held 
their properties not under the Soldier Settlement Act but under the 
Tenants Act. 
This Act ensured tenants of a flat rental and imposed added 
obligations upon the Board which was now required to repair and 
maintain buildings. The government, having rejected revaluation for so 
long, now found itself offering civilian settlers de facto revaluations: the 
soldiers forced to vacate properties due to excessive rents were 
understandably enraged by such decisions. The Board noted that: 
complaints have been made in some quarters that civilians are 
paying less for properties than those charged to the soldier 
settlers, and this is correct in some cases, and is mainly the 
outcome of the neglect of many of the outgoing men. Neglect of 
orchard properties has had a depreciating effect on values, and 
allowances have to be made to endeavour to obtain more desirable 
tenants." 
30 Returned Soldiers' and Closer Settlement Department Report For 1921-22, T. J. P. P., Vol LXXXVII, 
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The rental of these properties in the Huon 	caused anger and 
bewilderment among many. In September 1923 the Cygnet Council 
passed a motion rejecting such practise and wondered why "the offer had 
not been made to the soldiers to carry on at the lower rate instead of 
being turned off their properties." 31 Such anger was perfectly 
understandable. The depression in the fruit industry had led most 
soldier settlers to despair and to see civilians take up properties at vastly 
reduced rentals only reinforced their sense of despair. The government 
appeared to have lost all interest in their plight. 
The first report of the new District Inspector for the Huon, E. J. 
Jennings, highlighted such anger. He noted that the depression in the 
fruit industry, to which he saw no immediate end, was having "a 
depressing influence upon settlers in general, and is responsible for 
many of the settlers vacating their properties." 32 Jennings conceded 
some settlers only remained on their properties for a year or so in an 
attempt to make as much as they could before vacating: but insisted the 
majority were triers, anxious to mai,p.tlin their properties: 
A lot of them are going out to work two or three days a week, other 
are wood-carting now and again, and every possible way of 
"keeping the pot boiling" is being utilised until prosperity grows 
brighter. But for these efforts on the part of a large number of 
settlers they would be faced with an unpromising future. 33 
The report belied the Board's promise that each property would support 
a man and his family. To complicate matters, the worsening economic 
climate and the rapid rise in unemployment had left the soldiers with 
fewer opportunities for such work. Those special grants which had been 
provided by the Government to help the returned men, grants that had 
caused so much bitterness within the community, could not last forever. 
Jenning's report was not all doom and gloom. He was confident that 
when those men who were not triers or opportunists had left, the Board 
would realise its objective: "to successfully settle returned soldiers with 
farming knowledge, and give further impetus to the primary 
31 Huon Times. September 11 1923. 
32 Returned Soldiers' and Closer Settlement Department Report For 1921-22, T. J. P. P.. Vol 1,XXXVI1,1922- 
23, Paper No 28. 
33 ibid. 
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industries so necessary to lead our state to an era of prosperity.!' 34 
Jennings was especially pleased to note: 
that the old spirit of camaraderie so prevalent on active service, is 
still in great evidence among settlers. Socially, of course, no 
settler is regarded with any degree of distinction above his 
neighbours, and the same impartial treatment is maintained 
throughout. Most settlers have returned to their pre-war districts, 
and as a result they have merged into the social life of the 
community as friends of al1. 35 
It was just such interaction with the community that was to make the 
failure of the settlers more keenly felt by all. 
Jennings' guarded hopes continued to be denied by the increasing 
difficulties faced by settlers. As outlined earlier, the depression in the 
fruit industry intensified between 1923 and 1924. The fruit returns 
continued, as the Huon Times so often noted, to be disastrous. Even a 
large scale exodus from the Huon failed to relieve the economic 
pressures upon those who remained. The area was infused with a deep 
sense of resignation: there was now little talk of progress or new 
developments. The failure of the High School, the closure of the Huon 
Timber Company and the refusal of either State or Federal governments 
to provide relief were symptomatic of the orchardist's difficulties. The 
Board's tentative steps towards the provision of remissions or 
revaluations did little to help the settlers' position. To add to their 
difficulties many settlers now experienced a break down in health. 
It is difficult to determine the exact number of soldiers suffering ill-
health though clearly the number was significant. The report of the 
Commonwealth Repatriation Commission for 1924-25 made reference to 
the growing illness amongst returned men, and referred to the "drastic 
change in numbers...in the percentage of certain medical disabilities." 36 
Between 1921-22 and 1924-25 the incidence of respiratory disease grew 
from 6.1% to 19.2%, tuberculosis from 13.8% to 17.3%, heart disease 
from 4.1 to 8.7% and rheumatism from 3.6 to 5.3% 37 Many medical 
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practitioners helieved the physical effects of 1__!assing and War Dille Stress 
only became apparent after the passage of a nu in her of years. Soldiers 
returoing to Australia seemingly fit soon fell victim to latent war time 
37,-k 
injuries. ivlany such men having taken up soldier settler properties now 
found it impossible to continue. The Board cannot he loaded with 
responsibility for this situation. 
The original application forms had asked prospective settlers to list 
war time injuries and many did so, though the soldiers' perception of the 
term "wounded" did not include disease or gassing. When Charles 
Jackson completed his application form to the question "wounds" he 
answered "gassed, but no wounds." 38 The answer typified those of most. 
But one must suspect many judged such admission would prejudice their 
chances for a property though such a fear proved groundless: illness 
proved to he no harrier to the acquisition of a farm. The Board, when 
faced with these cases of ill-health, usually tried to find a way to allow 
the settler to continue. 
Soldier Settler George page pulling stumps: cad ,/ 192(ls. 
Ill- health contributed to Thomas Miller's departure from his property 
at Cygnet. 39  Originally in partnership with a Herbert Jones, by June 
1922 the two, as was so often the case with partnerships, had a falling 
38 Lands And Surveys Department (LSD) 1 1 01/2/592. 
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out. The Board ordered Inspector Harrison, the new Inspector for the 
Huon, to investigate the consequent dispute. He reported both men to 
he "poor types, and I really could not make a choice between them. At 
my suggestion a coin was tossed, with the result that Jones agrees to 
transfer his interest in the property to Miller."40 Harrison rejected any 
idea of terminating the leases of both men on the ground that any new 
tenant would be sure to fail and so contribute to a bigger loss to the 
state. Clearly Harrison considered this case already hopeless. 
In 1923 another Inspector reported that Miller had made no 
improvements and in 1924 the lease was cancelled. Then Miller asked 
the Board's help in seeking a better pension: 
I beg to ask you as I am unable to do hard work of any class my 
property would of been worked only I am un able to do farm work. 
I beg for you to help as to getting my pension rose. I have been 
put out and as had to take a dear house as there where no other 
empty rent is 11/- a week and my pension 7/- I cannot do hard 
work and there is no other going on at present. 41 
Miller's case was far from unique. G.Stansfield, an early returnee, had 
taken up his Ranelagh property in 1918. By 1923, due to an unspecified 
health problem, he was forced to relinquish it. To that point Stansfield 
had been managing reasonably well and reports had been favourable. 
No doubt Stansfield was somewhat luckier than Miller as the Board 
allowed his brother to take up the property and so he was able to retain 
some sense of possession. The practice of family members taking up 
properties vacated due to ill-health seems to have been wide-spread. 
While the Board's operations display little consistency there seems to 
have been a willingness, where possible, to allow this practice. 
Leslie Stanton42 and James Howard43 provide further cases in point. 
Stanton took up his property at Cradoc in 1920 but in 1922 his doctor 
ordered him to move to a drier and warmer climate. As he was to be 
away for twelve months the Board allowed him to sub-let his property for 
that period. Within a few months Stanton's wife informed the Board of 
her husband's death and requested she be allowed to take over the 
40 ibid . 




property. The Board gave her a weekly tenancy. In 1924, however, 
Stanton's wife informed the Board that she could not continue the lease: 
the repayments were too high. She claimed the situation was so had that 
even if the Board let her have the property interest free for twelve 
months she would still be unable to meet her expenses. 
Unfortunately Mrs Stanton's all too brief appearence reflects the 
paucity of material which might throw light upon the role women played 
in resettlement. That they indeed played a most significant role must of 
course be beyond doubt for the labour of women and children was of 
vital necessity to the success of any small orchard. But in one area at 
least the settlers' files shed some light on one significant feminine role: 
much of the settlers' correspondence with the Board depended upon 
their literary skills. Such skills no doubt meant many women played an 
important role in the daily management of their husbands' orchards and 
as such shared a level of equality perhaps not shared by women in urban 
settings. 
James Howard took up his property in 1919 but in March 1920 the 
Board received a letter from his doctor certifying he was "unfit for hard 
labour owing to war injuries." 44 Howard had purchased the property 
from his parents who had continued to live with him. They now worked 
the property while Howard was in Sydney. In 1925 the parents asked the 
Board whether they might purchase 32 1 /2 acres of their son's property 
but the Board was unable to consider the request until Howard clarified 
his intentions. In January 1926 the parents offered to purchase the 
whole of the property. But the Board had already decided to cancel 
Howard's lease due to the non-payment of some £96 arrears. Howard's 
brother was now able to purchase the property on his parents' behalf. 
The transfer of a lease or sale of a property to a relation was not the 
only option open to the Board when it attempted to help soldier suffering 
poor health. Douglass Burgess 45 had taken up a property at Ranelagh in 
1920 but in 1922 was hospitalised in Hobart suffering bronchitis, 
emphesema and possibly tuberculosis. After a short stay in hospital 
Burgess returned to his property but was soon suffering poor health 
again. In July 1923 he asked whether he might be allowed to sub-lease 
his property for three years as his doctor had ordered him away 
44 ibid . 
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from the area. Burgess claimed he had: 
been unable to do any work this last twelve months and have had to 
pay for all my work to he done...I dont want to give up my place 
because I put all my money into it. It k on account of ill health 
that has caused me to do this. It is not bluff by saying that I have to 
get away from here as I could show the Dr Cert if required. 46 
The Board allowed Burgess to sub-lease his property. By 1934 he was in 
difficulty again and, with arrears of £493, was allowed to mortgage the 
property to the Port Huon Fruitgrowers Co-operative. By 1937 Burgess 
was some £67 in arrears. In 1938 he transferred the lease to his cousin. 
Even when soldiers left the state, the Board was prepared to offer what 
assistance it could. James Davis 47 had taken up a property at Franklin 
in 1921 but was forced to surrender the lease on grounds of ill-health in 
1924. Having moved to the more benign climate of South Australia with 
the intention of grazing sheep he approached the Board for assistance in 
gaining a soldier settler property in that State. The Board was happy to 
supply a good reference: 
During the three years Mr Davis effected considerable substantial 
improvements and worked the property to the complete 
satisfaction of the Closer Settlement Board...I have pleasure in 
stating that Mr Davis was a most satisfactory settler, and certainly 
met all the obligations imposed by his lease. 48 
Not all soldiers suffering poor health received such treatment. 
William Glass 49 took up his Mountain River property in 1920 but in 
1923, on his doctor's instructions, moved to a drier part of the state in an 
attempt to cure his neuritis, a condition that probably resulted from the 
amputation of a toe while on active service. In 1924 Glass was placed on 
a yearly lease but in 1927, now £480 in arrears, his lease was cancelled. 
The local Inspector, Russ Cairns, reported he had: 
had this holding under notice for some time...& informed lessee if 
conditions did not alter I would have to recommend that his lease 
be cancelled. The property is in a very neglected state & lessee is 
always away at work on some road job or another. He had no 
46 ibid . 
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possible hope of succeeding & makes no effort to improve his 
position. 50 
It is clear from the above cases that the Board, when confronted by 
situations involving serious health problems, generally adopted a 
genuinely philanthropic attitude towards the settlers. Where possible it 
made every effort to maintain them on their properties. At least in some 
cases the government's actions were not simply the result of political or 
economic considerations. But for whatever reason, try as it might, the 
government could not stem the flow of departures. To continually offer 
remission of interest and arrears when there were no markets for fruit 
merely extended the settlers' misery. 
Mark Stranger 51 was just such a settler, typical of many, forced to 
leave his property as a result of the lack of markets and poor returns. 
That he was a broken and embittered man is clearly evident from the 
letter he wrote to the Board in 1923 when surrendering his lease: 
Owing to the fact that I have to experience another had season 
with the apple markets I find that I am in financial difficulties with 
the merchants & under the immediate prospects in view cannot 
possibly pay my way...It seems hard that after sinking four hundred 
pounds & three years hard labour on this place that one has to 
walk out in debt...The place when I took it over was in bad 
condition. In regard to rent I have done my best to meet the Board 
in every way & feel safe in saying that I am among the small 
number of soldier settlers in this district who have done so. I will 
leave the matter in your hands I have done my best a man could do 
no More. 52 
But Stranger was not alone. Thirty four other Huon settlers vacated 
their properties at this time. By December 1924 some 48% (53) of all 
Huon settlers who would vacate their leases had done so. 53 The 
government's offer of remission and revaluations provided small hope to 
settlers and was clearly designed as no more than a mild palliative to the 
growing complaints of the settlers and their supporters. The Board's 
decision to sit as a Board of Review at least entitled the government to 
50 ibid. 
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claim it was doing something to help the soldiers and, most importantly, 
served to defer serious consideration of a total revaluation, a situation 
the government most feared. But the remissions and revaluations given 
to Huon settlers clearly demonstrated the paucity and tardiness of 
government largess. 
The cases of Garnett Graham 54 , Vernon Hinton 55 , Cyril Rodman 56 
and Charles Donaghue 57 exemplify this point. Graham approached the 
Board for a revaluation in August 1923, claiming his property was not 
"worth the money placed on it, for the reason the place is so subjected to 
floods. I am continually losing heavily every year on account of this. I 
reckon that I lost this year 1000 cases of apples also 3/4 acre of 
potatoes."58 The property's value was reduced from £1 000 to £860 
after the Inspector confirmed Graham's claims. In 1925 the property was 
revalued again. The new value was set at £460. Although the annual 
rental now fell to £23 Graham was still unable to make the properry pay 
and he surrendered it in 1926. In 1924 Hinton's buildings were revalued 
from £650 to £550 and he was allowed remission of £41 on arrears. He 
vacated his property the same year. Rodman had his capital value 
reduced in 1924 from £1 219 to £1 000 and he received a reduction of 
£15 in rent. He surrendered his property in 1933. Donaghue received a 
partial revaluation of his property in 1923 and saw his capital valuation 
fall from £1 500 to £1 090 but despite such reduction he, like the 
others, was forced to surrender his lease the same year. In these, and 
other similar cases, it is clear the Board's limited revaluations or 
remissions provided insufficient incentive for a settler to continue with 
the property. The highly inflated original valuations and the decline in 
the apple industry left them little choice. 
Such revaluations and remissions even offered little help to those 
settlers who would eventually prove successful. Thomas Burnaby from 
Port Cygnet provides an example. He had purchased his property in 1919 
but in May 1923 sought a revaluation because of "three successive 
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markets this season." 59 At this stage Burnaby found himself scarcely 
able to meet his commitments to the Board. He insisted his application 
for revaluation be dealt with privately, and warned that if this was not 
the case he would prefer to continue as best he could. While failure was 
endemic to the system there were many who still did not lose their pride. 
No doubt Burnaby felt that the 'presence of Board members on his 
property, so clearly intent on reviewing his position, would be the subject 
of intolerable gossip within the community. Certainly his 
communications with the Board showed him to be an able and capable 
settler in trouble through no fault of his own. The Board assured 
Burnaby his application would be heard privately. 
In June Burnaby informed the Board that due to recent inclement 
weather he was likely to experience yet another had season. It had now 
become imperative that his request for a revaluation be heard at the 
earliest possible occasion. He told the Board that it was "now time that 
(it) should sit and report, as it would then see in actuality the present 
disastrous position of the man on the land."" For Burnaby the moment 
of crisis had arrived. 
In November Burnaby wrote the Board an extremely detailed letter: 
I respectfully make the following appeal in connection with the 
property owned by me. 
1. That the property be revalued for rental purposes to nineteen 
hundred pounds ie the original value of the Board in 1919, at time 
of purchase. 
2. That the two hundred pounds paid by me as cash deposit 
above the amount of value by the Board be remitted to myself as 
arrears and rent due etc. 
In making the above request, which I request you to give serious 
consideration, there is no need for me to refer at length to the 
unsatisfactory state of the fruit industry throughout Australia 
generally. 
The position of the orchard settlers must be well known to 
yourself to need any reference here. 
But I would briefly point out that the low price of fruit, bad 
carriage, high freights, & high cost of general production, had had 
59 A 116/372. 
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the effect of reducing profits as to make it practically impossible 
to pay interest, & hire on the capital values of the land in 1919. 
The first after the war boom in land. 
Since taking possession here I have, in common with other 
growers, been faced firstly, with the impossibility of obtaining 
space for fruit, ie 1920-1921. During the first of those years I 
shipped overseas about 300 cases & in the second only about 500, 
owing to lack of space. This caused a tremendous glut of fruit on 
local and interstate markets; so much so that a large quantity had 
to be carted straight from the orchard to the evaporating factory & 
sold for 2/- & 1/6 per bushel of 50 lbs. Unfortunately in 1922 
though more space was available the fruit carried very badly & the 
losses of the year are well known to all. Fortunately however I was 
able to pay one years rent etc out of my own means & anticipated 
better times, which however have not yet materialised, but with an 
endeavour to pay my way I raised a loan of seventy five pounds on 
improvements, fifty pounds of which I refunded as rent etc due. 
Had the year 1922 not been so disastrous I should not have gone 
into arrears with my rent etc, hut as that year ran me heavily into 
debt at the time I have found it quite impossible to pay my way & 
can see no way of quickly pulling up the one hundred pounds due 
for that year. 
I would draw your attention to the fact that I have at all times 
thoroughly worked, sphered & pruned the orchard & no labour 
had been spared, besides which about fifty pounds worth of 
manure has been sown on the property at my own immediate 
expense. 
Realising the necessity of having some other means of income 
beside the orchard I have carried out at considerable expense, a 
scheme of clearing, grassing, besides improving & extending 
fences, repairing & improving buildings etc & there is no doubt 
that from now on I shall reap the benefit of this work. 
In 1921, 1922 there was no market for plums & I found it 
necessary to feed my potatoes to stock on account of low prices. 
I may add I have no complaint with the property but with the 
unsatisfactory condition of the fruit industry, & therefore I appeal, 
for your very serious consideration, of my requests, emphasizing 
the facts that I have laid out all my capital about six hundred 
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pounds in the place, & have spared no effort to keep the property 
in first class order and condition." 
Burnaby, like most settlers, achieved a limited success in his 
application hut unlike the majority, retained his property (until the mid 
1950s when it was purchased by his son.) The fact that he found regular 
and profitable employment on the Hobart wharves no doubt helped. As 
an older and married man he also had the help of his sons to work the 
orchard in his absences. 
Huonvillc: orchards in carly 1920s. 
By the , end of 1924 nearly all the soldier settlers in the Huon were in 
difficulty. The condition of the fruit industry, overvaluations, purchase 
of poor properties, growing unemployment, and failing health and a less 
than helpful policy of remissions and revaluations had all played their 
part. But one is left wondering when a case like that of Charles 
Jackson 62 from Esperance is considered. Was this an instance of sheer 
incompetence on the Board's part or a case of wilful deceit on the part of 
local interests. At this remove it is difficult to determine. In 1919 the 
government valuator had suggested the property would make a poor 
purchase, Grace Calvert claiming "it would never keep a man and his 
family, but by working on it some 4 or 5 acres of small fruit could be 
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grown (but)...the lesee will have to earn most of his income outside of 
the property." 63 The government, as was so often the case, allowed 
Jackson's "home": the subject of such a damning report. 
Jackson his property. Jackson took up his lease in 1920 hut had left by 
1923. Following his departure the Board asked its insurer, the 
Tasmanian Government Insurance Office, to report on the value of the 
property. The report created wide-spread consternation within the 
Department: 
I found the dwelling and attached kitchen in a most deplorable 
condition and quite unfit for habitation. The place is very damp, 
floors dropping, paper hanging off ceilings, and walls, principally 
owing to dampness -hack verandah boards ripped up and taken 
away - evidently for firewood - spoutings down and one room at 
back of house is used as a cattle shelter - windows broken and all 
doors open. The trees in the orchard are worth nil as the whole 
place is open to any straying cattle, and fences are down. The only 
item of any value is the iron on the roof and this should be worth 
approximately forty pounds. I might state that I would not accept 
the whole property as a gift and in view of the condition of the 
building, the place from an insurance point of view is valueless. I 
would suggest that the policy he at once cancelled and return 
63 ibid. 
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premium made. I confirm our inspector's report in every detail 
and do not think the same was drastic enough. Enclosed you will 
find two small photographs of the building and you will note that 
the supports of the verandah are also falling down. I can 
unhesitatingly state that out of many thousands of places inspected 
by the writer during the past 34 years, that the building in question 
is the worst he has ever inspected. 64 
There was continued correspondence between the Board and the T. 
G. I. 0. over the property until 1936 when the Agricultural Bank finally 
declared it a complete loss. 
The receipt of letters such as that of M. E. Mitchelmore of Southport 
would have done little to reassure the Board of the wisdom of its 
purchases. Mitchelmore, like so many others, had approached the Board 
with the intention of renting a vacated property at Strathblane and his 
letter, delightfully understated as it may he, nevertheless provides clear 
evidence of the widespread failure of resettlement in Esperance: "if you 
can understand you have had a bit of had luck with the places you have 
bought, people who have bin to tired to work them.." 65 Mitchelmore was 
allowed to rent his house for 6s a week due mainly to the Board's fear 
that local mill hands would strip the house of all that was valuable if it 
were left vacant too long. All this exemplified how depression in the 
Huon threatened the Board's interests. 
Thomas Inches, the Board's Inspector in the Huon, officially 
sanctioned Mitchelmore's claims in his annual report for 1924. Inches 
reported that "a fair amount of the time has been taken up endeavouring 
to find tenants for vacated farms." 66 Inches's report painted a picture of 
near total despair. He noted that extremely wet weather had again led to 
a reduction in the quantity and quality of the crop and with low prices 
prevailing in England the growers had received poor returns. He made 
reference to one orchardist who had only received 1s 6d a case for fruit, 
and pointedly noted that such prices were only "obtained by men who 
(had) spent a lifetime on the orcharding industry, and they find it 
difficult this year to make ends meet. Small matter for wonder is it 
64 ibid . 
65 ibid. 
66 Returned Soldiers' and Closer Settlement Department Report For 1923-24, 1. J. P. P., Vol XCI 1924-25, 
Paper No 13. 
179 
then," reported Inches,"when returned soldiers are finding things very 
difficult."67 Despite the prevalent doom and gloom of his report Inches 
still upheld the Board's optimistic assurance that "given a good season or 
two, the soldier settlers generally will get on all right." 68 Such optimism 
rang hollow against the reality of the following season. As ever the 
hoped for good season failed to materialise and many Huon settlers were 
plunged deeper into debt. 
By 1924 the settlers' sense of hopelessness is clearly evidenced by the 
note of resignation that permeated their correspondence with the Board. 
None of the Board's stratagems to keep settlers on their properties had 
proved effective and many settlers were now forced to work off their 
holdings just to "keep the pot boiling". In some instances this was to be 
merely the forerunner to departure; in other cases the last desperate 
effort to retain what capital settlers had built up in their orchards. 
In March 1924 Studley Townshend wrote to the Board from Cradoc to 
surrender his property. The continuing poor returns on fruit had left him 
no option. "I find I am unable to forward any of the money due to you 
owing to the crop on this place being a complete failure this year. I am 
already twelve months interest behind & it would be fully twelve months 
before I would be able to find anything at all."69 The fact that 
Townshend had been forced to work off the property for nine months of 
each year to feed his family had left him little chance to develop his 
orchard. In one sense though Townshend was lucky for he at least found 
local employment. Others were not so "lucky". With unemployment so 
widespread in the area many settlers were forced to leave the Huon 
Joshua Bone was such an individual. Having failed to find local 
employment he was forced to surrender his orchard in 1924 to move to 
the mainland in search of work. 7() His had been one of those properties 
purchased on the assumption that part time employment would have 
been readily available. It had been a costly assumption for the taxpayer. 
Not all settlers were as honest as Bone and Townshend and the Board 
had ever to be on the lookout for those attempting to use the system to 
their advantage. In June 1924 Malcolm Schultz from Wattle Grove 
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asked the Board for permission to work away from his property. He also 
sought a remission of rent. In his absence Schultz planned to employ 
someone on contract to carry out the labour on his property. His letter 
displayed a remarkable confidence on his part: "of course you havent 
been hard on me in the past and I have no reason to think that you will be 
in the future." 7 I Such confidence was well founded for he was granted a 
remission of rent and allowed to sub-let the property for 5s a week. But 
in 1925 a neighbour informed Inspector Cairns that Schultz soon 
intended to surrender his property. Following his investigatious Cairns 
told the Board that "it is common talk that Schultz is going to get this 
season's crop off & then throw it up. The crop is very good: & I suggest if 
this lessee is behind with his payment the Dept should get some hold on 
the crop"72 The Board soon cancelled the lease and took control of the 
crop, Schultz receiving 25% as compensation for his labours. Schultz 
was lucky to receive such a return. Many honest settlers had left with 
nothing. 
The 1924-25 season, following a by now established pattern, also 
proved disastrous. While returns on fruit had been generally reasonable 
the General Strike in England had left many settlers in receipt of bills 
rather than income. As Cairns noted in his 1925 report "the returns 
coming to hand are very poor, in some cases the grower being in debt. 
With the exception of those who sold the larger portion of their crop 
F.O.B. the season is disastrous, & I feel greatly concerned over the 
position of some of our settlers." 73 Cairns was right to be concerned. 
By the end of 1925 the number of settlers who had left their 
properties in the Huon had risen to 62. By now fully 60% of those 
settlers who would eventually prove unsuccessful had left their farms. 
The continued failure of the apple industry and the difficulty of finding 
employment, matched with the ever deepening debt of the settlers, 
ensured such departures would continue. In October 1925 William Jones 
of Glen Huon approached the Board with the request that an Inspector 
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he sent down to discuss his financial position. Jones claimed he could 
not: 
carry on with the place any longer as we are milking down here and 
the weather is so had we are having so much rain down here there 
is now grass down here for the cows...I will off to turn out and go 
out to work to earn a live as we have very little money fore 
enythink and I am still receiving the bills for my arries and it is a 
grate worry to me and I would rather be off the place 74 
Although granted a suspension of arrears and advised to sell off a 
portion of his property to raise working capital he was ultimately forced 
to vacate in 1930, by which time the financial burden had become too 
great to bear. 
Not all displayed Jones's submissive attitude. In early 1925 Russel 
Ayres again wrote to the Board. Now he complained about the Board's 
payments to a local contractor for work supposedly done on his property. 
For Ayres such payments clearly evidenced the indifference with which 
the Board treated its settlers. Vehemently he wrote: 
don't these things get a little attention. Of course he is not a 
soldier settler it does not matter about that, who makes good to 
the Government all this, why should not all these blunders be 
made pay up, we are called up to make our part good, so if you can 
cast things like that aside why cannot the soldiers arrears be cast 
aside. 75 
Ayres complained again about the lack of a road to his place, a problem 
he considered to be the major hurdle to his success. He claimed such a 
road would give him "a chance to pay up my arrears that will be assissate 
to a soldier what they all preach but don't practice." 76 
Although Ayres would not have realised it, his words were to prove 
prophetic. Since January 1917 the dilemma of soldier settlement had 
bedevilled successive state governments. None had been able to 
formulate a policy that provided the correct balance between the 
soldiers' claims to patriotism and the financial strain this imposed upon 
a community suffering its most severe depression since the 1890s. The 





the financial and political reality of the situation, had led to a dangerous 
policy of inaction. By 1925 such a policy had brought the state near to 
financial ruin. For ten years government had found itself unable to deal 
with the problem of soldier settlement in a sound financial way - to have 
done so would have invited electoral disaster. To tamper with a clearly 
flawed scheme was the only option they had been able, or willing, to 
follow. Lyons and his government had remained well aware of this 
massive problem. Its unravelling demands a return to broader issues of 
State policy. The Royal Commission promised Lyons the hope that this 
long standing delicate balance might be broken and that finally some 
realistic course of action would be open to the government. 
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Chapter Eight. 
Minister and Board as Adversaries; 
Royal Commission as Adjudicator. 
The Royal Commission into soldier settlement began its work on 18 
June 1926 and presented its report to Premier Lyons some three months 
later on 29 September. 1 Lyons chose the Chief Justice, Sir Herbert 
Nicholls, to head the Commission. C. H. Ferguson was appointed 
assistant. Nicholls was an obvious choice for such a role. He had been a 
former Independent Member of the House of Assembly, attorney-
general and Minister administering the Education Act in Propsting's 
Government of 1903-04 and leader of the Opposition from 1906 until his 
appointment to the Supreme Court in 1909. Having already sat on a 
number of Royal Commissions he was experienced to the task. 2 The 
Commission found the State's resettlement scheme to have been a 
complete failure and effectively exonerated all involved. It was a finding 
that surprised few. Politicians of all persuasions had long been aware of 
the underlying causes of the continued failure of soldier settlement. 
Indeed, G. M. Foster and Frederick Burbury when questioning the 
Board's efforts in August 1918, had foreshadowed the Commission's 
findings. The settlers' experiences bore ready testament to such failure. 
The Lee Government's decision to allow settlers the opportunity to take 
up properties throughout the State had effectively ensured an awareness 
of such difficulties within most Tasmanian communities. 
The Commission's findings were welcomed by the Government, the 
Closer Settlement Board and those soldier settlers still remaining on 
their farms. For Lyons the Commission's findings gave hope for 
exorcising that emotional hold returned men had held over successive 
governments since 1919; a hold that had brought the State to the brink of 
economic disaster. Lyons hoped the Commission's findings would at last 
enable his Government to place the administration of soldier settlement 
on a more business like basis, ensuring the needs of the State came 
before those of the returned men. The Commission's findings promised 
the Board an end to what it knew had been the damaging political 
interference of all governments since the scheme's inception in 1917. No 
doubt officers of the Board felt vindicated by the Commission's findings 
1 RC 37/1 
2 Australian Dictionary of Biography, Melbourne: Melbourne University Press, Vol 111988, pp. 22-23. 
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that this continued political interference had been primarily responsible 
for the Board's inability to resolve the recurrent problems of soldier 
settlement. The Royal Commission promised the Board an 
independence it had never enjoyed before and gave the assurance that at 
last settlers would be dealt with on the basis of economic rationality 
rather than political advantage. The Commission's decision to 
recommend 
revaluations to the remaining settlers raised hope that something might 
be gained after their long years of struggle. That the Commission 
recognised revaluation alone might prove insufficient suggested to these 
men the possibility of a more optimistic future. 
The Mercury and the Examiner reported the Commission's findings 
in full 3 though such publication inspired little reaction, the 
correspondence pages of both papers remaining silent on the matter. 
The Mercury was highly critical of the Commission's seemingly cavalier 
approach to the actions of those successive Ministers who had allowed, 
for entirely political reasons, the continuation of a scheme known to 
have been inherently flawed and expressed its concern that officers of 
the Board had unwillingly aided such duplicity for fear of losing their 
positions. For the Mercury "the report of the Royal Commission...(was) 
of a nature to make people reading it rub their eyes and ask where they 
are." 4 Of course the Mercury's adoption of such a high moral stance 
conveniently ignored its responsibility in having created a political 
climate that precluded responsible action on the part of either the 
Board or Government. 
By way of contrast the Examiner found "the Royal Commission's 
report (to have been) a very human document." 5 Though a sad tale of 
failure, it was a failure inspired by the highest of motives: the 
establishment of a program that allowed for a "practical remembrance" 
to those who had shown themselves willing to make the ultimate 
sacrifice. Any inactivity on the part of Government was understandable, 
"the returned soldiers' voice ... a powerful one in a land still throbbing 
with the pangs of war wounds." 6 Talk of patriotism, of a debt of honour, 
3 Mercury, September 30 1926: Examiner September 30 1926 
4 Mercury, September 30 1926. 
5 Examiner, September 30 1926. 
6 ibid. 
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had meant that no cost had been considered too great at the scheme's 
conception but as "the errors of those days ... seeded and reproduced 
their kind, ... the benefits of the scheme (became)... almost smothered 
beneath a tangle of debt and failure." 7 The Examiner argued for the 
nexus between politics and sentiment to be severed: it was time for the 
Government to adopt a business like approach. But the paper warned 
that while the Commission's suggested program of revaluation might 
solve some problems it should not be viewed as a general panacea. 
There would be more heart ache before the sorry tale ended. 
While the Commission's report elicited little, if any, response within 
the wider community, its appearance provoked a deal of controversy 
within Parliament. 8 Such controversy centred not upon the 
Commission's findings, a topic upon which all were in general 
agreement, but upon the reasons behind the Government's decision to 
establish the Commission. The opposition was convinced the primary 
motivation for the Government's decision lay more in the disagreement 
between the Minister responsible for soldier settlement, James Belton, 
and his Department, than in any abiding concern for the plight of the 
settler or the State's finances. 
In November 1926, the Opposition, during debate on the estimates in 
committee of supply, questioned the Government over a payment of £450 
to the Commission's secretary, 1-1. R. Dobbie. Such a seemingly 
innocuous inquiry was merely the forerunner to a more damaging, and 
certainly more embarrassing, line of questioning. That line of 
questioning soon became obvious when C. E. W. James asked the 
Government why the Royal Commission had been established in the first 
place. It was a question which evoked consternation and confusion. A. 
G. Ogilvie's reply showed a keen understanding of its import. No doubt 
adopting the adage that "attack is the best form of defence", Ogilvie 
proceeded to attack the Opposition over its handling of soldier 
settlement, making particular reference to the strained relationships 
that had existed between previous Ministers and the Board. Such a 
fraught response to such a seemingly innocent question heartened the 
Opposition. Sir Walter Lee, clearly aware the Opposition had touched 
upon a raw nerve, laconically noted that the Government "seemed 
7 ibid. 
8 Mercury, November 25 1926. 
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reluctant in telling members what the reason was." 9 The comment led 
Ogilvie to a vituperative attack over Lee's decision to establish a Royal 
Commission into the State's railways. Undeterred, Lee now suggested 
the Royal Commission into soldier settlement had been established 
primarily because Belton as Minister had been unable to work with 
officers of his own Department. "Dame rumour was ever a lying jade", 
claimed Lee, "but it has been said there was friction between the 
Minister and officers of the Department." 1 ° Lee was also curious as to 
why the Royal Commission's report had been tabled but not published. 
When the Government claimed the report was not important enough to 
warrant publication, Lee declared the whole issue to be peculiar, though 
it must be doubted whether Lee ever understood the full peculiarity of 
the situation. 
That Lee's accusations were based more on fact than rumour though is 
supported by the memoirs of Noel Lamidey," an Englishman who 
emigrated to Tasmania in the early 1920s. Lamidey's original intention 
to take up orcharding frustrated by poor health, he sought, and was 
given, a position in the State's public service. He soon found himself 
Chief Clerk to the Board and privy to the inner workings of Belton's 
Department. It was a position of some political sensitivity, especially 
following Lyons's serious motor-vehicle accident of July 1926. 
According to Lamidey Albert Ogilvie 12 , used his new found power to 
push for a Royal Commission into soldier settlement - a move designed 
more to undermine Belton's standing in the Labor Party than to further 
the settlers' interests. But Lamidey reported Ogilvie's plans to be soon 
threatened by Nicholls's decision to adjourn his hearings sine die; 
Nicholls having failed to uncover any evidence that could justify the 
continuation of his hearings. Lamidey now claimed to have been 
approached by a senior public servant and promised rapid advancement 
on condition he revealed any illegal actions on the part of Belton's 
Department. Lamidey scorned such approaches, believing Belton to be 
an "honest and a kindly politician - insofar as any politician can be 
9 ibid. 
10 ibid. 
11 Lamidey, N. W., Partial Success: My years as a Public Servant, Canberra: Self-Published (1970). 
12 It should be noted Lamidey was in error in suggesting A. G. Ogilvie, rather than the Chief Secretary J. A. 
Guy, was acting Premier in Lyons's absence. His memoirs do though fit well with other evidence. 
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honest - with the interests of his Department at heart.' 13  Such faith was 
soon undermined at the next sitting of the Commission when Belton sat 
side by side with Ogilvie. Lamidey could only invoke the inherent 
hypocrisy of politicians to explain such a situation. "This switch at 
Ministerial level was a facer. Whereas we had been defending his 
administration we now found in this new and rather precarious situation 
that he was no longer (ironically enough) on his own side." 14 Against 
better advice from senior colleagues Lamidey next confronted Ogilvie 
over his political machinations. It was to be a pyrrhic victory and only 
Lamidey's departure for Melbourne and the Federal Government's 
Development and Migration Commission allowed him to avoid Ogilvie's 
inevitable retribution. 
While Lamidey's accusations hold the essential element of truth they 
nevertheless do not detract significantly from Lee's claim that the Royal 
Commission was established as a result of antagonisms between Belton 
and his own Department. Perhaps Lamidey's faith in Belton had been 
misplaced. In the event it is clear that the Royal Commission's role was 
to a large extent fixated upon the adjudication of the dispute between 
Belton and his Board. Both Belton and W. N. Hurst, Board President and 
Secretary for Lands, provided the Commission with submissions which 
were highly critical of the other party. As Lee very well knew, it was this 
dispute which had lain at the core of the Royal Commission's activities. 
The tension that had long existed between Belton and his Board 
reached breaking point after the Labor Party's success in the State 
election of June 1925. Labor, in winning sixteen of the thirty 
parliamentary seats, at last gained office in its own right; the Party 
finally free to implement its own policies without recourse to the support 
of independents. Central amongst those policies was Belton's promise 
immediately to revalue all properties belonging to soldier settlers. 
Belton knew such a promise would inspire intense resentment on the 
part of the Board, long opposed to all attempts at revaluation. But 
Belton knew that a Labor victory would give him the mandate to insist 
upon his promise and effectively resolve his dispute with the Board. 
While such an outcome no doubt played a significant role in Belton's 
13 ibid., p.11. 
14 ibid., p.12. 
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decision it was overshadowed by more important political and economic 
considerations. Revaluations promised to deliver the electoral support 
of the R. S. L., a support which might prove crucial in a Parliament so 
evenly divided. 15 And that support could he attained in the happy 
knowledge that revaluations were already high on Belton's agenda. 
As earlier chapters have shown, since the end of the war the economic 
plight of Tasmania's rural sector had intensified with each successive 
year. Nowhere else was this effect more pronounced than upon the 
soldier settlers. They had soon recognised their properties to have been 
over valued and as such incapable of providing a living. The need for 
revaluations was soon high on the list of R. S. L. demands. By 1923 R. S. 
L. calls for revaluation had become insistent and in July it had held a 
special meeting in Hobart to discuss the settler's difficulties. 
Those who addressed the meeting were adamant that they were in no 
way responsible for their plight. They perceived themselves to have been 
the victims of the severe downturn in the rural sector, the inequitable 
terms under which they had been placed on their farms and the greatly 
inflated prices they had been forced to pay for their properties. The 
meeting believed there would soon he a mass exodus of settlers unless 
something was soon done to ease their difficulties. It was argued that 
this exodus would not only prove embarrassing to Government but 
wholly transfer the economic burden from the struggling settlers to the 
taxpayer. 
The meeting was convinced the only course open to Government was 
the immediate and complete revaluation of all soldier settlement 
properties. While it was admitted such revaluations would pose an 
enormous cost to the State it was argued "any adequate steps taken to 
- place soldier settlers on a sound basis would involve a large loss to the 
State, but loss was inevitable, because if no action was taken hundreds of 
good settlers would be forced to give up their farms."I 6 
While such complaints continued throughout 1924-25, generally 
through the correspondence of individual settlers but occasionally 
through meetings organized by the R. S. L., the settlers continued to 
struggle on their properties. By 1926 the situation had become 
15  That no government of the early 1920s had sufficient numbers to allow of decisive action over soldier 
settlement certainly played a significant role in creating difficulties for the settlers. 
16 lIuon Times. February 2 1923. 
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desperate. 
In April 1926 a large gathering of soldiers met at Penguin to complain 
I6A 
of their difficulties vet again. The meeting passed two resolutions: the 
first calling upon the Government to halt all proceedings against 
defaulting settlers until a revaluatn of their properties had taken place 
and the second urging the replacement of the existing soldier settlement 
Board with a simpler administration which would he incorporated into 
the Lands Department. 
Following the meeting, a deputation met the Minister responsible for 
soldier settlement, Mr Belton, and impressed upon him the need to carry 
out their demands. Belton told the members of the deputation that "he 
was fully seized of the position of soldier settlement, and the matter had 
given both himself and the government concern." 17 While he promised 
some action on re-valuation, he refused to commit the government on 
the matter of reconstituting the Board, and gave no hint that a wide-
ranging inquiry would ensue. 
In fact the Government had been contemplating such a move for some 
time, its hand forced by Belton's growing antipathy towards the Board 
and the ever deepening crisis in the State's finances. That the two were 
inexorably linked in the minds of many would prove more than a happy 
juxtaposition of circumstances. 
Belton had, upon Labor's return to office in 1925, instructed the Board 
to carry out a complete revaluation of all properties still in the hands of 
soldier settlers. It was Belton's second attempt at revaluations. An 
earlier attempt in 1924 had met with spirited resistance from the Board, 
its decision to limit revaluations to remissions on interest and arrears 
effectively undermining what had been an already limited gesture on 
Belton's part. The Board's actions had both frustrated and angered 
Belton who was now determined upon nothing less than a full revaluation 
of all soldier settler properties. But by November 1925 it was clear to 
Belton that the Board had no intention of carrying out his electoral 
promise. He promptly recalled Board members, then at Marrawah, to 
Hobart. Fortuitously for Belton one of their number, 0. G. Norton, 
chose this moment to take leave to travel to England. Belton now moved 
to replace Norton with a temporary appointee, one Harold Brumby, and 
17 • Beresford, "The World War One Soldier Settlement Scheme in Tasmania",T1IRAPP 30, No 3,1983. p97. 
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proposed that Brumby, and not the Board, carry out revaluations. It was 
Belton's intention that Brumby should report directly to the Minister on 
his revaluations, effectively bypassing the Board. This would give Belton 
complete control over revaluations. 
The Board bitterly resented Belton's plan arguing "the man (had) not 
been born who (could) fairly value farms extending from the north of 
King Island to the south of the Huon, which includes pastoral, dairying, 
sheep, orchard, and small fruit properties." 18 Belton countered by 
suggesting Brumby's employment would introduce a necessary 
uniformity into revaluation. The Board and its Minister had reached 
impasse. 
In December 1925 Belton informed Cabinet of the need for immediate 
action on soldier settlement losses, and warned that the Board's present 
policy of remission on interest merely postponed the inevitable, offering 
no solution to what had by now become an increasingly complex problem. 
Belton informed Cabinet "on their present valuations, very few first-class 
farmers could make a living from holdings which are occupied by 
soldiers" 19 and suggested the time had come for the Government "to get 
to the root of the problem." 2° Belton believed the appointment of an 
independent valuator such as Brumby to be the only possible way for 
settlers to receive a fair revaluation of their farms. After all, Belton 
suggested: 
it (was only) natural that the Board which was responsible for the 
purchase of the holdings should show some hesitancy in reducing 
substantially the valuation of the properties which it purchased, as 
the members must deem it a reflection on their judgement of 
former values. 21 
Belton also believed that any further attempts by the Board to continue 
with the revaluations would "be strongly opposed by the soldiers 
themselves."22 
The impasse was eventually resolved following "compromise" between 
Belton and the Board, a compromise which saw the appointment of the 
18 RC 37/1: W. N. Hurst submission to Royal Commission., p.9. 
19 P1)1/409/176/12/25, 3 January 1925. 
20 ibid . 
21 ibid. 
22 RC 37/1: J. BcIton submission to Royal Commission., p.4. 
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State's Chief Valuer, The Commissioner of Taxes, II. E. Downie, to 
oversee the revaluations. But Downie, believing the task of revaluation 
to he beyond the competence of any one man, soon appointed special 
evaluators to help him, a decision that doubtless pleased the Board. It 
was, however, the last pleasure the Board enjoyed. Belton temporarily 
suspended its operations in March 1926. 
Belton and the Board offered differing interpretations of this event to 
the Royal Commission. Hurst suggested the Board's rejection of Brumby 
as valuator had led to "a feeling of estrangement between the Minister 
and the Board," 23 as a consequence of which Belton terminated the 
Board's meetings. Belton proffered the alternative explanation that "in 
view of the expenses entailed by the Board's Meetings, (now Downie was 
supervising revaluations) I discouraged the calling of members 
together...(considering) the Departmental officers could handle the 
position in a better way." 24 Whatever the truth Belton now moved for a 
Royal Commission into the Board's affairs, claiming his decision to have 
been motivated by a long tii concern "that arrears were heaping up, 
remissions of rent and the writing off of had debts were....considerable, 
and on the increase,...(and)...that...there was a weakness somewhere in 
the departmental administration." 25 The Government was only too 
ready to accept such a recommendation. After all the cost of soldier 
settlement had bedevilled successive Nationalist Governments: Lee's 
fall from office in 1923 was largely the result of his inability to deal with 
the issue. Lyons no doubt realised his own Government would be short-
lived unless he either found a successful resolution to the issue or a 
means of distancing his Government from its political dangers. The idea 
of a Royal Commission promised both Belton and Lyons the opportunity 
they needed. Certainly the State's financial situation called for some 
form of immediate action!
In October 1925 Lyons reported to Parliament on the continuing crisis 
in the state's finances, in no small measure a consequence of the soldier 
settlement scheme. 26 Lyons noted the special relief given the state by 
the Commonwealth in 1923 but had still to record that "future heavy 
23 RC 37/1 Ilurst submission., p.9. 
24 RC 37/1 Belton submission., p.3. 
25 ibid. 
26 Financial Statement of the Treasurer. October 1925, T.J. P. P., 	XCIII, 1925-26, Paper No 17. 
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losses are inevitable. It has been pointed out if all properties were let, 
and every settler met his obligations in full, the undertaking would cost 
£35 000 per annum, but the actual loss for the year was over £ 120 000. 1127 
For a considerable time successive governments had been able to 
insulate the real cost of the scheme from the taxpayer. This had been 
accomplished by recording the cost of the scheme as a charge against 
revenue. By June 1925 it had become clear to Lyons that such an 
approach could not be carried on indefinitely. The annual amount owed 
by settlers had risen from £22 34 in 1921 to £ 1 62 990 in 1925. In just six 
years the total debt on the scheme had risen to a staggering £666 430. 
By now the scheme's financial obligations had become "greater than the 
state (could) bear"28 and Lyons, rather than asking the Tasmanian 
taxpayer to defray the cost, sought further relief from the Federal 
government. He had no choice: without Federal assistance Tasmania 
faced financial ruin. 
The annual report of the Department of Lands, Survey and Closer 
Settlement for 1924-25 had no doubt helped force Lyons's hand. 29 The 
- 
report noted the cancellation of 125 soldier settler leases for the year 
and warned Parliament that the central problem now facing the Board 
lay in determining the extent of debt to be allowed settlers before 
cancelling their leases. As Belton noted: 
the work of collection has presented many difficulties, and in 44 
cases it has been found necessary to issue warrants of distress for 
rent. This action has been taken where circumstances warranted, 
and only then when all other measures have been exhausted. Many 
deserving and industrious settlers have not been in a position to 
meet their demands and these cases have been given every 
consideration." 
Hurst had to report that collections on rent had fallen for the year and 
that he could now see no way, given present policy, of the Board being 
able to overcome the burgeoning growth in settlers' debt. The simple 
fact that the State borrowed its money at six percent only ensured the 
27 ibid. 
28 ibid. 
29 Annual report of the Department of Lands. Surveys, and Closer Settlement For 1924-25, T. J. P. P., Vol 
XCIII, 1925-26, Paper No 25. 
30 ibid. 
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continuation of such losses. The increasing accumulation of arrears, the 
high cost of administering vacated leases and the necessarily lower rates 
the Board had to offer to attract civilian tenants only underlined the 
seriousness of the continuing crisis in soldier settlement. Hurst 
foreshadowed even further losses on soldier settlement now many 
settlers were in receipt of demands for payment on recent advances. That 
persistent veneer of optimism, all too evident in earlier reports, had by 
now become very thin. "Although it cannot be claimed," wrote Hurst, 
"that soldier settlement is an unqualified success, it must he conceded 
that it has resulted in an increase in the productivity of the State 
generally."3 I Such words offered small comfort to Lyons. 
The annual report of the now Closer Settlement Board and Lands and 
Surveys Department for 1925-26 proved even more disquietening. 
Though the Federal Government had waived £262 000 of the State's debt 
on soldier settlement Hurst had to report that debt to be still rising, 32 
outstanding arrears now at a worrying £201 813. 33 But what particularly 
concerned Hurst was the "number of settlers who do not appear to make 
any attempt to keep faith with the Crown, and who trade on the public 
sentiment."34 This hard core of debtors had by now become particularly 
obvious due to the clear polarisation in the nature of the settlers' debt. 
Hurst urged the Government to take action against this 12% of settlers 
who now owed 51% of outstanding arrears, arguing that the time had 
arrived for them to: 
be made to realise that the country cannot afford to carry them any 
further, or grant more concessions than are provided under 
existing legislation, and that unless they conform to the conditions 
as laid down by Parliament, they must give way to others who will 
endeavour to meet their obligations. 35 
Such attitude had left the Board directly opposed to Belton's 
promised revaluations. Indeed the Board argued that revaluations could 
only exacerbate what was an already difficult situation, reporting "many 
31 ibid. 
32 Annual Report of the Department of Lands, Surveys, and Closer Settlement for 1925-26, 1'..1. P. P., Vol 





lessees (to be) withholding payment until it is known what the outcome 
of the revaluations is to be." 36 Better, so the Board believed, to offer 
remissions on interest and arrears and allow the genuine trier to succeed 
than to prop up those failures who must be removed. It was of course an 
attitude that placed responsibility for such failure upon the settlers 
rather than the Board, a view rejected by Belton. Such tension had 
finally led to the Board's suspension, Downie's appointment and became 
the prime cause and the prime theme of the Royal Commission of 1926. 
Belton's parliamentary report of this dispute disguised the ill-feeling 
generated by these events: 
On making investigation as to the work being performed by the 
Closer Settlement Board, I found that it was mostly in the 
direction of submitting recommendations for remission of rent 
and interest, and that £10 621 Os 10d covering 295 cases, was 
remitted. This method of meeting the difficulty was, in my 
opinion, merely palliative, and did not touch the fringe of the 
problem.37 
But if apparently bland, these words revealed the root of the dispute. 
The Board had long rejected any idea of revaluations, arguing it denied 
good business practice and, worse still, encouraged settlers to adopt a 
light-hearted attitude towards their financial obligations. That the 
Board, for most of its existence, had served Nationalist Governments, all 
resolutely opposed to any revaluations had understandably predisposed 
it to such an attitude. Having established its principles of administration 
it was now no doubt reluctant, probably on grounds of equity, to alter the 
way in which it dealt with settlers. There was though another, more 
significant factor, which lay behind the Board's position. This was its 
belief that revaluations left the resettlement scheme open to a most 
direct form of political manipulation. 
The Board had, from the scheme's beginning, been subject to such 
interference. The very act of purchasing the initial properties and their 
allocation to settlers had often been guided by the whim of political 
influence rather than responsible economic management. It was an 
36 ibid. 
37 Ministerial Statement: Minister for Lands and Works James Belton, November 1926, T. J. P. P., Vol 
XCV,1926-27, Paper No 6. 
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interference which, the Royal Commission found, had by 1923 brought 
the administration of the scheme to a point where it lacked any ability to 
deal efficiently with the settlers, to become instead an impotent arm of 
government subject to legislative whim and political pragmatism. 
The Board resented such political interference, believing it to restrict 
effective management and to create injustices within the system. In 
Hurst's view Ministerial involvement in revaluations meant many settlers 
might be denied equitable treatment not because they weren't deserving 
but because they lived in the wrong electorate. As Hurst informed the 
Royal Commission: 
The legislation does not to my mind in practice work out quite•
fairly. The Minister must of necessity, being a Member of 
Parliament, represent a constituency of about one fifth of the 
voters of the State, a House of Assembly district; he must also of 
necessity know intimately a great number of the Returned Soldiers 
in his constituency, and as self-preservation is the first law of life 
the Board has found Ministers reluctant to approve of 
• recommendations which tend to make them unpopular in their 
district. This causes real injustice because the settlers in one 
district get, as a rule, preferential treatment, and this is not fair to 
the State or the Board. 38 
Hurst's evidence to the Commission provided numerous references to 
such political influence. He referred to "one Minister (who) went so far 
as to prevent ordinary demands for rent to he sent out to Returned 
Settlers and Closer Settlement lessees in his district within three months 
of a general election"39 and claimed Belton's promised revaluations 
before the recent election to have been yet another example of such 
interference. Hurst noted: 
It is remarkable that such promises as these are invariably made 
just prior to a general election, but such promises make the 
satisfactory management of the Department an exceedingly 
difficult if not an impossible task." 
It was not a comment to soothe an already antagonistic Minister. 
Belton had long been uneasy about the administrative practices of the 
38 RC 37/1 Hurst submission to Royal Commission, p.9. 
39 ibid., p.10. 
40 ibid. 
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Board, believing they were designed more to keep the Minister at a 
distance than allow the implementation of government policy. Belton's 
analysis was largely correct. Faced with political interference, the Board 
had adopted counter practices. Before the Commission, Hurst argued 
that it was the system and not the individual Minister who had been 
responsible for the situation. 
The Board's decision to resist a general revaluation was not a 
reflection of innate contrariness on its part. Rather it suggested the 
central dilemma of the scheme. While the Board believed the success of 
soldier settlement depended upon the adoption of a business like 
approach those early Nationalist governments which had overseen the 
scheme, partly in response to an acknowledged "debt of honour" but no 
doubt with one eye to electoral advantage, perceived soldier settlement 
to be an act of public benevolence. Such differing perceptions of the 
scheme necessarily created tensions between Ministers and eir 
Departments. Belton's Ministerial activities had given little cause for 
the Board to change its opinion. 
From the moment Belton had taken office there had been antagonism 
between himself and the Board. This feeling led Belton to instruct the 
Auditor General to assist the Royal Commission in its investigations, a 
decision resulting from what he believed had been the improper 
practices on the Board's part, especially in relation to its dealings with 
advances to settlers and the writing off of any losses on stock and goods. 
Belton claimed the Board had regularly acted on such matters without 
his approval, a practice in direct contravention of all normal Ministerial 
procedures. 	Belton's complaint held the implicit suggestion such 
practice verged on the fraudulent. 	In his evidence to the Royal 
Commission Belton noted that of the 62 advances made by the Board 
during the previous seven months 53 had been made without any 
reference to him. One of these advances had involved the not 
inconsiderable sum of £500. As Belton warned "it suggests... to me that 
r1 the lax methods which have been adopted with these advances amounting 
to thousands of po4ds might lead to improper practices." 41 
Belton was furth6r irritated by what he claimed to be the lack of 
information presented to him when investigating the writing off of losses 
and was irritated that Hurst, in his submission to the Royal Commission, 
41 RC 37/1 Belton submission to Royal Commission, p.2. 
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had claimed him to be fully apprised of all necessary information in each 
case. Belton believed the correspondence, reports and investigations in 
each case were not provided. Indeed, he was able to show that in cases 
where goods had been illegally disposed of no reference was made to this 
fact and only the term "missing" was used on reports. Belton was 
particularly distressed that the police were rarely used in any cases 
where stock or goods had been listed as "missing" and pronounced 
himself certain that a greater use of the police would have seen a tighter 
more diligent response from the settlers. 
Belton was though particularly concerned to clarify the issues 
surrounding the case of Mr Smith, believing it showed there had "been no 
political interference during (his) term of office." 42 Belton was also 
clearly of the opinion that the case offered clear proof of the Board's 
deliberate intention to undermine his credibility as a Minister. It was 
indeed a potentially damaging situation for Belton, especially in light of 
Lamidey's claims, as it involved Belton's son-in-law, J. A. Hurst. On the 
Board's advice Belton had written off £321 of Smith's debt - never, so 
Belton claimed, realising that a portion of that sum was in fact owed by 
Hurst. Belton vehemently protested that if he had known about his son-
in-law's involvement he would have referred the matter to.someone else. 
He argued that his own involvement in so personal a case to be 
completely the result of Board incompetence and suggested the case 
offered personal example of the Board's dangerous inadequacies. 
Doubtless it inspired an intense bitterness on Belton's part. 
The situation was only made worse when W. N. Hurst, in attempting to 
justify the case. claimed that no adequate investigation had been made 
into the case because the then Board President, G. C. Rudge, "was not 
quite satisfied that every officer in the Department was reliable at this 
time."43 Belton was quick to note that: 
In view of the large amounts which were being collected by the 
Department, I am unable to understand why a thorough enquiry 
was not made as if any of the officers were not honest, the 
Department might have been defrauded of large sums. 44 
42 ibid ., p. 15 . 
43 ibid., p.I6. 
44 ibid . 
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Belton was convinced t he Smith case showed W. N. Hurst's claim that the 
Board " had been candid and open to Ministers and to the Audit 
Department all through, and nothing has been hidden" 45 to he fake. 
The case {.ave ready understanding of Belton's concerns. 
Belton's criticisms of the Board provoked the Public Service 
Commissioner, R. J. Meagher, to appear before the Commission. His 
defence of the Board was at least in part a scathing attack on Belton. 
Meagher claimed the Board, over a protracted period of time, had 
developed practices which were entirely consistent with the correct and 
proper administration of the settlers and entirely rejected Belton's 
claims that the Board repeatedly failed to provide sufficient 
documentation for the proper assessment of cases involving remissions 
of rent or the writing off of losses - on stock and goods. Meagher told the 
Royal Commissioners that Belton received weekly files on such matters 
from his DepartmenL though he did concede specific details were often 
omitted from such reports. But Meagher offered excuse for the Board's 
actions by arguing that the provision of full particulars would "in 
effect...mean he (the Minister) would be employed full time as is the 
Advance Clerk appointed for this particular work. 46 Meagher believed 
a Minister's responsibility was not to replicate the work of an Advance 
Clerk but to formulate new Government initiatives. Indeed, Meagher 
suggested that .Belton's decision, at this stage "to question the authority 
for granting advances, (showed) an abnormal ignorance of the 
Department over which he (was) supposed to exercise control." 47 
Meagher also rejected Belton's suggestion that the Board should have 
made greater use of the police force in the pursuit of defaulters, claiming 
settlers who illegally disposed of stock or goods rarely made money from 
their transactions. Indeed. Meagher believed that it would have been 
"an exceptional (settler who left) with a fortune.
„ 48A As well, Meagher 
believed the prosecution of such settlers would only leave their wives and 
children in a most desperate situation, a situation to which neither 
Parliament nor the average citizen could give moral support. Meagher 
also argued Belton's request to have been too harsh . a judgement of the 
45 ibid. 
46  RC 37/1 Submission of R. J. Meagher, Public Service Commissioner, p.3. 
47 ibid. 
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settlers as they, like the community in general, were composed of both 
the lawful and the lawless. It would he inequitable to treat all settlers as 
if they were of like character. After all, suggested Meagher, in a 
comment more redolent of the benevolent politician than the business-
like Board he was defending, was it not well to remember: 
that the British Empire was not built up by Plaster Saints, the 
happy-go-lucky careless dare-devil has played his part in the 
construction of things. Because we now have no need of them 
(settlers) don't let us forget what they have done in the past, and is 
the loss of stock even if it were threefold of any consequence to 
their lost limbs, wrecked bodies and nerve shattered mind." 
Meagher was at his most scathing when criticising Belton's decision to 
promise revaluations as a plank of Labor's 1925 election campaign. He 
believed such a promise, especially the decision to allow settlers to 
remain on their farms free of rent until the completion of the 
revaluations, to have: 
completely revolutionised all previous methods of dealing with 
debtors, and had this promise not been given...many of the had 
cases (and by that we mean those who can pay but won't) would 
have been finalised and their farms let to other people. 50 
Meagher was adamant that the proposed revaluations would in no way 
improve the Board's ability to deal with such "bad" cases and probably 
only serve to hamper and restrict the Board's activities in this area. 
Meagher's submission to the Royal Commission concluded with some 
observations of a general, though no less damning nature. He felt 
Belton's accusations to have shown a "narrowness of vision and personal 
vindictiveness hard to understand" 51 and called for a more constructive 
approach to the problems that continued to plague soldier settlement. 
He believed such an approach would free the Board from a political 
interference which had so long seen it to he nothing more than "the 
cockpit of political endeavour." 52 Meagher's request would only be 
partially substantiated by the findings of the Royal Commission. 
As said at outset the Royal Commission's report was tabled in late 
49 ibid. 
50 ibid., p.4. 
51 ibid., p.5. 
52 ibid. 
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September 1926. This merely made public what was known to most. 
Indeed, the Commissioners seemed somewhat apologetic, noting that the 
report "to an experienced eye, will appear superfluous, hut as to report is 
our employment, we have set forth our view of what happened." 53 The 
Commissioners were convinced from the outset "that the initial 
conception of the scheme was such that great losses of money were 
certain and that of the 2 000 men to be put on the land few could hope to 
succeed." 54 The immediate causes of such failure were found by the 
Commission to have been the high prices paid for land, stock and 
buildings; the inappropriate procedures adopted for selecting settlers 
and the consequent unfitness of many of these settlers to manage their 
farms; the intermittent political interference in the scheme's 
management and the downturn in the State's economy. But the 
Commissioners believed the primary cause of failure lay in that "wave of 
popular enthusiasm for soldier settlement on the land...which swept 
every one away at the end of the war." 55 Such public enthusiasm 
effectively pushed many men onto farms whether they were qualified or 
not 
That too high a price had been paid for land was only too evident to the 
Commission. While the Commission partially blamed such circumstance 
on the involvement of commission agents, the pressure on Government 
to purchase, the community's belief that the Government, unlike private 
purchasers, was more likely to pay higher prices for land and on the 
settlers' desire to purchase properties of their choice, it nevertheless 
believed the main cause had effectively stemmed from the character and 
background of the settlers themselves. Many properties had been 
purchased on the assumption they would have been managed by skilled 
farmers, not the unskilled, as the Commission found the majority of 
settlers to have been. The Commission argued that even if a settler had 
the necessary farming experience he often lacked the business acumen 
to manage his property effectively. As the Commission noted: 
The scheme, in effect, came to buying places from men who had 
proved that they could not work them and handing those same 
places over at prices given to successful farmers to men whose 
53 RC 37/1 Report of the Royal Commission, p.3. 
54 ibid., p.4. 
55 ibid., p.9. 
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qualifications might he anything from perfection to nothing, or 
worse. 56 
Such a situation stemmed from the Government's inadequate selection 
procedures. Indeed, the Commission placed heavy emphasis on this 
point, believing it to have been the central cause of the scheme's failure. 
As it noted, "only the selection of a man suitable in every way for each 
farm could have saved, if anything could have saved, the scheme. But the 
men were not selected at all." 57 The selection process proved to be 
simplicity itself. Soldiers wanting to take up a farm had only to approach 
prominent members of the community for testimonials, present these to 
the Government and be given a farm. Such a process implicitly 
suggested that "every soldier who wanted a farm ought to have one.."58 
The Commission held these testimonials to be worthless. They failed to 
take into account either the physical or mental capacity of the soldiers, 
their sobriety, or their farming or business skills. They provided no 
guarantee the settler was industrious or honest and made no attempt to 
ascertain whether the intending settler had capital or not. In the 
Commission's view: 
With land bought at prices fixed by the facts...we have set forth, 
and then handed to men "selected" in the fashion just described, 
nothing but calamitous failure could be possible.59 
As if this were not sufficient, the Commission found, the Government 
had made no provision to provide training to those soldiers it had 
"selected". 
While the Commission found the price of land to have been too high 
and the settlers subject to no adequate process of selection it remained 
convinced that the farms purchased were generally of a type to support a 
settler and his family, given of course that "he could (have gotten) it at a 
sufficient price, and if he had the necessary skills and strength." 6° It 
was, to say the least, a paradoxical finding. An equally paradoxical 
finding was the Commission's rejection of any suggestion that the 
involvement of Municipal Councils in land selection had led to increased 
56 ibid., p.5. 
57 ibid., p.7. 
58 ibid. 
59 ibid., p.8. 
60 ibid .. p . 7 . 
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land prices. Certainly the machinations of Robert Harvey at Cygnet and 
the comments of Francomb and A. S. Brennan reflect poorly on the 
Commission's findings at this point. 61 
The land purchased and the soldier selected the settler had now to face 
up to his financial obligations; obligations the Commission held to have 
been unreasonable, often confusing and of such an onerous nature as 
would have tested even those best of settlers. The Commission was quick 
to reject G. C. Rudge's submission to the contrary, claiming it was based 
on the idea of the perfect, rather than was so often the case, the 
imperfect settler. Indeed Rudge's desire to introduce an air of optimism 
into the proceedings was effectively squashed by the Commission's 
highly qualified concession "that success was possible, indeed probable, 
for strong,industrious, sober, skilful, and thrifty men."62 That the 
Commission believed such circumstances to have been the exception 
rather than the rule is obvious. 
The Commission having considered the causes of failure now turned its 
attention to the allocation of blame. As its investigations had largely 
exonerated the settlers, the Commission had only the roles of the Board 
and the politicians to consider. As has already been noted, with both the 
Board and Belton providing submissions which put responsibility for 
failure on the other party the Commission's role was to be more that of 
the adjudicator than the investigator. Its decision was to praise and 
condemn both parties at the same time. While fault was found on both 
sides, neither was held to have been responsible for the scheme's failure. 
The Commissioners found that from the scheme's beginning "the 
Minister, Board and officials were...faced...with the fact that to make the 
scheme a real business or political success was impossible." 63 The very 
causes of failure precluded any effective action on their part. The 
Commission believed it was at this point that "the wisest thing that could 
(have been) done was to ascertain what men had no chance of success 
and...remove them at once" 64 but found this option closed due to 
political considerations. While many settlers in their departure had 
selected themselves many remained, "asking for concessions or, in effect, 
61 See Chapter 6: "Resettlement and Political Response", pp.I29-133. 
62 RC 37/1 Report of the Royal Commission, p.I0. 
63 ibid., p.12. 
64 ibid . 
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taking them by not paying their dues under the contract."65 	The 
Commission, in imagery which clearly reflected R. J. Meagher's 
submission, considered these men tO he a very mixed lot. The problem 
the Board faced at this point was to determine between those settlers 
who were genuine triers and those who were incorrigible. It was a 
process fraught with difficulty, not the least of which lay in the attitude 
of the politicians who declared that "the scheme now it was set going 
should be benevolent rather than strictly businesslike." 66 
The Commission based its decision on two grounds. The first of these 
stemmed from its philosophical approach to the political system - the 
second was an acknowledgment of the realities of political office. The 
Commission held the essential nature of government to be one of 
benevolence, that "public affairs are not and cannot be conducted like a 
private business. ...The State cannot possibly deal with its affairs upon 
the principle that whatever pays shall be done." 67 Government, involved 
in matters of greater complexity than the mere acquisition of wealth, 
were required to reflect and act upon the attitudes of the community it 
served. The Commission held that the government, in adopting a 
benevolent attitude towards the returned settlers, had correctly assessed 
the attitude of Tasmania's community in the early 1920s. Of course at a 
more cynical level the Commission believed that: 
if a Minister..(had endeavoured) reasonably to enforce the 
Crown's rights (he) would...have lost his portfolio and perhaps his 
seat and have been replaced by someone whose benevolence went 
the full length of yielding to humbugs as well as honest...men. 68 
After all, that had been the reality of the situation. 
The Commission's discussion of the Board's role, though slightly more 
damning, nevertheless led to its exoneration. The Commission praised 
the Board for its repeated attempts to administer resettlement on 
business like lines, especially commending the efforts of the Board's 
accountant, I. H. Fielding and its then President, J. L. McGough. 
Though the Commission was prepared to concede political interference 
had frustrated such intentions it still felt the Board "could and might 
65 ibid. 
66 ibid., p.13. 
67 ibid. 
68 ibid., p.14. 
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have insisted more than (it) did upon a stricter administration of the 
scheme, 	instead 	of 	passively 	accepting 	the 	extravagantly 
undiscriminating benevolent attitude" 69 of Government. But the 
Commission conceded such a stand to have been fraught with danger, the 
future prospects of any public servant dependent upon the good offices 
of his superiors. After all, it argued, the public servant held his position 
at the Minister's discretion and while "one Minister might thank and 
praise an officer closely associated with him for a strong attitude (such 
attitude in) another...(might) awaken dangerous resentment." 70 That 
the Commission believed Belton capable of such "dangerous resentment" 
must be only too obvious. Certainly Belton's submission to the Royal 
Commission underlined such concerns. It is clear the Commission 
believed any urgings by the Board for the adoption of a more business-
like approach to the settlers would have proved at best useless, at worst 
dangerous. 
The Commission found the tension between the needs of government 
and the self-preservatory instincts of public servants had by 1923 
reduced the system to atrophy. At this point the administration 
consisted of no more than "the writing of casual letters, usually so weak 
in tone as to amount almost to invitation to the recipients to bounce the 
Department." 71 Such an attitude only encouraged settlers to further 
avoidance of their obligations and "it (seemed) that every one, Ministers, 
President, Board, Staff and Inspectors lost heart." 72 But the 
Commission believed it was also at this point that something might have 
been done to salvage the scheme. Both the government and the Board, 
having conceded failure, might have taken action to remove those 
settlers who were obviously failing. But such a move proved impossible, 
for at this point the scheme "became affected by minor, detailed and 
unjustifiable political interference, as contrasted with policy." 73 its 
administration guided more by political abuse than sound principles of 
government. And what conclusions did the Commission draw: 
On the whole we do not see why, from the safe height of our 
69 ibid. 
70 ibid., p.15. 
71 ibid.. p.14. 
72 ibid,. p.15 
73 ibid,. p.18. 
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seats...we should say that anything else was to be expected but that 
the attitude of the country should be reproduced in the 
administration of the scheme. The indications seem to us to be 
very clear. No Minister would have survived who attempted to 
administer the Soldier Settlement Scheme on a • basis of pure 
business. The party system would have settled that. It seems to us. 
to have been inevitable from the beginning that this scheme would 
be administered in such a way that the Minister in charge of it 
always would be secure against a verdict that he was guilty of 
unpopular things. But the failure of the scheme had come 
suddenly and overwhelmingly. 74 
The Commission made little comment, except in the most general of 
terms, on the bitter dispute between Belton and the Board, prepared 
instead to leave such matters to the courts and parliament. Its 
investigations at an end the Commission had now only to deliver its 
recommendations. It believed it was necessary for the Government to 
establish a new Board, to be given the same legislative protection from 
political interference as accorded the Judiciary and the Auditor 
General. Such a Board was to immediately initiate a general revaluation 
of all soldier settler properties so that the remaining difficulties of 
settlement might at last be resolved. While the Commission was 
satisfied that the present Board members were eminently qualified to 
carry out such a task it accepted the Government's proposal that the 
Commissioner of Taxes be employed instead and strongly supported 
Downie's decision to revalue properties on the basis "of what each settler 
has got from the State, not of what he has to show today." 75 While the 
Commission argued that some settlers only needed the sympathetic hand 
of government to make good it believed there were others who should be 
turned off at once. Some of these settlers had never been "Bona Fide 
settlers and (were) only dummying for a relative, and, even then, not 
paying their dues" while others were .settlers "hopelessly in 
arrears...doing no good for themselves; (and) to carry them on further 
(would be)...to postpone their insolvency and ultimately worse."76 
The Commission urged the adoption of a realistic attitude to the 
74 ibid,. p.16. 
75 ibid.. p.21. 
76 ibid,. p.19. 
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question of Ministerial control, the issue at the core of the Royal 
Commission. While conceding that "for a long time the 
Department...(had) obtained the approval of the Minister as a 
subsequent and not a precedent act" 77 the Commissioners rejected 
Belton's claims that such actions had been deliberately mischievous, if 
not at times corrupt. The Commission believed the idea of any Minister 
holding total knowledge of all areas of his portfolio to be impractical - 
perhaps even undesirable as it often meant he was unable to deal fully 
with his more important responsibilities. It behove the Minister to have 
the necessary faith in the integrity and competence of his officers as the 
strength of Government depended upon such a relationship. Of course 
the Commission's recommendation that Meagher be instructed to 
undertake a complete investigation into the Board's administration must 
have given Belton small comfort. 
The difficulty surrounding those farms which had reverted to the State 
was seen by the Commission to pose the greatest threat of all. For this 
problem the Commission could offer no suggestion - only warnings: 
If they should be rushed onto the market, they would be sold at 
much less than value. To let them on short leases would be had 
business, as the lessee would then be under a strong temptation to 
suck the life out of the farm and throw it back upon the 
Government. Long leases would be better, but, even then, there 
must be a tendency as the lease nears its end for the lessee to take 
all he can out of the land. 78 
The Government's main danger when disposing of these farms was that 
it might inadvertently create "a class of lessees with special interests 
against the Government, who might combine to enforce their demands 
by political action." 79 And so the problem would turn full circle. The 
Commission's recommendations received immediate attention from 
Government: the revaluation of settlers' properties were undertaken 
even as the Commission sat. By June 1927 a new Board, possibly more 
representative of the interests of Government and settlers, was in place 
and Meagher's inquiries had led to greater efficiencies in 




78 ibid,. p.24. 
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Commission's findings may have been short-lived, Andrew Lawson 
appointed Minister for Soldier Settlement in early 1927. 
While such changes undoubtedly provided some relief to settlers the 
problem of soldier settlement remained. The settlers still clamoured for 
further relief as the Government's financial situation continued to 
worsen. Hurst's observation "that soldier settlement is not, and never 
could be, a business undertaking"" must have offered little comfort to 
Government. The latter years of the 1920s would see . only an 
intensification of the State's difficulties with regard to soldier 
settlement. 
80 Annual Report of the Department of Lands. Surveys. and Closer Settlement For 1926-27.1. J. P. l'., Vol 




Belton's dogged determination to implement Labor's promised 
revaluations gave heart to many a struggling settler, their status as victim 
at last publicly acknowledged in the Government's offer of financial 
relief. But not all settlers were pleased by the Government's offer. 
Especially those settlers who had taken up orchards were concerned that 
the Government's offer did not go far enough. While pleased that 
revaluations were to be based on a property's productive capacity, 
rather than its purchase price, they were still worried by the 
Government's lack of assistance with both the transportation and 
marketing of fruit. More ominous still for orchardists was the 
Government's decision to cease offering advances to settlers, most 
orchardists being able to continue from one season to the next only on 
the strength of such advances. To such farmers as these revaluations 
appeared more a palliative than a solution. 
By June 1927 the process of revaluations was complete, costing £210 
000. 1 But the Government's hope that such a loss would permanently 
remove the financial incubus of soldier settlement was soon dashed. 
Settlers' arrears still stood at a disconcerting £211 277 and a further £33 
375 was written off through revaluations. The annual loss in 1926-27 
stood at a worrying £83 080. 2 Such figures convinced Hurst that the 
State's difficulties would not be solved by revaluation, even if coupled to 
a tighter administration. He believed all State efforts would prove 
useless without Commonwealth assistance. That Hurst had to report a 
staggering loss on soldier settlement of £93 941 in the following year 
merely provided impetus for such conviction. Tasmania had ,by June 
1928, suffered a total loss of 1 154 33 3 on its soldier settlement scheme. 
While revaluations had held the promise of a more prosperous future 
for both the settlers and the State the reality seems to have been 
otherwise. Between 1926 and 1927 eleven Huon settlers were forced to 
vacate their properties and the cost of soldier settlement remained 
I Annual Report of thc Department of Lands, Surveys, and Closer Settlement For 1926-27, T. J. P. P., Vol 
XCVII, 1927-28, Paper No 45. 
2 ibid. 
3 Annual report of the Department of Lands, Surveys, and Closer Settlement 1927-28, T. J. P. P., Vol XCIX, 
1928-29, paper No 30. 
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unrelenting. Despite revaluations those settlers continuing on their 
properties sank deeper into debt. Revaluations may have lowered rates 
of interest but without an income such reductions in themselves gave 
little to the settler. 
These continued difficulties forced the government to consider further 
forms of assistance to settlers. Following completion of revaluations the 
government established a new Closer Settlement Board in May :1927. 
Two members of the old Board, Hurst and P. J. Perry, retained their 
positions: Hurst continued as President. The government appointed 
Carmichael Lyne as its representativeand A. D. Cooper to represent the 
soldiers. The new Board acted immediately to address the many 
grievances, either on the Board's part or the settlers, that remained from 
revaluations. Their investigations revealed that the settlers' main 
concern now centred upon their difficulty in repaying both interest and 
capital on advances for buildings. The Board soon realised that despite 
revaluation, most settlers would still find it impossible to repay loans 
over that 25 year period allowed for under the Act. In early 1928 the 
Government altered the terms and conditions that related to the whole 
of the settlers' debt; granting a flat rental for three years on interest and 
advances, suspending arrears for the same period interest free, and 
reducing interest on land and buildings to a flat rate of 5%. The Board 
was convinced the Government's revaluations and its review, when 
coupled with the new terms and rates of interest, would ensure the 
success of the genuine trier. Such an assessment had by now become 
cliche. 
There can he no doubt the government and the Board were genuine in 
their attempts to help the remaining settlers. But such moves still failed 
to acknowledge the basic difficulty most settlers faced when attempting 
to make a living from their farms. As the government lacked either the 
capacity or the initiative to help settlers market their produce many no 
doubt came to regard such offers of assistance as more of a symbolic 
gesture than a practical aid. Varying the rates of interest did little to 
ensure a settler received a reasonable return for his efforts. 
Certainly this was the continued experience of those men who had 
taken up orchards in the Huon. The vagaries of the weather and the 
export markets ensured their existence remained generally desperate . - if 
not impossible. Indeed the 1926 and 1927 seasons proved the worst yet 
for these settlers, Inspector G. Edwards in 1926 reporting "another bad 
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season owing to the coal strike in England, (with) many settlers receiving 
accounts instead of cheques for fruit shipments." 4 Inspector J. W. R. 
Cairns reported "the returns coming to hand (to he) very poor, in some 
cases the grower being in debt. With the exception of those who sent the 
larger portion of their crop f. o. h. the season is disastrous, and I feel 
greatly concerned over the position of some of our settlers." 5 
Cairns's fears were shared by the Huon branch of the R. S. L. In 
September 1926 it held a special meeting to discuss the effect of such a 
ruinous season on its members. One returned man told the meeting that 
after having paid for his freight and labour he had received a paltry 
return of £5.18s, a return that ensured his position would he hopeless 
now that he was required to pay for spray and manure for the coming 
season. Indeed, the meeting believed the situation would remain 
impossible for most orchardists until the Government acted to ease the 
financial burden involved in the marketing of their fruit. All offers of 
extended loans or further advances were rejected as it was held such 
measures merely added to the overall level of a settler's debt. What was 
needed, so it was argued, was a mechanism to catch those speculators in 
the industry who "wedged (their) bloated carcase in between the 
auctioneer and the distributor." 6 The orchardists believed they had 
little hope of success unless the Government acted immediately to 
remedy their grievances. 
Whatever the government did, it was too late for some. In November 
1926 Cyril Batchelor from Cradoc wrote to the Board to surrender his 
property. Facing mounting debt and at the mercy of what he considered 
to be an unfair marketing system he had reached the end: 
Last year through taking notice of Mr Thomas' reports (the fruit 
Inspector) I shipped all fruit to England on consignment; result, 
bankruptcy. No help after several applications. Unable to stay on 
property and do necessary work. The crop showing this year will 
not he worth £20. What can a person do in an unequal contest of 
this description. I will expect your Inspector Mr Cairns to take 
4 Annual Report of thc Department of Lands. Surveys, and Closer Settlement ior 1925-26, T.J. P. P., 
Vol XCV, 1926-27, Paper No 28. 
5 ibid. 
6 Ihron Times, September 14 1926. 
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over property at or on January 15 1927. 7 
The 1927 season proved wickedly ironical. Growers, blessed by a 
generous growing season, had picked a bumper crop. It was to prove 
their undoing. As Cairns despairingly reported: 
orchardists have had very large crops, and consequently low prices 
asked, with the exception of a few who sold f. o. b. are having a 
disastrous season. English returns up to date are low, and 
interstate markets are returning very low prices. 8 
By 1927 it had become clear to the Tasmanian government that the 
continuing losses on soldier settlement still remained a significant threat 
to the economic viability of the State. Hurst, in his annual report, 
informed Parliament that unless the Commonwealth was prepared to 
offer a greater level of assistance to the State then soldier settlement 
would continue as a mill stone around the taxpayer's neck. 9 It was a 
situation not unique to Tasmania. Every Australian state, to a greater or 
lesser extent, was experiencing difficulties akin to Tasmania's. The 
matter was the main subject of a conference of Commonwealth and State 
Ministers held in Sydney in July 1927m  following which the 
Commonwealth appointed Justice Herbert Pike to inquire into the 
administration and financial difficulties that States faced over such 
settlement and to recommend "the principles upon which a final 
adjustment in respect of losses shall be made with the States:" 
George Herbert Pike was an apt choice for the position. Born in 
Hobart in 1866 he had left with his parents for Sydney in 1883. There he 
had worked in the survey branch of the Department of Lands while 
studying law part time. Admitted to the N.S.W. Bar in 1892, he decided 
to specialise in land law, no doubt a reflection of his earlier interest in 
surveying. In 1921 he was appointed first judge of the N.S.W. Land and 
Valuation Court and in 1929, sole Royal Commissioner for the 
Commonwealth Government's inquiry into soldier settlement 
7 AB19/28/691. 
8 Annual Report of the Department of lands, Surveys. and Closer Settlement For 1927-28, "op. cit." 
9 ibid. 
10 Ministerial Statement of the Minister for Lands, Works, and Agriculture, and Minister Controlling 
Forestry. T. J. P. P., Vol XCIX 1928-1929, Paper No 17.. at p.4. 
Ii Report On Losses Due to Soldier Settlement By Mr. Justice Pike, C. P. P.. General Session 1929. Vol 11, 
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losses. 12 
In January '1928 Pike journeyed to Hobart to investigate Tasmania's 
resettlement scheme. While the government, the Board and individual 
settlers happily offered evidence the R. S. L., for reasons unstated, 
declined to participate. Pike's investigations determined that of the 
original 1 976 settlers soldiers settled in Tasmania only 777 or, 39%, now 
remained on their properties. Only Queensland had suffered a loss that 
came near Tasmania's and there some 60% of settlers still remained on 
their farms. Pike found the total loss to Tasmania on soldier settlement 
to have been £1 321 169 of which the Commonwealth, having already 
contributed £546 688, should now pay 113 897 as a final reckoning. 
While Pike was impressed by the fair and reasonable nature of the 
state's resettlement scheme, especially the generous nature of its 
revaluations and concessions, he was nevertheless concerned by what he 
considered to be the settlers lack of an adequate living area. Indeed, 
Pike considered this to he the main problem that the remaining settlers 
had to face. While such a claim dir!5.--rztly contradicted the findings of the 
1926 Royal Commission, both at least agreed that the prices paid for 
properties had been at largely inflated valuations, though Pike found the 
cause of such a situation to have been primarily the result of the State's 
lack of arable land rather than any untoward interference on any 
vendor's part. Pike was also convinced that the State's problems in this 
area were suddenly compounded by the immediate downturn in its 
economy, noting that: 
The large losses in (Tasmania) are largely due to the heavy fall in 
prices asked for hay, potatoes, peas and oats, and to the fact that 
to a large extent small cultivated farms and orchards were 
purchased for soldiers, and were therefore, liable to depreciate 
rapidly if not farmed and cultivated in the best possible manner. 13 
Such a finding only added considerable urgency to Tasmania's claims for 
relief. 
In late May 1929 Nationalist Premier J. C. McPhee, who had come to 
office following Lyons's defeat in the 1928 election, travelled to Sydney 
for final discussions with Pike before the latter delivered his 
12 Australian Dictionary of Biography, Melbourne: Melbourne University Press, Vol 11 1988, pp. 231- 
232. 
13 Pike, "op. cit.", p.19. 
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recommendations to the Commonwealth Government. At that meeting 
Pike sought specific assurances from McPhee that he would provide 
Tasmania's remaining soldier settlers with adequate living areas, Pike 
utterly convinced the remaining settlers had little hope of success 
otherwise. Pike evidenced his claim by reference to the Campania Estate 
which he believed provided the settlers with only 1/3 of the land deemed 
necessary for a living. 
Pike's request for an expansion of the settlers' "living area" initially 
met strong opposition from McPhee, the latter more prepared to argue 
the causes of failure than the future direction of government policy. 14 
Indeed, McPhee's reluctance underlined that continued Nationalist 
inability to accept responsibility, in part or in whole, for the failure of 
resettlement, and clearly marked a return to that long held Nationalist 
belief thaf factors other then early Nataionalist stewardship had led to 
the scheme's failure. It was a position entirely consistent in a party that 
held itself to be the "natural" managers of Tasmania - a party that 
believed itself to epitomise all that was financially prudent and 
responsible in administration. But any reluctance on McPhee's part was 
quickly overcome by Pike's threat that no federal monies would be 
forthcoming until McPhee acceded to the request. As Pike told McPhee 
"unless I can report to the Commonwealth that the State has undertaken 
to do this,...I cannot recommend the Tasmanian debt be considered." 15 
McPhee's reaction was instantaneous: 
You can take it from me we will put that matter in hand at once. 
We will...see that it is done. It will be an exhaustive examination 
of the whole position, and each man will be given a living area. I 
cannot see any great difficulty, because things have come to the 
stage when we have to see that these men are properly settled. 16 
14 The transcript of this meeting between McPhee and Pike paints Mcphee in a poor light: Pike clearly amused 
by thc Premier's comments. That McPhee should admit to only a cursory reading of the report of the 1926 
Royal Commission into soldier settlement. indeed one might doubt he ever read it, gave Pike cause for 
concern. McPhee's comment that "in Tasmania the initial development of the soldier settlement scheme was 
unfortunate, to use a modified expression" suggests he felt powerless in the face of those difficulties 
surrounding the whole question of soldier settlement. Such an attitude doubtless inspired small confidence in 
the remaining settlers. 
15 PD1/469/176/3/29, 22 May 1929. 
16 ibid. 
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At the end of June 1929 Pike received yet another deputation from 
Tasmania, this time from two Board members, Hurst and Fielding, 17 the 
latter a temporary replacement for Carmichael Lyne who had died. 
Hursl. and Fielding had travelled to Sydney in the hope Pike might 
consider a further Tasmanian claim of;663 417 on soldier settlement 
leases as a result of the government's recent decision 18 to grant settlers 
a flat rental and write off the total value of houses and other depreciable 
improvements on resettlement properties. The claim met with little 
sympathy from Pike who believed "an allowance of130 000 ... would 
fairly meet any possible claims." 19 Pike told Hurst and Fielding he was 
convinced that after the government had provided the settlers with an 
adequate living area their futures should be assured. Hurst remained 
unconvinced. 
In his report to Parliament for 1928-29 Hurst advised the government 
to reject Pike's final recommendation believing it would penalise 
Tasmania by approximatelyV 770 a year. Hurst felt Pike's offer failed 
to acknowledge that "Tasmania, as one of the poorest of the states, (had 
been) forced to borrow more largely per head of population than...her 
richer neighbours." 2° It effectively meant Tasmania would be forced to 
carry losses on soldier settlement in perpetuity. The Government chose 
to ignore Hurst's advice. For the Commonwealth soldier settlement was 
at an end. 
By 1930 only 49 of the 158 soldiers (31%) who had taken up properties 
in the Huon remained on their orchards. A further seven of these would 
surrender their leases by 1935. 21 The transfer of soldier settlement 
leases to the Agricultural Bank in 1931 and further revaluations in the 
early 1930s offered some relief to those who remained, but their 
continued existence proved a struggle. What explanation can be offered 
for their survival? The task is not an easy one and no certainty can be 
placed upon the findings which are at best generalizations. The deeper 
truth, no doubt, lies hidden in the daily experiences of the settlers 
17 Pike, "op. cit.", p.I4. 
18 See p.209 of thesis. 
19 Pike, "loc. cit." 
20  Annual Report of the Department of Lands. Surveys, and Closer Settlement For 1928-29,T. J. P. P., Vol CI 
1929-30, Paper No 39. 
21 Figure derived from AI319 files on settlers in the IIuon. 
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themselves, experiences to which we no longer have access. In many 
ways the successful settlers proved the mirror image of the unsuccessful. 
However there were at least five potentially significant differences 
between the successes and "failures": 22 
(1) No successful settler took up his property before 1919. These 
eleven pre 1919 settlers presumably abandoned their farms because of 
ill health and/or the Board's purchases of doomed properties. 
(2) Though the figures must necessarily be treated with great caution 
they indicate that 32% of successful settlers compared to only 8% of 
unsuccessful settlers, purchased their properties from relatives. The 
figures on both sides were almost certainly higher, hut the differential 
probably operated in favour of the survivors. There were definite 
advantages for any settler who purchased his property from a parent or 
relative. Such purchases often provided a settler with ready access to 
much needed capital, derived from the sale of the family property. 
Indeed, in many cases evidence suggests families saw resettlement as 
merely an opportunity tc pass on a property to a son while gaining 
financial advantage from the transfer. In purchasing a propertry from 
the family a settler also gained access to vital knowledge of the property, 
to a ready source of unpaid, or at least cheap labour, to shared plant and 
equipment and likely assistance in the marketing of their produce. 
(3) Some 41% of successful settlers invested personal capital in the 
purchase of their property. Only 12% of the unsuccessful settlers were 
able or willing to make such an investment. 
(4) The average size of a settler's property in the Huon was a mere 8.3 
acres. While the unsuccessful settlers tended to take up properties 
which were nearer to this average the successful tended to hold larger 
properties. However this difference only reflects the average: any case 
by case analysis renders the situation more complicated and less certain. 
(5) While it would be impossible to provide any specific figures it is 
clear that the orcharding experiences of the successful settlers was 
notably greater than that of the unsuccessful. Certainly the majority 
(63%) of successful settlers claimed to have had long experience of 
either orcharding or farming whereas only (43%) of the unsuccessful 
claimed such experience, and then often as a labourer rather than as an 
owner. Of course many settlers in applying for properties no doubt 
22 ibid . , 
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provided information which they believed would enhance their prospects 
and so their claims must be taken with some caution. The Royal 
Commission's observations on settler's testimonials underlines the need 
for such caution. Nevertheless a close study of pertinent files does 
indicate a corelation between experience and success, confirming 
common-sense assumptions. 
While the above points neatly fit the profile of the successful settler 
which might be drawn from both the Tasmanian government's Royal 
Commission and Pike's Commonwealth report, they still somehow 
remain inherently unsatisfactory in offering a complete explanation for a 
settler's success or failure. Indeed, any discussion upon the failure of 
soldier settlement that concentrates too closely on the settlers' 
experiences runs the risk of transferring responsibility for the scheme's 
failure to the settler when clearly it lay with state and federal 
governments. The settlers were political pawns, and as such their natural 
fate was "failure"; they were the victims of the situation, rather than 
masters of their fates. The Tasmanian Soldier Settlement Scheme was 
fundamentally flawed from its very conception. As A. G. Ogilvie noted 
in 1926 "like a crippled child, it never had a chance."23 Just as these 
soldiers were used as pawns in War, so they were in the politics of peace. 
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